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ABSTRACT 
Hegemony and Urban Space: The case of the Turkish Capital Ankara 
Cites are social products resulting from conflicting interests. Urban space is produced, 
reproduced and transformed through the action of interest-driven human agency who 
strive for different outcomes. Some see urban space as a living place, whereas some 
others perceive it as a source of speculative gaining or use it as an arena of 
representation for a particular identity. While actors change urban space with their 
strateg eII gies, schemes and projects, they do so always under a sp c fie structura context. In this respect, the relationship between strategy and structure stands as one of the basic 
problems of urban social and political analysis. The thesis develops a strategic relational 
approach to the state and the urban question which overcomes some of the difficulties of 
the structure- agency nexus, and applies it to the study of first the Turkish state, and then 
to the analysis of its capital Ankara. 
Having shown that the dominant state-centred perspectives in Turkey analyses the state 
and the urban question around a misleading duality, such as the 61ite versus the masses 
and the state versus civil society, it is argued that a relational understanding of the state 
and the urban question which overcomes the dualities, between the society and the state, 
is the more productive. 
A study of the Turkish state and its capital Ankara is hardly possible without referring to 
the Kemalist project. For this reason, the Kemalist project is placed at the centre of 
analysis and argued that Kemalism needs to be seen as a bourgeois revolution with nation 
state formation as its most distinctive aspect . 
Having shown that the Kernalist project 
denied the real communities that were a part of Ottoman tradition, in favour of an 
imagined community which was thought to be Western-looking, secular and modern, it is 
revealed that the most important spatial dimension of this denial was the rejection of the 
Imperial capital, Istanbul, in favour of a small Anatolian town, Ankara. 
As a symbol, arena and means of this transformation, Ankara exhibited all the 
contradictions of this refusal in the form of a duality between the old town inherited from 
the Ottoman period, and the new town which was built by the republican regime. The 
duality took a new form and gained new dimensions after the Second World War with 
the massive population influx into the city from the rural areas, as the emerging squatters 
at the outskirts of the city outnumbered the established population of the city in a short 
space of time. 
This case study of Ankara dwelled upon the view that although the cultural and identity 
dimensions, which are the central concerns of the mainstream literature, are important 
ones in the understanding of the development of the city, economic and material interests 
are central to an exhaustive understanding of the soclo-spatial change the c ty underwent, 
as Ankara has not been only a capital but also a capitalist' city where exchange value 
overrides other forms of value. 
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INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Cities are battle fields of conflictino, social forces and interests. They are products of t) I 
conflict, struggle and negotiation between different actors employing different In 
objectives, strategies and projects towards urban space. While some groups conceive 
urban space as a living place, the others see it in terms of money and profit making. For 
some others, it is a theatre of identity. Often, these projects are irreconcilable and clash 
with each other. It is possible to see urban space as an outcome of these conflicts and 
struggles. 
In these struggles, capital cities hold a specific place as political command centres. 
Because of their strategic positions, they become an important arena of hegemonic 
struggles. In this thesis, my objective is to study the Turkish capital, Ankara. as an arena 
of struggles for hegemony between 1923 and 1980. 
As is well known, Ankara became the capital of a newly founded Turkish Republic 
when it replaced the imperial capital, Istanbul in 1923. The relocation of the capital to 
Ankara was not an ordinary decision as every new social and political order tends to 
create its own space as a part of its hegemonic strategy. As in other cases such as St 
Petersburg and Brasilia, the decision marked a break with the past and began a new 
period which was characterised by the formation of the Turkish nation state. After 
having becoming a new capital, Ankara immediately turned to be the most important 
socio-spatial element and laboratory for the Kernalist project, where the preliminary 
models of the new nation state were produced. 
Whereas the city was conceived as a central element in a new modem and Western- 
looking model of society, the actual city, the modernising elite found in their arrival did 
not quite fit into this ideal. The clash between the real communities and the imagined :D 
one was inevitable in the decades following, the relocation of the capital in Ankara. The 
conflict was not only cultural. The changing fortune of the city created a condition for 
speculative gains around the urban land and who would appropriate the emerging rent 
became another conflict-ridden issue in the city during the 1920s and the 1930s. 
In the wake of the World War H, the city began to face another crisis as it become one 
of the most attractive targets for a migrant population. In a short time the city, which 
was designated as a model of the Western type of modernity, turned to be a city with the 
highest number of squatters with seventy percent of its population living in these illegal 
dwellings. 
Such a dramatic trajectory deserves a rigorous examination and there has been 
considerable literature from various perspectives which gives an account of the Z: ý
development of Ankara. In my view, however, this literature has at least two major 
weaknesses. 
The first is that it suffers from empiricism. That is, most of the work on Ankara does not 
go beyond providing a chronological account of the events in the development of the 
city. This does not mean, however, that the existing literature, has not been affected 
implicitly or explicitly by any theoretical current. I will claim that, although their 
concepts are not employed systematically, there is a considerable influence of the 
Chicago school and Weberian perspectives on the study of Ankara. Moreover, we might 
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talk of a peculiar marriage of the Chicago school and a Weberian perspective as will be 
seen in the course of the thesis. 
The clearest manifestation of the impact of these perspectives, which is the second 
weakness of current literature, is the perception of the major conflict in and over the city 
as that of an elite-mass confrontation. While the Kernalist elite was seen as the major 
driving force behind the modernist project towards the city, the native population of the 
city and the migrant population were seen as the masses whose interest was, by and 
large, in contradiction with that of the elite. Although the recent debate on this issue has 
turned to focus on a dualism between the state and civil society; the main concem 
remained the same. 
Accordingly, two major positions emerges out of this perception. The first one, the state 
centred view has attributed a progressive role to Kernalism and the Kernalist elite in 
creating a modem city. The failures of the Kernalist project have been seen as due to 
deviations from the principle of the project. The second view, that is, the civil society- 
centred view, considers the Kernalist project as an elitist one in that it excluded the non- 
modem sections of the society from its project. In turn. its failures are explained with 
reference to this exclusionary elitist strategy. 
Given these debates, it is not surprising that the literature has been dominated by the 
Weberian and Chicago school perspectives as the former takes the state as its home C 
domain while the latter focuses upon community. In turn, the main debate on the 
development of Ankara has become predominantly politico-culturalist in that the main 
4 
focus is on the creation of a modem city though the meaning of modernism depends on C Cý 
the side taken.. 
Unfortunately, the debate developing around the dualism between the state/elite and 
civil society/masses confuses as much as it clarifies in the sense that It focuses upon a 
very particular aspect of the Ankara experience, that is its cultural dimension, and 
excludes the economic material dimension of the development of the city. And 
wherever, this dimension is taken into consideration its treatment is unsatisfactory since 
the political conflicts are only conceptualised in elite\rnass terms. It is so unusual to find 
a reference to the class formation and class conflict in order to provide a macro level 
framework for the debate. It is at this point that the absence of a political economy 
perspective which would provide a macro level perspective by drawing upon the r: ) 
economic and class dimensions of urban conflict and social change becomes apparent. 
This thesis is an attempt in this direction. It aims to introduce a political economy 
perspective to the debate on the development of Ankara. While the main approach of the 
thesis does not refuse the importance of certain aspects of the existing debate such as the 
role played by the state in the development of Ankara and the conflicts between the state 
elite and the so called masses, its main emphasis is upon the conflicts emerging out of 
the distribution of material economic interests and class formation in the city. It argues 
that without taking these dimensions into account. the culturalist focus becomes not 
only one sided but also distorted. 
5 
An Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter I reviews the literature on state theory and urban social theory. After discussing 
the main theories of the state and the urban, it criticises the main theories in both fields 
and shows their weaknesses. 
Chapter H is an attempt to employ a more synthetic framework to the study of the state 
and the urban. Drawing upon Gramsci and Jessop, a strategic relational approach is 
defended in both fields to overcome the main weaknesses of existing theories. Such a 
perspective would allow one to study the projects and strategies of different classes and 
social forces to form hegemony at both national and urban levels. 
Chapter III explores the trajectory of the Kernalist project. It rejects those interpretations 
which conceives Kemalism as a project which. either represents a complete break with 
the Ottoman heritage to form a modem, Western looking society, or identifies a t-I 
continuity in terms of state tradition. Rather, it proposes a reading of Kemalism which 
conceptualises it as a particular entry into capitalist modernity. In that sense, Kemalism 
is seen, not only a nation state formation project in a Weberian sense, but also as a 
project aimed at forming a capitalist economy. In this sense, it is a class-based 
hegemonic project alongside its national popular elements and in line with the changing Z-- 
balance of class forces the hegemonic position of the Kernalist project has been 
redefined. 
6 
Chapter IV turns to the urban level and examines the trajectory of urbanisation in 
Turkey and attempts at periodising this urban experience. It defines three distinctive 
periods on the basis of the changing social base and political forces in Turkish cities. 
The first period (1923-50) is characterised by the urbanisation of the state whereas, the 
second period (1950-80) is distinguished by the urbanisation of labour power. The third 
period (1980- and after) is a period dominated by the urbanisation of capital. Although 
the paper proposes three distinctive periods characterised by three different forces, it 
does not assume sharp breaks between consecutive periods. Rather, it employs an 
approach which sees each round of urbanisation as a layer and hence allows certain 
continuities in interaction between layers. 
The following two chapters comprises a case study of Ankara between 1923 and 1980. 
In other words, the case of Ankara is studied with reference to first two periods defined 
above, namely the urbanisation of the state and the urbanisation of labour-power. The au 
study of the last period was not included in the case study partly due to the fact that, 
comparing to the last period, the first two periods present an interesting case in terms of 
the problematic this thesis set out to tackle, that is, the so-called elite versus masses or 
the state versus civil society dichotomy. 
Chapter V focuses on the first round of urbanisation, that is, characterised by the 
urbanisation of the (nation)state. It is shown that in the case of Ankara, this period can 
be studied as not only the urbanisation of the state but also the middle class. By making t: l 
the state and the middle class the key elements of the hegemonic bloc, their project 
is 
It) 
discussed with reference to the establishment of middle class hegemony in the city. 
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Chapter VI examines the second round of urbanisation which is characterised by the 
urbanisation of labour power. The main focus in this chapter is on the challenge faced 
by middle class hegemony in the city due to the rapid migration to the city starting from 
the mid- 1940s. While the fate of middle class hegemony in the city is discussed in the 
face of the massive population influx of the rural population into the city, the main 
emphasis is placed upon the projects of the latter groups vis a vis the middle classes and 
the state in the city. 
The concluding section provides an overall evaluation of the city in relation to different 
rounds of urbanisation and projects emerged each round. 
Method 
The research on which this thesis is based is mainly a qualitative one The data examined 
includes: 
memoirs, especially for the first period where various memoirs exist for leading 
names of the Kemalist regime such as Ismet Inonu, Halif Rifki Atay. 
Planning documents and the Planning Committee Reports. As we shall see there are 
three distinctive planning attempt between 1923 and 1980, and each attempt at 
planning provides important clues for the hegemonic projects and forces of the each 
period. This requires a discursive reading of these documents and reports. 
* Daily newspapers: which provide one of the major sources for the thesis. It is worth 
noting that the newspapers did not serve only as a source of information for a 
particular event but also as a source of discursive analysis of a certain periods. Given 
that it is a tradition in Turkey that newspapers have served as a forum in which 
8 
leading politicians and bureaucrats, whom I call organic intellectuals of alternative 
hegemonic projects, air their views, they provided important insight into the b 
understanding of the projects of different periods. The newspapers traced and used in 
the case study of Ankara are the followings: 





o Publications of State Statistical Institute (SSI) regarding population, employment and C) 
other social indicators. 
Municipal records, research reports and publications including planning documents. 
9 Secondary sources (articles\books\reports etc), which were not only employed as a 
source but also used critically to reveal the failures and shortcomings of the existing 
literature on Ankara. 
Last point I would like to make is that all these data and information gain meaning 
within a theoretical framework. Despite the hegemonic view that there is no superiority 
among alternative perspectives as they are discoursively constituted, my contention is 
that reality still stands as the final reference point in the judgement of alternative 
perspectives. It is the claim and objective of this thesis to make a contribution to the 
understanding and change of the reality with which it deals. 
CHAPTERI: 
THEORIES OF THE STATE AND THE URBAN: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
9 
CHAPTER 1: THEORIES OF THE STATE AND THE URBAN: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
I. L Introduction 
Urban areas are one of the most prominent battle fields of conflicting interests. These 
struggles take place in and over urban space. Whilst urban space is subjected to these 
struggles, the very same social forces behind them, consciously or unconsciously, 
produce, reproduce and transform it. In this sense, these struggles in and over space are 
also about power. To control space, it is necessary to struggle for power. The converse is 
also true. As space is a container of social power, any struggle to change power relations 
must also dominate space (Lefebvre 1979). Thus, various interests, with different 
purposes, of different classes, groups and individuals, constitute the material basis of 
urban social and spatial change. 
In capitalist societies, the state is at the centre of this conflict-ridden process. Especially 
in the urban context, the maintenance of the formal and substantial integrity of territory 
is one of the main commonly accepted functions of the state. Furthermore, it can also 
facilitate certain cohesion to these conflicting agents by virtue of its authority. In spite of 
the centrality of the state to urban process, it is difficult to claim that we have enough 
knowledge of it. In my view, such a vagueness creates important problems in urban 
studies as well as in other fields, since every study, implicitly or explicitly, is based on a 
conception of the state. In the following section I examine the existing literature on ZD Cý 
state theory. Then, I go on to evaluate the repercussions of each theory of the state for 
urban studies. 
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L U. Theories of the State 
I expose different conceptions of the state under two main headings: state centred and 
society centred perspectives, even if sometimes it is difficult to include certain 
approaches especially within the society centred approach. 
1.11.1. Society-Centred Approach(es) 
There is a common assumption of various perspectives within the society-centred 
approach that makes calling them society-centred possible; any rigorous analysis of the 
state must refer beyond the state, to the society as a primary source for explanation. Yet, 
apart from this starting point, there are important differences and incompatibilities 
between them. In the plenitude of approaches, I consider only three of them: the 
I instrumentalist' approach, which seeks to describe the power and influence of the ruling 
class in the operation of the state structure; the 'structuralist' approach, which examines 
the state as an element of capitalist formation; and the capital logic perspective, which 
describes the state as a functionary of capital. 
In the instrumentalist view, state policies and interventions are explained with reference 
to the interests of the dominant class. According to Miliband (1977) basic objectives of 
the state are the maintenance of the class system and the development of social 
institutions to serve capitalist interests. Through the documentation of the links between 
the state 61ite and the ruling class in terms of cultural and material affinities, it is argued 
that the state acts as an agent of the ruling class. These attempts, however, have never C) 
clarified whether such a link, hence direct participation of the ruling class in the state, is 0 
a cause or effect. Apart from this flaw and wide variation in the social background of the 
state 611te, there is no room to consider the effects of the state apparatus on the society in 
the absence of any distinction between class power and state power. The instrumentalist 
approach fails to identify the structural elements of the society as well. 
The structuralist approach begins to analyse the state by rejecting the instrumentalist 
view on the ground that the state is structurally rather than contingently capitalist. Direct 
control of the capitalist class in the state apparatus is not necessary. Instead, the state 
performs certain functions due to an objective relation with the overarching social 
formation. Thus, functions of the state are broadly determined by the structure of the 
society rather than the agencies occupying positions of power. For Poulantzas (1973), 
the state is not an autonomous entity, but reflects the balance of power among classes 
and their fractions. This facilitates a (relative) autonomy to the state vis-a-vis the classes. 
Hence, the state may not always act instrumentally for the dominant class. Nevertheless, 
in the end, the state preserves the long-term dominance of the ruling class due to the its 
structural determination. Even if such a conception seems to provide a certain base for 
the analysis of the state in its own right through the concept of relative autonomy, its 
autonomy makes no difference in the long run due to the structural determination of the 
state. 
In my view, the structural determination of the state and state as a distillation of class 
struggle are two different and contradictory conceptions whose relation is not made 4 n- Ln 
clear within structurali st- state theory. Despite its more sophisticated foundation, there 
are other criticisms offered. It is argued that the structuralist view is unable to take into 
12 
consideration the historical evolution of the state apparatus. Thus, it Is also unable to 
distinguish between expected and actual behaviours of the state. 
Capital logic approach argues that the celebrated dichotomy between instrumentalist and Cý 
structuralist views is false and misleading since both approaches simply reiterate the 
connection between class and the state. Against such an orientation, they examine the 
separation of the economic and the political (Holloway and Piccotto 1978 p. 14). Such a 
separation is vital in the provision of the general conditions of capital accumulation and 
reproduction. Because, they go on to argue, no individual or competing capital can 
ensure the reproduction of the whole. In this sense, their main focus is on the link 
between capital accumulation and the state. They conceive the capitalist state as a 
political support of the capital accumulation process, its form as a corresponding 
political repercussion of the current developmental stage of production and its functions 
as corresponding to the needs of class domination. In this sense, their basic concern is 
the derivation of the state from the rules of functioning of capital. Despite the important 
insights of this approach, it bears important functionalist connotations. Also, it has an 
inherent tendency towards reducing the political to an epiphenomenon of the economy. 
Further, there is also an important problem in terms of the insensitivity to the historical 
evaluation of the state apparatus. 
In sum, it is impossible to argue that there is a comprehensive approach with regard to C I, -
the realm of the state within a society-centred understanding. As Jessop, rightly points c 
out there are two different, but by no means incompatible, points of view: capital and 
class-theoretical approaches. The class -theoretical approach emphasises the agency 
aspect of capitalist societies at the expense of structural aspects. It examines the specific 
13 
conjunctures, hegemonic struggles, balance of forces, different forms of struggles to 
understand the change in the form and functions of the state. The c api tal -theoretical 
approach, on the other hand, focuses on the laws of the capital accumulation and its 
internal dynamics. In other words, contrary to the class-theoretical approach, the 
emphasis is on the structural aspects of the capitalist mode of production. Yet, neither of 
them has paid enough attention to the state itself and the state's own logic or struggles. b 
State-centred approach(es) are important in this regard. 
1.11.11. State-Centred Approaches 
Contrary to society-centred approaches, the main defining feature of state-centred 
approaches is their claim that the state has its own interests apart from the interests of 
other social forces and that they are quite different from the interests of other agencies. 
Separating the state and society in this way, they focus on bureaucratic politics and 
organisational aspects of the state as a power container. In their recent study, Bringing 
the State Back In, 'Skocpol and her colloquies have developed two different versions of 
state-centred theorisation. 
In the first version, it is argued that the state has its own special interests by virtue of its 
insertion into an international order as well as its unique responsibilities in the 
protection of internal order. In this sense, the state should be considered an independent 
variable rather than a derivative of the economic level. There are rules and procedures 
peculiar to the politics as well as agencies such as politicians, managers, and the 
military. In this sense, the state consists of an institutional ensemble and agencies. It is 
clear that there is a reversal of the society-centred explanations. The strong emphasis of 
14 
the society-centred approaches is replaced by the emphasis on the state. Hence, 
explanations run from the state to the society. 
In the second version, however, there is a loose conception of the state and considerable 
difference from the first one. Here the state is considered as 'potentially autonomous' 
rather than necessarily autonomous. It is stated that when the state is autonomous it 
doesn't necessarily mean that the state can gain and realise this autonomy in all 
circumstances. The degree of autonomy depends on its instruments and resources, and 
these are seen as intervening variables between the formulation of the state goals and 
their subsequent implementation and the material resources controlled by the state. For 
this reason, the autonomy of the state is a concrete and contingent issue rather than an 
abstract and universal fact. It depends on certain conditions and changes from time to 
time (Skocpol 1985). 
There are many vague points in both formulations. It is, for instance, not clear whether 
they are rejecting the society-centred approach entirely or whether they are suggesting a C 
combination between the state and society-centred approaches. Furthermore, there is no 
consideration of what factor(s) determine the resources available to the state. In my 
view, the essential value of the state-centred approach is in its emphasis on the internal 
structure, mechanisms and processes of the state, as well as its insistence on the 
differential interests of the state's actors. Nevertheless, when the state-centred approach 
starts to emphasise the other aspects of the society, the limitations of its framework 
begins to appear. By the same token, the essential value of the society-centred approach 
can be seen in its emphasis on the external environment of the state. Nevertheless, it, 
too, seems to loose its power when it moves towards the internal domain of the state 
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(see Friedland and Alford t985). Yet, the problems in the analysis of the state become 
acute due to the lack of communication between different perspectives. In the following 
section, I will examine the state of the art in urban studies with respect to the very same 
issue. 
L Ill. Theories of the Urban 
The reflections of capital and class-logic approaches to the society and the state are quite 
evident in urban studies. I examine the capital-logic view in the case of Harvey (1978, 
1982,1985a, 1985b, 1989), the class (action) theoretical view in the case of Castells 
(1983,1989) and the state-centred view with reference to Pahl (1975,1977). Such a 
review, of course, doesn't cover all approaches in the field, nor represents all those 
studying similar perspectives. But, they represent most mature extensions of each above 
mentioned approach in urban studies. I expose and evaluate these perspectives around 
three main headings: the conception of the urban, the agency- structure dialectic and the 4: ) 
state in the urban context. 
1. Ill. 1. The Conception of the Urban 
In their alternative conceptions of the urban, Harvey emphasises the specificity of urban 
process in the circulation process of capital, whereas Castells locates the consumption 
and struggles around it to the focus of the urban. Pahl, on the other hand, puts the urban Zýý 
managers to the centre of the urban system. I set out and evaluate their positions in 
relation to the specificity question. 
16 
Central to Harvey's approach is the idea that the urbanisation of capital, the reproduction 
of labour power and the formation of an urban consciousness can be explained through 
the logic of capital in general, and specifically in the circulation process. In his relatively 
early works (1976,1978), Harvey pointed out two points of contact between the capital 
accumulation process and urban process; in the secondary circuit through the production 
of the built environment and in the tertiary circuit through the social expenditures to 
reproduce the labour power. 
Inevitable competition between the capitalists, leading to a drive to invest in new 
technologies, results in a crisis of over- accumulation. By the switching of investments 
from the primary to the secondary circuit, capitalism is able to overcome the over- 
accumulation problem temporarily. This means switching of investment to the partly 
built-environment. Thus, investments in the built environment are seen as the way of 
stabilisation of the capitalist economy during penods of crisis. The same process is 
experienced in the tertiary circuit of capital. Capital accumulation processes and 
urbanisation processes meet here, around social expenditure, to reproduce labour power. 
Investments in this circuit involve again the built environment, housing, transportation 
etc. which is necessary for the reproduction of labour power. 
Nevertheless, these solutions are always temporary because of the unstable structure of 
the capital- accumulation process. In the face of a permanent condition of crisis, the 
uneven development of capitalism makes it possible for capitalists to move from one 
place to another to increase their rate of profit. Thus, capital is withdrawn from one 
developed area and reinvested in another (no matter which region or Country) CI 
underdeveloped area. Capitalism creates new built environments whereas it destroys it 
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in another place (Harvey 1982,1985a). In the end, capital in the search of profit creates 
a built environment which reflects its competition and Instability (Harvey 1985a p. 135). 
His recent works apply a similar understanding, to a much broader evaluation of urban 
process in capitalist societies. He categorises urban experiences of the societies 
according to the dominant regime of accumulation. He uses the concepts of the 
Keynesian and post-Keynesian city to show their relations to Fordist and post-Fordist 
regimes of accumulation. He argues that the Keynesian city was shaped as a 
consumption artifact and its social, economic and political life organised around the C) 
theme of state-backed, debt-financed consumption. This demand-side urbanisation 
sought to stabilise capitalism through the maintenance of effective demand. Thus, the 
Keynesian city put emphasis over the spatial division of consumption, since the success 
of the Keynesian project depends on the mass mobilisation of the spirit of consumer 
sovereignty (Harvey 1985a Chp. 8). However for Harvey, The collapse of the Keynesian 
program changed all that' (ibid p. 21 I). In parallel to the changes in the econorruc 
structures, 
I urbanisation has, like everything else, dramatically changed its spots... A combination of shrinking 
markets, unemployment, rapid shifts in spatial constraints and the global division of labour, capital flight. 
plant closings, technological financial reorganisations lay at the root of that pressure... Fixed capital 
investments and physical infrastructures in existing locations were consequently threatened with massive Z-- 
devaluation, thus undermining the property tax base'(ibid p. 216). rý 
Amidst these conditions ruling class alliances in urban regions were forced to adopt a t: ) t:, - 
much more competitive posture around four options: the options of the production 
workshop, of the consumption artifact, of command functions, and of the locus of 
redistributed surplus. 
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fn sum, Harvey conceptualises the urban in the framework of capital accumulation 
processes. For him, 'the urban process implies the creation of a material physical 
infrastructure for production, circulation, exchange and consumption' (Harvey 1978 
113). 
Another formulation(s) of the specificity of the urban was set out by Castells during the 
early 1970s. Castells position can be considered in two phases: structuralist and 
action-oriented periods. 
In his early writings Castells theorised the city by starting with a theory of a capitalist 
mode of production consisting of three levels. He argued that the theory of urban space 
is an integral part of the general social theory: 
To analyse space as an expression of the social structure amounts, therefore to studying its shaping, by zn! 
elements of the economic system, the political system and the social practices that derive from them' 
(Castells 1977 p. 126). 
The political system organises urban space through functions of domination and 
legitimisation. The ideological system marks space with a network of signs. The zn 
specificity of urban space, however, is attached to the economic domain. Within this 
domain, he turned to consumption for the definition urban space since production is 
organised at higher levels. Thus, he concluded that urban social theory should concern Cý 
itself with the analysis of the social organisation of consumption, hence reproduction of "I 
labour power. 
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Castells, however, never argues that other processes do not take place in the urban 
context. His argument is that, only the consumption moment s specific to the urban 
level. For him, 
'urban organisation is not, then, a simple arrangement of spatial forms, but rather these forms are the C, 
expression of the processes of collective treatment of the daily consumption patterns of households' 
(Castells 1978 p. 16). 
In sum, the essential link between the capitalist mode of production and urban 
development is established through collective consumption which is supposed to specify 
the urban. 
In his later works, Castells retains collective consumption as the defining factor of the Z: ý
urban, despite important changes in his theoretical position. He adds two new 
dimensions to his later formulation: community culture and community politics. 
Contrary to the sophisticated elaboration of collective consumption inherited from 
previous framework, these new aspects of the urban are quite vague. In this sense, 
although Castells seems to retain the idea of the specificity of urban, it is now not clear 
what this specificity attached to the urban is (see Castells 1983 Part 6). 
A third approach to specifying the urban was developed in Rex's and Pahls works. They 
both attempted to show that 'the specific task of urban sociology was to study and 
explain the ways in which inequalities in the city arose out of the actions of 'urban 
manners' (that is individuals such as estate agents, local authority bureaucrats, social 
workers and so on) who controlled access to strate6c urban resources such as housing* 
(Saunders 1985 p. 72). As Pickvance points out, 'the perspective this gave rise to was 4-- 
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one in which urban managers were seen as independent variables, i. e. as causally 
responsible for patterns of urban resource allocation' (Pickvance 1984 p. 37). 
The idea that the urban managers constitute an independent sociological variable is 
modified in Pahl's later work (Pahl 1977,1979). In the face of intense criticisms, Pahl 
accepted that the urban managers are constrained both by the operation of the market 
and the central state. Hence, urban managers came to be seen as intervening and 
mediating variables in urban analysis rather than independent ones in his later approach. 
To sum up, I would argue that, despite lack of communication and intense debates 
among different conceptions of the urban, there is a clear division of labour in the works 
of Harvey, Castells, and Pahl. Harvey and (early) Castells focus on the economic 
domain of the urban. Pahl, on the other hand, places emphasis on the political processes 
in the urban domain. Whereas Harvey argues that there are two points of contact 
between capital accumulation processes and urban process -the construction of built 
environment in the secondary circuit and social expenditures to reproduce labour power- 
in fact, he is always keen to study the first contact point; i. e. the construction of the built 
environment. Ironically, the second point has constituted a basis for the works of 
Castells. Moreover, whereas Castells is quite insistent on specifying the urban field with 
certain academic concern, Harvey is rather reluctant to do this. He sees space, following 
Lefebvre, as an indistinguishable part of the capital accumulation process. t) 
As far as the 'specificity question'is concerned, I think there are important compatibility 
among these three perspectives. Harvey refers to the external environment and 
constraints of the urban process rather than to the urban process itself. In this sense his 
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employment of the term urban 'regions' is not accidental. Harvey in fact addresses the 
ýregional question'. On the other hand, Castells and Pahl refer to the two substantial 
characteristics of the urban -collective consumption and the urban political process. Yet, 
this doesn't mean that their conceptions can simply be put together. There are important 4n 
problems to be overcome in relation to the conception of the agency-structure 
relationship in the urban context. 
1. Ill. 11. The Conception of Agency-Structure Dialectic 
There is now a growing recognition of the importance of the agency-structure dialectic. 
But, as Smith points out Ihis awareness has not yet been fully extended to the realm of 
urban studies where structural and social action perspectives tend to be treated as 
antithetical' (Smith 1984 p. 12; cf. Pickvance 1984). 
As I have already shown, Harvey's argument that the logic of capital accumulation is the t: ) 
basic cause of urban development shows his emphasis on structure at the expense of 
agency. For Pahl, on the other hand, agency has a priority vis-a-vis the structures. 
Castells position(s) is quite interesting in this regard. Contrary to his previous position Z-: ) 
on this issue, in his later studies he makes an attempt to recapture human agency, but in 
my view at the expense of structures, 
Harvey's explanation of the urban phenomenon, as I have shown in specificity debate. 
revolves around the logic of capital accumulation and problems which arise from it. 
Even in his later rather flexible essays, Harvey retains the view that capital accumulation 
processes explain everything; changes in the social and spatial structures of the city are 
1 1) 
explained with reference to the internal contradictions of capital. In the end, although 
Harvey doesn't employ a structural ist-Marx i st framework, there is a little room to 
appreciate the historical role of the human agency in producing and reproducing the 
urban space. The only source of urban change in the last instance is reduced to the 
competition of the capitalists, and 'secondarily'to the conflict between wage-labour and 
capitalist. 
Thus, in the small place he allows for agency, Harvey puts emphasis on class relations. 
Harvey argues that class relations are central to all other social relations. In fact, he does 
recognise that divisions and stratifications in the urban areas could not be covered by 
only class relations. He admits, for instance, the importance of other interests operating 
in the built environment. In his later essays, he conceives of five primary loci of 
consciousness formation: individuals, family, community, state and class (Harvey 1985a 
p. 252). Yet, after an evaluation of these locus of consciousness formation. 'he concludes 
that 'the circulation of capital is so fundamental to the ways we gain and use our 
collective and individual social power that we have no option except to put its class 
relations at the centre of our analysis. There is a sense in which class relations invade 
and dominate all other loci of consciousness formation" (ibid p. 264). In the end, 
Harvey's judgement is that -urban conflicts are displaced problems of over- accumulation. 
The most striking change in Castells position concerns his new conception of the 
agency-structure relationship. Contrary to his previous (structural ist-M arxist) position, 
Castells puts considerable emphasis on agency in urban social change. In his self , I! ) - 
criticism, he argued against both a high level of abstraction and the neglect of the 4- 4- Cý 
(urban) actors in structuralist-Marxism. He criticised his previous position on the 
23 
grounds that 'to the physical determinism of human ecology or to the cultural idealism 
of the Wirthian tradition, Marxism tended to respond by reducing the city and the space 
to the logic of capital' (Castells 1983 p. 297). Yet, for him, such an approach is far from 
explaining urban issues. 
'... technology per se or the structure of the economy Itself are not the drivin4g, force behind the process of 
urbanisation. Economic factors and technological process do play a major role in establishing the shape 
and meaning of space. But this role is determined, as well as the economy and technology themselves, by 
the social process through which humankind appropriates space and constructs a social organisation 
relentlessly challenged by the production of new values and the emergence of new social interests' 
(Castells 1983 p. 291). 
Urban actors are now not only classes and class-deterryuned social movements, but 
various groups arisen out of different interests, oppressed groups as well as classes. 
Castells puts this point in the following long quotation: 
Ispatial formsI express and perform the interests of the dominant class according to a given mode of 
production and to a specific mode of development. They will express and implement the power 
relationship of the state in an historically defined society. They will be realised and shaped by the process 
of gender domination and by state-enforced family life. At the same time, spatial forms will be earmarked 
by the resistance from exploited class, from oppressed subjects, and from dominated women. And the 
work of such a contradictory historical process on the space will be accomplished on an already inherited 
spatial form, the production of former history and the support of new interests, projects, protests, and 
dreams. Finally time to time, social movements will arise to challenge the meaning of spatial structure and 
therefore attempt new functions and new forms(Castells 1983 p. 4). 
Contrary to his former position, Castells is reluctant to place class at the centre of the 
urban question. For him, class relations and struggles are no longer fundamental to 
understand urban conflict. They are important but by no means a primary source of 
urban social change. The autonomous role of the state and gender relationships are as 4 
important as class relationships. Nevertheless, he doesn't reject the possibility of a 
connection between the 'dynamics of social classes and the formation and outcome of 
urban social movements ? as in the Glasgow case (ibid p. 67). He goes on to argue that 'So 4- 41: ý 
neither the assimilation of urban conflicts to class struggle nor the entire independence 
of both processes of social change can be sustained. On the contrary, only by focusi Z7 1 ing 
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on the interaction between the social dynamics of class struggle and urban dynamics 
whose content must be redefined in each historical situation, are we able to understand 
social change in a comprehensive manner. Furthermore the hierarchy of determination 
between classes and cities varies according to each historical formation'(Ibid p. 68). 
Nevertheless, despite such positive insight, Castells replaces Harvey's idealisation of 
class relations with the idealisation of social movements. Castells argues that a new z1- 
urban meaning can be produced by one of the four societal forces: dominant class, 
dominated classes, social movements and urban social movements. Castel ls' hypothesis 
s that 'only urban social movements are urban-oriented mobilisations that influence 
structural social change and transform the urban meanings. The symmetrical opposite to 
this hypothesis is not necessarily true(ibid p. 305). This conclusion leads Castells to 
underestimate other forms of organisation and struggles such as the state and the 
political parties and struggles around them, although, following Poulantzas, he mentions 
the autonomy enjoyed by state. I will return to this issue in the following section. 
Despite the clear emphasis of Castells on actors, he admits the importance of the 
structure of the society. For him, Ihe meaning of the city is not produced arbitrarily 
by a 
particular social actor or by an undetermined conflict between many actors. 
The very 
process of social definition and the outcome of such a process relies upon the structure 
of society and upon that structure's particular mode of historical 
development' Obid 
p. 305). However, there are important problems with concepts that 
Castells introduced to 
locate his analysis of urban change in the broader context of a theory of social change. 
Such concepts as modes of industrial and informational development. seems to 
be 
undeveloped moreover, arbitrary. In the lack of clarity of these structural elements, 
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Castells falls easily into eclecticism and voluntarism. The neglect of a political and 
economic context is not surprising for this reason (cf. Pickvance 1985). 
In the discussion of the content definition of the urban, I have argued that Pahl specifies 
the city as a system of resource allocation. For him, the fundamental object of study of 
urban sociology is urban managers whose actions affect the inequalities in the city. 
Hence, there is an explicit emphasis on urban managers and their goals, values, t-I 
assumptions and ideologies. Pahl summarises his earlier position in respect to the 
agency-structure relationship as follows: 
'in my original formulation of the position I emphasised that access to any scarce urban resource or facility 
could be seen as comprising two elements: the spatial element, which could be expressed in terms of 
time/cost distance; and the social element, which included on the one hand the rules and procedures which 
defined access for populations, defined in both social and spatial terms... and, on the other hand, the 
interpretation and administration of these rules and procedures by local managers or gatekeepers' (Pahl 
1977 p. 50). 
For Pahl both, spatial and social, elements operate to a considerable extent 
independently of the economic and political system. For instance, he argues that 'these 
spatial constraints on the distribution of resources operate to a areater or lesser degree C) 
independent of the economic and political order'(Pahl 1975 p. 249). 
By the same token, he claims that urban space is a material resource and urban 
managers who are responsible for deciding locations and distributions can manipulate it 
according to their goals and values. These managers were also supposed to be 
independent of structural constraints. In the end, Pahl surnmarises his earlier position as 
follows: 
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'a truly urban sociology should be concerned with the social and spatial constraints on access to scarce 
urban resources and facilities as dependent variables and the managers or controllers of the urban system 
which I take as the independent variable'(Pahl 1975 p. 2 19). 
It is clear that Pahl emphasises the agency side of the society while the structural aspects 
are remarkably neglected in parallel to Weberian concerns with the goals and values of 
human agency. However, in the face of criticism that he attributes too much power and 
influence to the urban managers at the expense of more broader political forces, 
assuming independence of managers from vis-a-vis economic structures, Pahl amended 
his model by suggesting that urban managers are mediating and intervening variables 
rather than independent ones. Accordingly, Pahl puts emphasis on the relationship 
between the central state and private sector in his later works. 
1. Ill. Ill. Conception of the State in the Urban Context 
In the preceding part, it has become clear that the state has a central place in Pahl's 
approach. The same is not true for both Harvey and Castells. They always give priority b 
to other societal forces and structures vis-a-vis the state. Nevertheless, this doesn't mean 
that they exclude the state totally from their analysis. It is important, but not primary. a 
dependent rather than independent variable on contrary to Pahl's conception. Since 
Pahl's position has been explained in the preceding part, I go on to examine Harvey's 
and Castells'theorisation of the state. 
Harvey (1987) assigned to the state two basic roles in relation to the urban process-, the 
channelling of investments from primary to other circuits of capital, and displacing the 4-ý 
class struggle around the built environment. As Gottdiener (1987) points out 
in this 
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conception, the state's ontological status is nothing other than as the agent of capital in 
general. 
In his later works, although Harvey retains the substance of this previous conception, his 
new position on the state becomes controversial and eclectic at many points. The role 
assigned to the state becomes more central than in the previous conception as can be 
seen in the following passage: 
Ihe state, finally, has to be omnipresent within (and not external to, as many theories of the state seem to 
propose) all facets of this circulation process, compensati I creatinc, Iona term ng the market failure; V. ý L- investments, regulating the family as well as the uses of money, time, space, and capital in key ways' 
(Harvey 1985b p. 265). 
The same orientation to centralise the state to the social relation is more clear in his 
treatment of local alliance formation. There, the local state is treated as the political 
means of the articulation of various interests within the urban region. Because, in 
comparison to other societal agents, the state is more convenient for this purpose: 
First, territory and the integrity of territory is the objective of its personnel... Second, by virtue of its 
authority, it can give firmer shape and cohesion to regional class alliances through the institutions of law, C-1 Cý 
governance. political participation and negotiation, repression and military might. Third, it can impose 
relatively firm boundaries on otherwise porous and unstable geographical edges. Finally, by virtue of its C 4-- Cý 
powers to tax and to control fiscal and monetary policy, it can actively promote and sustain that structured 
regional coherence to production and consumption to which capitalism in any case tends to undertake 
infrastructural investments that individual capitalists could not tackle'(Harvey 1985a p. 152). 
Furthermore, Harvey also admits the importance of particular interests formed within 
the state apparatus. He, for instance, argues that Ihe bearers of managerial expertise can 
use the state apparatus as a medium to advance their interest. By doing this in the name 
of the public interest they can project a bureaucratic-managerial consciousness onto the 
whole society. For this reason. Harvey asserts that the state is more than a cohesive 
apparatus. It also internalises and projects its own specific forms of consciousness (ibid 
p. 260-68). 
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In my view, Harvey's attempt to inject a more flexible theorisation of the state into his 
capital logic approach and creates an eclectic model. This can be attributed to his basic 
assumption that there is one logic of capital. In fact, there are likely to be several 
possible logic of capital and politics is about the struggle among these different logic. 
Let me put it another way, once we accept that, like Harvey, there is only one logic of 
capital, there is no reason to search for relatively autonomous (urban) politics. 
Castells' treatment of the state is similar to Harvey's theonsation of the state with 
regards to its relation with dominant mode of production. Castells identifies the state 
with dominant social relations. He even dismisses the political parties as a part of the 
state apparatus. For this reason, he emphasises the importance of non-institutional 
channels, i. e. urban social movements, to accomplish the radical transformation of the 
urban space. By the same token, he makes a strict distinction between political parties 
and urban social movements. Because, 
Ihe political system is aimed at the state, is dependent upon the state, and is a part of the state. Therefore 
to some extent it institutionalises some forms of social domination and accept the rules of bargaining with 
such forms. At the other end of the scale, social movements exit, develop and relate to civil society and 
are necessarily limited to, or bounded by, the rules of game and the institutionalisation of dominant values 
and norms. This is why social movements are the source of social innovation while political parties or 
coalitions are the instruments of social bargaini ng'(Cas tells 1983 p. 294). In -- 
Thus urban social movements are considered as alternative organisations to the state 
institutions in Castells' formulation. Whereas urban social movements represent the civil 
society, political parties are a part of the state system. Whereas social movements cause 
social innovation, political parties can afford social bargaining. For this reason, their Cý IC) 
function are institutional maintenance and social reproduction rather than institutional 
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change and social transformation. The latter can only be achieved by urban social 
movements (see Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1 Antagonistic and Compatible Relations in Urban Change 
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Source: Smith and Tardanico 1987 p. 97 
There are important flaws in Castells' conception of the state. Surprisingly, Castells 
seems to consider the state as a simple instrument of the dominant class. He emphasises 
the role of the state to regulate social relations in the interests of the dominant class at 
least as far as his conception of social movements is concerned. But he neglects the fact Cý 
that the state performs this function under the pressure of various forces. For this reason, 
there is no reasonable excuse to exclude the state system in the achievement of radical 
change in the urban structure. Especially the local state, in many case, is used by radical 
groups in order to give a new urban meaning to cities. The problem partly results from 4- Cý In 
Castells' idea that the state system, including political parties, is a homogenous and 
monolithic unity. This is not true for either state apparatuses or political parties. There 
are important contradictions, hierarchies and disarticulations between different branches 
of the state and especially between the central and local state, as well as among the 
central and local branches of political parties. 
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In sum, contrary to Pahl's treatment of the state, neither Harvey nor Castells consider the 
state as other than a functionary of the capital-accumulation process. Pahl, on the other 
hand, emphasises the importance of the state, but in this case, at the expense of more 
general processes and structures. 
L IV. Conclusion 
This short review of the current literature has shown that there is no convincing 
theorisation of the state in either state-centred or society-centred camps. There are rather 
well-structured dichotomies not only between these two perspectives but also between 
the approaches within the same perspective. Whereas society-centred approaches put the 
society at the centre of the theorisation of the state, it is the other way around in the case 
of state-centred explanations. Further, there is a dichotomy between class and capital- 
logic theorisations of the state within the society-centred approach. Whereas the class- 
logic approach emphasises the struggles around the state as a primary explanatory 
source, the capital-logic view gives the priority to the imperatives of capital 
accumulation in the same regard. 
This implicit division of labour and lack of communication among them create Cý 
important problems in every field of the social sciences. Because each perspective, as 
Alford and Friedland point out, has contributed something to our understanding of the 4- 
state (Alford and Friedland 1985). In my view, there are important lessons in this insight 
for urban studies. I now go on to examine the state of art in urban studies with reference 
to the previous debate. 
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The comparison of these three perspectives in urban studies has shown that there are 
major differences between their conception of the urban, the agency- structure dialectic 
in this particular domain. and the state at the local level. These are shown in Table 1.1 



















For a research strategy which utilises from these perspectives, there seems to be three 
possibilities (see Pickvance 1984). In the first alternative, which is the most common 
strategy, one of these 'alternative' frameworks is taken as a base for the research. The 
reasoning here is that these alternative frameworks are incommensurable. Because they Z: ý
have different conceptual universes, i. e. sets of concepts which cannot be translated into 
observable measures and ask different questions. I think all of the three perspectives 
reviewed above use this sort of strategy in their researches. In turn, this means an 
absence of communication between them. The second position 
is to use different 
theories in an eclectic way. This would follow from the positivist position that there is 
no problem of incommensurability since every concept can 
be operationalised 
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(Saunders' dual- state thesis is a good example of this point). In my view neither of these 
positions is acceptable. 
The third position asserts that 'while every paradigm has its own set of concepts, it does 
not follow that they are mutually incomprehensible. It is possible for people to think 
themselves into different conceptual universes'. Further, it can again be argued that 
'observation while theory-influenced is not totally the ory-determi ned(Pic kv ance 1984 
p. 45). This is because each paradigm has an (low-level) area of communication. This 
understanding can pave the way for joint use of the 'insights' of different perspectives 
without falling into eclecticism. I examine this possibility in these three examples. In my 
view, Harvey's framework embraces more broader and general aspects of social 
processes such as capital accumulation, uneven development and so on. On the other 
hand, Pahl refers to more specific aspects of social relations such as attitudes of urban 
managers. Castells, to a certain extent, refers to more pluralistic aspects of the society as 
far as urban social movements are concerned. Nevertheless, I don't purpose a simple 
articulation of these approaches. Because, it seems to me that, without solving certain 
problems it again leads the research into eclecticism. First of ail, each perspective , 
mentioned above, make claims at every level of abstraction, although their object of 
study refers to certain levels. For this reason, eclecticism can only be avoided by using 
them on different levels. Then, the question remaining is how to either eliminate or 
integrate their extensions to different levels of abstraction. By the same token, every It) 
approach is far from being unproblematic even in its proper level of abstraction. 
Harvey's capital-logic approach is a good example in this regard. To assume that there is C) cn 
only one logic of capital is not acceptable at any level of abstraction as a starting point. 
Similarly. the role of the state cannot be restricted to the lower levels of abstraction 
33 
since in the manipulation of these alternative logic the state takes an important part. This 
makes it, then, difficult to restrict the study of the state to one level of abstraction. In 
other words, it refers to the indivisibility of the micro and the macro, as well as abstract 
and concrete. 
In my view, the argument advanced by Friedland and Alford, (1985) that each 
perspective has a home domain and emphasises a particular aspect of social relations, is 
a starting assumption for a new framework aimed at overcoming the barriers created by 
preceding perspectives and articulating the macro and the micro and abstract and 
concrete within the same framework without falling into trap of eclecticism. 
CHAPTERII: 
A THEORY OF THE SOCIETY, THE STATE AND THE URBAN 
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CHAPTER II: A THEORY OF THE SOCIETY, THE STATE AND 
THE URBAN 
/1. L Introduction: 
In the preceding chapter, I have argued that there is a well-established division of 
labour among alternative theories of the state and the urban question in the sense that 
each theory has a distinctive home domain. fn turn, this division of labour prevents 
an exhaustive understanding of the state and the urban question and we need to 
develop a synthetic framework without falling into the trap of eclecticism. 
This chapter aims to expose such an alternative framework for the analysis of the 
state and the urban question. In the first part of the chapter, by largely drawing upon 
Gramsci (1971) and Jessop (1983,1985,1988,1989,1990), 1 will present a middle- 
range theorisation of the state to close the gap between the capital and class 4-D 
theoretical approaches. 
In the second part of the chapter, I shall attempt to integrate this top-down 
perspective with a bottom-up understanding of the very same social processes 
through a detailed examination of recent developments in urban studies as urban 
areas are important battlefields of the alternative accumulation strategies, state 
stratecries, and hegemonic projects. They become dominant in general through C) Cý 0 
craining the battles in these localities. Whereas these projects and strategies produce, 
reproduce and transform these localities, the local social structures do not remain 
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silent in this process. The end product is an outcome of interaction of these top-down 
and bottom-up processes. 
/I. IL A Strategic Relational Approach to the State-Society Relationship 
In my view, Gramsci provides an important starting point for developing middle- 
range concepts to create a synthetic framework which would bridge the gap between, 
at least, class and capital logic approaches. His concepts such as 'hegemony' and 
'integral state' as well as 'power block' and 'organic intellectuals' provide important 
conceptual devises for a strategic relational analysis. 
Gramsci's approach to state-society relationships has important insights beyond 
those of positivistic-deterministic approaches in that it shows that there is no pre- 
destined line of development independent of projects and strategies of human 
agency. This view is very clear in his view of the relationship between the structure 
and strategy: 
'Politics in fact is at any given time the reflection of the tendencies of development in the structure, 
but it is not necessarily the case that these tendencies must be reallsed. A structural phase can be 
concretely studied and analysed only after it has gone through this whole process of development, and 
not during the process itself, except hypothetically ... 
From this can be deduced that a particular 
political act may have been an error of calculation on the part of the leaders of the dominant classes... 
Mechanical historical materialism does not allow for the possibility of error, but assumes that every 
political act is determined, immediately, by the structure, and therefore as a real and permanent (in the 
sense of achieved) modification of the structure. The principle of error is a complex one: one may be 
dealing with an individual impulse based on mistaken calculations or equally it may be a manifestation 
of the attempts of specific groups or sects to take over hegemony within the directive groupings, 
attempts which may well be unsuccessful. ( Gramsci 1971; 408). 
Likewise, in Gramsci, projects and strategies of the actors are analysed not only in 
the framework of economic relations but also in relation to cultural, religious, moral 
and political factors. His approach is most clear when he analyses the establishment 
of hegemony in a particular society. For him, 'hecyemonv was equally concerned with 
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cultural religious, philosophical and moral factors, set within a wider theoretical 
model which included the economic mode of production as fundamental but not fully 
determining'( Bocock 1986; 85). 
will not go further here as I will discuss these issues below. However, it is 
important to point out that Gramsci's views are not always clear and consistent. 
Therefore they led to very different perspectives and one of the unfortunate 
developments is the recent post-Marxist reception of Gramsian thought. The open- 
ended character of Gramsci's enterprise led some, like Laclau and Mouffe, to argue 
for a discursive constitution of hegemony which leaves everything to contingency 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985). 1 think this interpretation of Gramsci partly finds its roots 
and justification in the fact that Gramsci is less interested in defining abstract logic of 
the economy or in the role of the state as an 'ideal collective capitalist' in a mode of 
production than in designating the complicated relations among various of social 
forces involved in the exercise of state power in a given social fonnation (Jessop 
1982). 1 think that is why we need to articulate the Gramscian view with a refined 
capital logic which can provide a structural context to the Gramscian strategic- 
relational approach. 
I think Jessop provides such a framework and in what follows I will mainly 
concentrate on his strategic relational framework. Such an intermediate perspective 
could show that there are alternative logic of capital (as against to capital logic) as Cý 
well as structural limits (as opposed to capital logic). Further, such an approach can 
also provide room to analyse the locric(s) of the state as well. Following 
Jessop, I 
Z" I'D 
analyse the altemative logic of capital through accumulation strategies, 
field of 
I 4ý - 
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struggles through hegemonic projects and alliance strategies, and finally the state(s) 
through the state (projects) strategies. 
11.11.1. Value Form: 
In my view, most of the alternative approaches including that of Laclau and Moufe 
disregards one basic point at the outset: a proper understanding of the value form Im 
which is an important determinant of underlying relations in capitalist societies. It is 
a value form that places limits on contingency and makes only a limited number of 
strategies possible. 
For any rigorous analysis of the capitalist state, value form is an important starting 
point as an important determinant of underlying relations in the capitalist societies. It 
frames the matrix of capitalist development that takes numerous forms in capitalist 
societies. As Jessop puts it, 
'Value form as a social relation comprises a number of interconnected elements that are organically 
linked as different moments in the overall reproduction of capital relations. These include such form 
as the commodity, the wage, money, prices, taxes, profits of enterprise, interest, rent and so forth. In 
their unity as interconnected elements of the value form these moments define the parameters of 
accumulation and delimit the sorts of economic crises which can develop within capitalism' (Jessop 
1983 p, 15 1). 
For instance, in a capitalist society, there are structural lirrUts to decomodification or 
to nationalisation of the economic enterprise. However, the value form should not be 
considered, as some variants of capital logic school do, as a structural constraint Cý 
which fully determines the course of accumulation. Because, the very same value 
form. as an important determinant of capitalist social relations, itself depends on 
certain extra-economic factors and mechanisms to provide unity or certain 
degree of 
harmony among different moments (Jessop 1990). For instance, the very substance I 
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of value depends on capital's ability to dominate wage labour, and, in tum, this 
domination depends on many factors outside the immediate economic realm. In this 
regard, a considerable indeterminacy and margin for variation exist in the form the 
capitalist development takes. These variations are the complex resultant of the 
changing balance of power and the course of the capital accumulation process can 
take various direction according to this balance. For this reason, although the basic 
parameters of capitalism are defined by the value form, it is necessary to go beyond 
this to conceive the nature and dynamic of particular capitalist economies as well as 
extra economic factors and forces. 
In sum, the view that there are countless alternative strategies to be followed is not 
true given the limits put by the value form and it is equally wrong to assume that 
there is only one logic of capital which is determined beforehand. Instead there are 
various alternatives open to different social forces within the limits placed by value 
fonn. 
11.11.11. Accumulation Strategies: 
Thus, following Jessop, it is possible to argue that there is no single path to growth 
and nothing taken for granted if we say that a dominant strategy will be the best one 41: ) 
for the interests of prime mover. In a given economy, there are possibilities for 
alternative paths of development which may be called competing accumulation 
strateo, ies and under certain enabline, and constrainino, conditions one of these C Z: ý n 
competing strategies with its specific mode of growth 
becomes dominant. The 
Cý ?n 
important point however, as Jessop points out, is: 
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'given the complex and overdetermined structure of mode of growth, one couldn't calculate an 
effective and most effective strategy to maintain it, The relative success or failure of a strategy 
depends on unacknowledged structural conditions of' action which may alter as well as changing the 
balance of forces (including changing organisational capacities and strategies) relevant to its 
successful realisation'. (Jessop 1988; 158). 
In this sense, it is also clear that all strategies do not have equal chances. Strategies, 
however, are always realised in specific structural contexts that should be seen as an 
ensemble of structural constraints and conjectural opportunities for different social 
forces. What is a constraint for some forces could be a conjectural opportunity for 
others(Jessop 1988 p. 158). Jessop goes on to argue that alternative strategies could b 
exist to the extent that: 
'a)calculating subjects are differentially located in relation to the structure (so that some structure 
presents them with a different ensemble of constraints and opportunities); b)calculate their strategies 
over different time horizons and/or spatial boundaries; c)engage in strateuic contact over a more or I-- C) 
less extensive social terrain embracino, fields of action (economic, political, juridical, moral, Cý 
educational etc. ); and enter into different types of alliance with other social forces'(Ibid p. 150). 
In such a competitive environment, once one strategy together with a growth model 
becomes dominant it means that it provides the unity among the different moments 
in the circuit of capital under the hegemony of one fraction. Nevertheless. even then, 
there is still space for alternative strategies and for conflict between and within the 
classes rather than the elimination and transcendence of them. Rather, such a 
domination provides a 'relatively' stable framework within which competition and 
conflicting interests can be contained without disturbing the overall unity of the Cý Z17) 
circuit of capital. 
Furthermore, other than a plurality of strategies, there are several tactics which can 
be followed in pursuit of a given strategy. The existence of alternative tactics is L- 
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important for the flexibility of the dominant strategy vis-a-vis the alternative 
strategies, since they create a margin of manoeuvre. 
In sum, such an approach is able to consider the economic sphere from both the 
points of view of structures which find its expression through the value-form and 
effects of market forces and action through the accumulation strategies which in turn 
reproduce and transform these structures. 
11.11. Ill. State Strategies: 
The fact is that, whatever the accumulation strategy with mode of growth becomes 
dominant, its success depends on the establishment of a correspondence between 
patterns of production and consumption. As is mentioned before, such a 
correspondence cannot be established only through a market mechanism. For this 
reason, regulationists point to the necessity of a regulatory mechanism(s). They 
introduce the concept of the 'mode of regulation' to examine the extra-economic 
conditions and mechanisms of the accumulation. A mode of regulation can be 
defined as: 
'the totality of institutional forms, networks and norms (explicit or implicit), which together secure the C 
compatibility of typical modes of contact in the context of an accumulation regime, corresponding as 
much to the chanaina balance of social relations as to their more general conflictual properties(Lipietz C 
1986 p. 12 1 ). 
In this sense, it refers to the interaction of a complex configuration of norms and 
institutions rather than only to the state. They involve traditional norms and 
hierarchies including family and churches alongside social and political institutions 
such as, associations, media, the political and administrative system, la\,,, and 
market(Haeusler and Hirsch 1989: 303). 
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Regulationists, however, insist that the regulative system shouldn't be considered as a C) 
conflict-free unity. Instead contradictions exist within and between the elements of 
the regulative system. Haeusler and Hirsch go on to argue that: 
'market and state intervention, formal law and traditional norms, bureaucracy and family represent 
different forms of regulation that correlate (for example state regulation of money, guaranteed private 
property) as well as contrast (such as compulsory production limits). The regulatory process is based 
on the institutional isation of social antagonisms and (class-)conflicts, and therefore can never be 
functionally secured but always entails conflicts and confrontations. Regulation is thus fundamentally 
a crisis-prone process and disturbances represent a functional principle (Haeusler and Hirsch 1989 
p. 305). 
In this plenty of regulatory mechanisms and institutions, the state represents the 
centre of the institutionalised regulative network by its relationship to the complete 
network of regulative instances. Like capital, state is a form of determined social 
relation. For this reason it must be examined in relation, not only, to distinctive 
institutional form (as in the state centred approach) but also to the changing balance 
of political forces determined by the factors located beyond the forms of the state as 
such (Jessop 1990; 206). In this sense, the state should also be considered not only a 
regulatory mechanism, but also as an institutionalised condensation of contradictory 
social relations which itself needs regulation. Z:: ) 
In capitalist societies, the relations between economic and political spheres constitute 
one of the most important areas of tension. More specifically the main debate on this 
issue concentrates on the functionality of state intervention for the capitalist 
accumulation process. Most of the society-centred approaches claim that state 
intervention is central to the capital accumulation process and that there are tight 
links between the economic and political spheres, whereas others such as Hindess 
-12 
and Hirst seem to argue that there is a necessary non correspondence between the 
state and economic sphere. Both understandings on this particular issue seems to be 
unsatisfactory. It is the basic contention here that a correspondence, albelt loose 
rather than tight, seems to be possible but must be constructed in the course of a 
struggle whose outcome is always contingent (Jessop 1990 p. 206; Pickvance 1980 
p. 46). I will go on to examine this point in detail to show why there is a problem of 
correspondence and to what extent. 
The most prominent feature of the relations between the economic and political 
spheres is the 'particularisation' of the capitalist state. The particularisation of the 
state is facilitated by the exclusion of extra-economic coercion from the circuit of 
capital. However, this makes the functionality of the state problematical. Because the 
very same particularisation and institutional separation facilitate the dislocation 
between the activities of the state and requirements of capital (Jessop 1990 p. 206). 
In sum, we can conclude that there is a correspondence between the state and the 
economic realm which is provided by value form but this correspondence can only 
be established in the course of struggle. For this reason, this correspondence and 
functionality of the state for the economy should be conceived around a loose-link 
model rather than a tight one (Pickvance 1980)'. 
At a more concrete level, Pickvance identifies four reasons for thinking that there is a substantial 
amount of dislocation between economic and political domains. First. the state is subject to 
contradictory demands by classes. or fractions of capital rather than a single demand. Secondly, 
different branches of the state develop strong patron-client relationships between their corresponding 
fractions of capital. Such relations hinder the meeting of collective needs. Third, there is no mutual 
compatibility between different demands and as the scale of intervention grows the probability of 
incompatibility increases. Finally, the state's resources are limited and prevent the performance of 
functions (Pickvance 1980 pp. 46-47). 
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This conception paves the way for the analysis of the state as a form-determined 
condensation of the balance of class forces engaged in struggle within as well as 
outside the state, and as a complex institutional ensemble that shapes and conditions 
the whole political process. Such an understanding considers the state as not an 
independent entity and endorses a selectivity of the state but doesn't suggest that its 
effects always favour one class or sets of interest. As Jessop puts it: 
'indeed the complexity of the state system is deemed to be such that its functional unity cannot be 
taken for granted and any coherence that exists among its activities is supposed to be forged in the ace 
of structural tensions and internal political struggles. This implies in turn that state forms have 
significant effects on the calculation of political interests and thus on the composition of the dynamic 
of political forces, These forces may well attempt to use the state but neither they, nor it, can be seen 
as neutral transmission belts of interests which are fully determined elsewhere in society. Conversely, 
if state forms and forms of political organisation have these effects, it is legitimate for political forces 
to struggle to change them to their advantage'(Jessop 1990 p. 149). L- ý11 
In this context, the State can be analysed around the strategies in a similar way to the 
economy. By following Jessop I argue that the state is the site, the generator, and 
product of strategies (Jessop 1990 p. 260). 
The state system as the site of the strategies can be conceived as a system of strategic 
selectivity in the sense that it is more open to some strategies than others. 
'Thus a given type of state, a given state form, a given form of regime, will be more accessible to 
some forces than others according to the strategies they adopt to gain state power; and it will be more 1-n C 
suited to the pursuit of some types of economic or political strategy than others because of the modes 4-- 
of the intervention resources which characterise that svstem'(Jessop 1990 p. 260). 
Strategic selectivity is different from structural selectivity in that it refers to the 
relational character of this selectivity. That is. there are different chances 
for different 
strategies which can be followed by the same social force. Such a conception able 
to escape trom the trap of structuralism and voluntarism. It avoids a voluntaristic 
explanation because it assumes that the strategic selectivity of structures refers to the ZI-n 
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fact that there is an unequal chance for every strategy. It also prevents a conception 
of structures that gives chance to only one choice. In this sense, although strategic tD 4D 
selectivity makes some strategies more likely than others, the formulation of 
strategies depends on the agency. For this reason, the success of a strategy both 
depends on structural conditions, both enabling and constraining, and the ability of 
agency to formulate the strategy in a proper way. 
Secondly, the state also represents a site where strategies are studied. The assumption 
that the capitalist state has an institutional and functional unity is not persuasive. 
Even when the formal unity of the state system is provided, this does not ensure its 
substantive unity as the state is also the site of struggles and rivalries among its Z-ý 4-n 
different branches. Hence, it is hardly possible to understand either the unity the of 
state system or the activities of the state without referring to political strategies. 
Through formulation of political strategies the state can act as a unified political 
force and state managers play a central role in the formulation of these strategies. 
Finally, the state is also the product of strategies. The formal and substantial aspects 
of the state can be conceived in and through past political strategies and struggles. 
That is, the past pattems of strategic selectivity and the strategies adopted to 
transform it provides a structural context for the current strategic selectivity and 
strategies. 
In line with this understanding, Jessop defines the state strategy as: 10 
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'a pattern of intervention in the economy which: (a) favours the course of an accumulation strategy and flow of material benefits to the requisl I ion that social base; and (b) constructs forms of representat' 
ý 
systematically favour the access of the key sectors and soci III ic power'(Jessop et. al 1988 p. 159). 
'al groups to sites of political and economi 
In addition to these three aspects -forms of representation, forms of intervention and 
forms of articulation of state as an institutional ensemble- of the state as form, there 
are two substantial dimensions which link the state and other political forces; social 
basis of the state and hegemonic project around which the exercise of state power is 
centred. These two aspects are important not only to link the state to society but also 
to conceive the relationship between accumulation and state strategies. 
11.11. IV. Social Base and Hegemonic Project: 
Social bases refers to 'the specific configuration of social forces, however identified 
as subjects and (dis-)organised as political actors, that supports the basic structure of 
the state system, its mode of operation and its objectives(Jessop 1990 p. 297). Such a 
support is always conflict-ridden. Yet the conflicts over specific policies is not 
inconsistent with the consensus which constitutes the basis of support as long as such 
conflict occurs within the limits of accepted policy paradigm and institutional 
framework. Further, 
I it should also be noted that the social bases of the state are heterogeneous and the different social I 
forces will vary in their degree of commitment to the state. At the same time there will be considerable 
variation in the mix of material concessions. symbolic rewards and repression directed through the 
state to different social forces(Jessop ibid p. 207). 
This brings us to the hegemonic project. Because the construction of an unstable 
equilibrium of compromise between various social forces depends lara), ely on the 
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existence of a hegemonic project, Gramsci makes a distinction between force and 
consent. He argues that the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, 
as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'. A social group dominates 
antagonistic groups, which it tends to 'liquidate', or to subjugate by armed force: it 
leads kindred and allied groups'(Gramsci 1971,58). However, Gramsci 'went on to 
link these two concepts together to define what he termed 'the integral state' as the 
combination of hegemony armoured with coercive power. The integral state is 
4political society plus civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the 
armour of coercion' (Bocock 1986; 26). 
Jessop defines hegemony in broad terms as 'the interpolation and organisation of 
different 'class relevant' (but not necessarily class-conscious) forces under the 
political, intellectual and moral leadership of a particular class (or class fraction) or, 
more precisely, its political, intellectual and moral spokesmen' (Jessop 1990; 208). 
Through the hegemonic project, it is possible to resolve the tension between 
particular interests and the general interests. Such a project requires, 
Ihe mobilisation of support behind a concrete national-popular program of action which asserts a 
II interests general interest in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly or implicitly advance the 
long-term - 
of the hegemonic class (fraction) and which also privileges particular economic corporate interests 
compatible with this programme(ibid p. 208). 
Further, it prevents the pursuit of other particular interests that are 
incompatible with 
it whereas the hegemonic project sometimes sacrifices the short term 
interests of the 
forces mobilised behind the project (Gramsci 197 1, Bertramsen 
199 1). 
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Hegemony, in this sense, refers to a situation in which one hegemonic project has 
achieved domination over the other rival projects. As in the case of state and 
accumulation strategies, there is always the possibility for the existence of competing Cý 
hegemonic projects. The domination of one hegemonic project does not necessarily 
mean that other projects are totally removed from the scene. The domination of one 
project 
'does not prevent the dominant project from being challenged by or encounter-ing other 
counter-hegemonic projects, but means only that some options have been eliminated, in part because 
they cannot mobilise the means to subvert a given hegemonic project's dominant position and institute 
themselves as dominant. Thus a given articulation between the ideological and the institutional 
features of a dominant hegemonic project implies that although, in principle, any hegemonic project is 
just as likely to be formulated as any other, it might simply fail to provide the structural moments 
which are necessary for its persistence, stability and durability(Bertramsen 1990 p. 1 14). 
Hegemonic project can be seen as a binding element of accumulation and state 
strategies. Hegemony is derived from leadership won via the provision and 
elaboration of a generally accepted accumulation strategy defined as a specific Cý 
economic growth model and state strategy. As Jessop emphasises, the stability and 
long term durability of hegemonic pr ject depends on the provision of particular Z: ý Oj 
conditions such as a specific form of organisation of the production, a specific form 
of the state. However, the link between them can only be established during the 
course of daily practice and struggles, In this sense, one to one correspondence 
cannot be assumed between them. 
Hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies are not identical in the sense that 
while accumulation strategies are directly concerned with econon-uc expansion, 
hence oriented primarily to the relation of production and to the balance of class 
forces, hegemonic projects are oriented to rather broader issues involving not only 
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economic relations but also the field of civil society and the state (Jessop 1990). The 
hegernonic project in this sense refers to the national-popular and not simply to class 
relations (Gramsci 1971). The important point however, is that there is a possibility 
of dislocation and inconsistency between them in specific situation. It is obvious 
however that accumulation and hegemony will be most safe when there is a strong 
harmony between them. 
The relationship between the hegemonic project and state strategies should be 
considered in the same framework. Neither the formal unity, limiting conflicts 
among its various sections and managers, nor its substantial unity, capacity 
successfully to carry out its global political function of maintaining social cohesion, 
can be entirely accomplished without blending the state strategies with a 
national-popular project. 
11. il. V. Concluding Remarks 
Such an approach can provide a base for a middle-range theorisation in order to 
overcome the problems inherited from capital and class theoretical approaches. 
It provides a conceptual framework to examine the alternative logic of capital in 
terms of competing accumulation strategies by relating them to the basic forms of I 
capital relations and the specific structural organisation, and to the modes of 
economic calculation and strategic capacities of relevant economic forces. 
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Likewise, the alternative logic of state organisation can be examined through Cý 
competing state strategies and projects, again by relating them to the same structural 
conditions and strategic capacities in the sphere of the state. 
Finally, the field of class and opular struggles can be examined in terms of p zD 
competing hegemonic projects and alliance strategies by relating them to the social 
forms and structural context. Such a framework is more promising than capital and 
class logic. 
Yet, one problem remains unresolved in this approach, though I do not think it is 
intrinsic to it. The strategic -relational approach developed by Jessop so far reflects 
top-down perspective, and in this respect it shares the problem of spatial amnesia 
with the other theories of the state. In my view, it suffers less from this problem than 
do the other rival approaches. Nevertheless, my conviction is that it is open and 
promising to be articulated with a bottom-up approach to get a complete picture of Cý 
social relations. 
Mainly the problem is that it situates all these social relations and processes in a way 
that they proceed as though the world existed on the head of a pin, as though they 4. 
were spatially undifferentiated. There is an implicit assumption here that social 
processes such as capital accumulation, class conflict and state intervention are 
general processes which are independent of space (cf, Giddens 1984). 
If we want to understand these processes and their political implications, we need to 
be quite conscious of the fact that general processes, such as accumulation strategies, Z) Z: ) 
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are constituted from the beginning in many places and they are only general in the 
sense that their spatial dimensions are not those of a single place (Duncan 1989a). As 
Duncan points out: 
'this artificial distinction between general and local emerges from a conflation of our mental processes 
of abstraction with what actually happens in reality. Thus we may mentally abstract theories of the 
state, say, from the places where real states are created and reproduced. This abstraction can be useful 
enough for theoretical analysis, which is after all a vital part of any research... But we should not be 
fooled by our own abstractions into imagining that processes can actually exist in an abstract way... 
States, for instance, can only exist concretely and hence enmeshed in all manner of contingent 
relations including spatial ones. Abstract theories of *the capitalist state'can only be a starting point in 
explaining what states do(Duncan 1989a p. 134). 
Unfortunately, the current literature in all social sciences is dominated by an 
understanding which assumes that there are only general processes occurring on the 
head of a pin. In this context it is not difficult to see a direct link between this 
attitude towards social processes and the dominance of the 'top-down' perspective in 
the literature (see Pickvance 1985). As Pickvance points out, this top-down 
perspective is essential and there should not be an argument with it: Tlowever, it has 
led to neglect the bottom-up' pressures from 'cities', 'regions', etc. (Pickvance 1985 4: ý
120). For this reason, we need to complement the top-down analysis with a bottom- 
up one. 
These two types of analysis have direct bearing on our discussion on hegemonic 
projects, and state and accumulation strategies. For instance, is it possible to achieve 
societal hegemony without making it local" Does the state 
keep its unity without 
controlling at least considerable amounts of its 
local extensions? Could an 
accumulation strategy become dominant without a corresponding 
'spatial division of C) 
labour'? Moreover, are all these so-called general processes independent of 
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bottom-up or grassroots pressures and struggles? It is clear that the preceding 
top-down perspective must be complemented with a bottom-up one to get a complete 
picture of previously discussed issueS2. 
In the following section I will extend my analysis of hegemonic projects, state and 
accumulation strategies to the local (urban) level to complete the analysis developed z! ) 
in the first section of this chapter. 
/I. /I. A Strategic Relational Approach to the Local (Urban). 
I will start with a discussion of the meaning and content definition of the 
local(locality)3 (Section 1) since only after we clear the meaning of the local can we 
proceed to a discussion of various forms of interaction between the local-scale 
processes and higher-scale processes (Section 11). In the light of these discussion I 
will examine the local political processes with a special emphasis on local projects 
competing for hegemony (Section IH). Then I will sum up the debate in the 
concluding section. 
2 Indeed, I shall suggest that such an intention (integrating top-down and bottom-up perspective) cc C 
requires much more examination in relation to the relationship between the social and space. But the 
problem is more complex than referred. When I allude, for instance, to the relationship between the 
global and the local, this does not include only a spatial relation. More obviously, the local cannot be 
identified with the spatial. Because the relationship between global and local. and local itself. refer to 
'two interconnected sets of processes, the social and spatial, which happen to produce particular 
combinations of social relations within a given geog-aphically delimited area' (Urry 1987). Then, to 
explain, for instance, local social relations one must consider both the relationship between the social 
and spatial, and the very nature of social relations themselves in this geographically delimited area. Cý 
31 w-11 use the concepts, 'local', 'locality' and 'urban' interchangeably. This is mainly due to the IC-
changing 'argon urban studies between 1970s and 1990s. While the concept 'urban' was the popular C ýj ý 
in 1970s, during the 1990s, the concepts, 'local' and 'locality' became popular. Although I am aware 
of the vagueness of the concept of local, I use it to denote the urban scale. The reason to prefer to use 
the concepts. local and locality is to provide a coherence with the literature I use in this section. 
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11.11.1. Defining the Local: 
As I mentioned above, the relationship between different scales refers to the 
problematic relationship between the social and spatial. For this reason any attempt 
aimed at understanding a particular scale, such as a local one, has to deal with this 
problematic relation. 
In the social sciences and particularly in urban sociology, there has been a long 
dominance of ideas that 'spatial processes' operate in some ways independently of 
social processes and that spatial patterns can be considered for their own right. 
Accordingly, as in the case of Chicago school, it has been assumed that so-called 
7spatial relations' are the analytical basis for understanding urban systems. The 
physical shape of cities as well as relations among people living in these places are 
assumed to be determined by these spatial relations. This understanding was 
representing an absolutist view of the space which assumes a strict separation 
between social and spatial. 
This way of thinking came under fire in the late 1960s, mainly, by Marxist 
researchers in the field. It was argued that there was no such spatial process 
independent of social processes. Instead, there are only social processes actincy in a n I 
spatial context. Further, it is also argued that since space is produced by society, it is 
nothing other than society. This view is based on a relativist view of space which 
asserts that space cannot have substance as it exists as a relation between the objects. 
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In recent years, as a third round, an approach which is critical of both 
understandings, has been growing around a relational understanding of space. 
Although they accept the starting assumption of Castells, they reject his final 
judgement that the spatial is social since it is produced by society. It is argued that it 
is quite right to assume that space is not something existing outside society and 
rather produced by society and that, space can only exist as a relation between 
objects which have substance. Space, on the other hand, doesn't have substance. 
However, by modifying the relativist view in one important way, it is argued that: 
For even though spatial relations are created by natural and social objects, it doesn't follow that the 
effects of these spatial relations can simply be reduced to the causal effects that these objects possess. 
Having been constituted by objects, spatial relations may taken go on to affect how, in what ways and 
even if these objects and their causal powers then relate... This spatial effect is still a secondary effect, 
and basic causes ... still reside in substance objects... But spatial relations now make a 
difference to how 
social and natural process work(Duncan 1989a p. 132). 
Despite my reservations on the realist view of science, I think such a middle position 
between spatial fetishism and amnesia is more promising than the preceding 
conceptionS4. 
In my view, the relational approach is better equipped to understand the society- 
space relationship, and if we accept this view, then, we have to start the definition of 
the local with its social constituents (since space is constituted by the social objects 
even if the former cannot be reduced to the latter). Put simply. the prime question we 
need to tackle is what specifies the locality. Nevertheless, the answer to this question 
is not that straightforward since each specific event takes place in a locality does not 
4Such a conception can help to overcome over-abstract accounts of social relations which 
leave no 
room for the variation of these relations in space and (time), 
hence, for human agency in creating these 
variations. Nevertheless, I am not identifying structures with national or international scales 
and 
C 
agency with a substantial and local scale. Nor 
do I identify the general with social and local with 
spatial. My only contention is to argue that any social processes. no matter whether 
local or national, C4 
are constituted in space and (time). 
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mean it is specific to that particular locality. Then, we need to face the classical 
distinction between 'of locality' and 'in locality'. My contention is that since the 
locality does not represent any more a power container as it was the case in city 
states (Saunders 1985), it is not possible to identify a social relation which 
characterise the locality independent of national and global scales. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean there is nothing specific to locality, and there are attempts to identify 
the specificity of locality in connection with the higher scales such as national and 
global oneS5. 
The current literature highlights this point very well. In this regard there seems to be Z: ý :: I- 
two subsequent orientations in the literature with regard to the analysis of relations 
between different spatial scales and their specificities. The first approach is based on 
the 'scale division of labour. It 'refers to the division of activities between different 
levels of the hierarchy of spatial scales, the territories composing it, therefore being 
nested'(see Cox and Mair 199 1). Castells is the forerunner of this approach, as I have 
shown in Chapter 1. As Cox and Mair point out, Castells(1977) identified the urban 
scale with collective consumption and the regional scale with industrial production. 
Taylor(1982) equated the local scale with everyday experience, the national scale 
with political structures and the global scale with economic structure. Smith (1994), 
on the other hand, identified the urban scale with the equalisation of abstract labour, 
In this sense, as Duncan points out, 'there is after all no necessary reason why causal mechanisms 
should only operate on a world scale or even a national scale. We know that social mechanisms are 
historically specific as people create particular societies... But, by the same token, we must admit 
spatial specificity. Capitalism has never been a total world system and the depth of its social 
penetration varies from place to place... But if we are to admit the national scale based on an 
appreciation of national specificities then there is no good reason to reject. a priori, the local scale' 
(Duncan 1989b-, 235). 
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(daily labour markets) and the global scale with the universalisation of wacye labour Z: ý
(capitalist production system). The national scale is defined with political control 
over labour, whereas the regional scale was said to differentiate different production 
sectors (Cox and Mair 1991 p. 200). 
The value of such attempts to determine the specificity of each spatial scale is clear. 
Yet, in my view they conceptualise the locality at a either too high level of 
,a 1% abstraction, as in the case of Smith who equates the local scale with the equalisation 
of abstract labour (daily labour market), or too concrete as in the case of Taylor 
which identifies the local scale with everyday life6. They either exclude many issues, 
such as urban land and locational conflicts as in the case of Castells and SrnIth, or 
conceive the locality as a chaotic place where everything takes place. 
In my own view, we can specify four socio-spatial processes as being characteristic 
of locality7. The first one, following Castells, is the process of collective 
consumption. The second one is the processes arising out of issues around urban land 
such as spatial proximity. Although some attention has been paid to urban land 
(Gottdiener (1985) and Scott (1990), the urban land question remained as one of the 
neglected issue in urban studies. I think struggles given around urban land constitutes Z-11) Z) 
6For instance, in the case of Castells, the identification of the urban with the consumption practices is 
derived from an Althusserian conception of modes of production. Such a conception excludes many 
practices which can be included in the content definition of locality. 
7 My own content definition bears important similarities with Pickvance's (1985b). He outlines three 
social processes as being characteristics of the urban. The first one is the process of collective 
consumption as in Castells' and Dunleavy's formulations. The second one is the processes arisinc, out 
of spatial proximity as in the Cox's (1978) and Scott's (1980) conceptions. Local level political 
processes are the third one which can be included to the content of urban. Pickvance's content 
definition of urban overcomes 'some' of the difficulties which are peculiar to previous conceptions. 
However, it does not cover important issues which are particularly central to urban/local processes 
such as urban land and local dependence. 
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one of the distinctive issue which specifies the locality. The third one concerns the 
local political processes around the local state. These are mainly social elements of 
the content definition of local scale. 
These three issues are central to the local-level social and political relations and 
holds a central position in local-level social conflicts. But they are hardly the only 
issues around which different groups form the locality as a spatial fix. I think there is 
another aspect which provides a base for defining the locality as a meaningful scale, 
and that is, local dependency (See Cox and Mair (199 1) and Harvey (I 985a)). 
Different actors in a different degree become dependent to a locality. The working 
class becomes tied to a locality through the labour and housing markets. Likewise, 
petty producers and small-scale enterprises invest in a locality and their future 
becomes very much dependent upon the prosperity of that particular locality. Even 
the big businesses which invest in a particular locality, though to a much lesser 
extent, becomes tied to the locality. This is the main that factor brings a structured 
coherence to a locality (Harvey 1985a) and makes the locality a meaningful unit of 
analysis. 
Related to this issue is the definition of the boundaries of the locality. It is on this 
point rather than on the content definition I find the labour-market an important 
determinant. In other words, despite criticisms, I think the local labour market rrUcrht 4: ) 
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be a useful criterion in drawing the boundaries of locailty8. (Cooke 1987, Warde 
1990, Smith 1984). 
11.11.11. Relating the Locality to Higher Scales: 
It is clear, on the one hand, that general processes does not fully explain what is 
going on in particular place. But, it is again true that it is impossible understand this 
uniqueness without referring to general processes since Ihe social and economic 
structure of any given local area will be a complex result of combination of that 
area's succession of roles within the series of wider, national and international spatial 
division of labour' (Massey 1978 p. 116). The methodological question, as Massey 
puts it, is how to keep a grip on the generality of events, the wider processes lying C) 
behind them, without losing sight of the individuality of the form of their occurrence. 
Despite her emphasis on the successive role of a locality within the series of wider, 
national and international spatial division of labour, Massey does not pursue this 
aspect and concentrate on the uniqueness of the locality. However, we can find in 
Harvey, what is m-issing as an intermediary step in Massey's analysis. 
There are important insights into such intermediate steps in Harvey's classification of 
alternative options for localities within the larger division of labour. The options are 
'divided into four types, roughly emphasising the contrasts between cities as 
workshops for production; cities as consumption artifacts; cities as centres of 
8 They also argue against the validity of local labour market as legitimating criterion for the locality. 
They assert that, first of all, it is difficult to characterise the local labour market in the sense that some 
jobs may have very different labour market characteristics in various places. If a set of jobs in any 
place which are open to all residents of that locality characterises the locality, they go on to argue that, Cý 0 
it seems to be impossible. Because, in one place there are a variety of segmented 
labour markets. Cý 
Further, the spatial boundaries of any labour market for different groups are likely vary. Then, it is 
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information, finance capital and administration; and cities as redistributive centres' 
(Harvey, 1985b-, 269,1985a). However these four options are not mutually exclusive 
and some cities may do well on more than one option. Before going to study each 
unique city or locality, it seems to me possible to find certain common points among 
the cities that have common functions on the basis of these options. Having the 
workshop functions, for instance, gives important clues about the cities' employment 
structure, consumption pattern, political culture so forth. In this sense, before 
jumping into the uniqueness of each city/locality, it might be useful to study these 
alternative options for cities and consider each locality with reference to its place 
within this spatial division of labour. 
Although Harvey's approach provides important insights into a satisfactory 
understanding of local and higher level processes, it does not provides us with a 
methodological point of view on the study of the interaction between different 
, geographical scales, and without such a perspective, a satisfactory understanding of D tn 
this interaction becomes difficult, if not impossible. 
Duncan and Goodwin (1989) provide a proper starting point with regard to the two 
sorts of relations between a locality and higher levels by considering the above zn 
debate on the spatiality of the social. They make a distinction between contingent 
local variations and causal local processes. The former refers to the contingent 
effects of a spatial pattern peculiar to the locality. The latter, on the other hand, 
difficult, if not impossible to employ the local labour market to define he boundaries of locality 
(Duncan and Savage 1989 pp. 187-8). 
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implies local specificity of generative social relations (Duncan and Goodwin 1988; 
Duncan 1989b; of Urry 1987). 
In the first example, the difference that local processes make on national level 
processes can be identified with spatial contingency. Let me take the example in 
Figure H. L We observe a state intervention in the housing field. Further, we also see 
the concentration of investments in certain localities rather than others. In this case 
the previous concentration of substandard housing in this particular locality was to 
affect, contingently, where the investment on housing took place rather than causing 
it. 
By the second kind of relation, a concentration of investments is observed. But in 
this case, such a concentration is attributed to the struggles given by the locally 
specific social forces as is seen in Figure H. 111. Here, causal local processes are 
socially generative. In this sense, variation is not a matter of the contingent effects of 
spatial patterns. By the same token, it is helpful to return relative merits of bottom-up 
and top-down approaches in these two specific examples. For the first case, (spatial 
contingency) top-down explanations are more explanatory than the bottom-up ones 
due to the fact that causal mechanism and processes take place on a more broader 
framework than the local level. Nevertheless, this abstract research must be 
complemented by bottom-up concrete research to show how the spatIal features of 
locality will affect this social process. In the second case, on the other hand, there is a 
local causal process which requires abstract research as well. In this regard. CD 
bottom-up explanations are as important as top-down explanations. In sum, in any 
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case, it is necessary to use these perspectives together even if their relative merits 
change according to the case in hand. 
Figure III Contingent local variation: the case of local housing 
General processes 
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Up to this point, I have intended to show that there is no such general process that are 
independent of spatial structures in general, and of geographically delimited 
countless localities specifically. Nevertheless, I don't claim that these locally 
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produced mechanisms are the only, even most important ones, and there is no general 
social processes as such. It is clear that general processes are at least as important as 
local processes. Rather, my contention is to show that there are local variations as a 
matter of the contingent effects of spatial arrangements as well as local causal 
variations. I have argued, at the beginning of this section that in order to grasp local- 
social relations, one must consider both the relationship between the social and 
spatial and the very nature of social relations themselves in this geographically 
delimited area. I have shown the importance of space for the social relations as a 
contingent factor. The very same debate has also shown the importance of the local 
social relations themselves vis-a-vis general social relations, when I have examined 
the local causal variation'. Now, I go on to examine these local relations in the light 
of preceding debates. 
11.11.111. Local Projects and Strategies: 
Even if there are important disagreements in the conceptualisation of local social 
relations and spatial structures, there is an agreement that they do matter. In the light 
of these debates I go on to examine (social and spatial) constitutions of the 
hegemonic project, the state and accumulation strategies at the local (urban) level. 
So far, we saw that there can be two types of relation between national (or global) 
and local processes-, local contingency and local causal variation, and seldomly we 
can also see a locality effect. I think this classification provides us an important 
starting point for the analysis of hegemonic projects, state and accumulation 
strategies with reference to their local dimension. N.. 
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In the preceding section, I discussed the hegemonic project through a top-down 
understanding. Now, I would like to complete the discussion by relating it to local C 
contingency and locally derived processes. What the analysis above has shown is 
that a hegemonic project can interact with local-level processes in two ways. On the 
one hand, can be affected by local processes contingently. For instance, a locality, 
due to its strategic location, lets say as a port city, might becomýe important for a 
hegemonic project which is based on an export-oriented growth strategy. Here, the 
locality might become vital for this hegemonic project due to its strateuic location ltý 
which can be considered a contingent factor. It is quite likely that this particular 
locality would become a winner within this hegemonic project and locally powerful 
groups would exploit this fortune to the end. 
On the other hand, the locality can create its fortune by either acting in line with the 
hegemonic project or sometimes, perhaps seldomly, acting against it. For instance, a 
local alliance may judge the hegemonic project and its spatial logic and act Cý 
accordingly. This would bring a locality into a better situation in the spatial division tý 
of labour. More dramatically, a local alliance can act against the hegemonic project 
by following its politico-cultural tradition. In this case, it would act as a counter- 
hecremonic project. By and large, in this kind of situation, the 
local hegemonic 
project is stimulated by political rather than economic corporate concerns. 
The 
success of this kind of counter-hegemonic mobilisation 
depends upon vanous factors 
ranging from the mobilisation of resources to the 
leadership and its strategies. More 
importantly however, the success is also determined by overcoming the scale a! 
Cý problem. That is, a counter-hegemonic project would 
hardly be successful against a 
hegemonic project which is organised at a nation-state 
level unless it goes beyond its 
Cý 
C-5 4-: ) 
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local boundaries by forming alliances with similar projects or by becoming a part of 
a national-level organisation which itself represents a counter-hegemonic project. 
In sum, there seems to be three alternatives in front of localities vis-a-vis the 
national-level hegemonic project. It can remain passive and get contingently effected 
by it. It might become active and use the opportunities to improve Its posltion in the 
spatial division of labour. Finally, it might act against the hegemonic project as a 
counter-hegemonic force either individually at the local level or as a part of a nation- 
wide counter-hegemonic project. 
Having analysed the position of a locality vis-a-vis the national-level hegernonic 
project, I would like to turn to the local level itself. Such an analysis is necessary 
because any alliance does pursue a position. Locality itself hardly becomes a 
conflict-free unity. There are always alternative projects of different group and 
classes towards the locality and these groups need not to be locally dependent 
groups. As we saw above, a national-level hegemonic project assumes a spatial 
division of labour among the localities. It is not that seldom that some cities become 
a specific target of these projects due to their strategic importance for the project. It is 
a common practice nowadays to promote some cities as finance centres and a world 
cities. These kinds of projects often brings international, national and local forces 
together to promote the city. 
In some other cases, local coalitions try to promote and revitalise the fortune of the 
city. This is the situation for many cities that speciallsed as a workshops 
in the 
previous round of the spatial division of labour. Cities like Manchester and 
Liverpool 
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are the best known example of these kinds of cities. Led by locally powerful groups, 
the projects in these cities aims at establishing hegemony in the city around a 
discourse which emphasises the common interests of the whole city and, as I will 
discuss in more detail below, the local state often plays an articulatory role in the 
formation of the local coalition and establishment of hegemony at the local level. 
Those local projects that aimed at gaining a better position in the spatial division of 
labour by exploiting the opportunities created by the national-level hegemonic 
project are not the only option. It may not be as often and as easy as these kinds of 
projects; there might be a local level project which challenges the parameters of 
higher level projects as well as the local-level power structure. It might try to bring 
popular forces together to form a counter hegemony in the locality. It is obvious that 
the change of success for them is limited comparing those who remain in line with 
the dominant economic and political relations in and above locality. The GLC 
experience in London can be seen as an example of this kind of attempt and it was 
eliminated by the Thatcher Government for the reason that it challenged the 
Thatcherite project. 
There is another group of projects which is different from the examples mentioned 
n I.. above in that, although they are involved in local-level issues such as collective 4_: ý 
consumption, neighbourhood quality, their struggle concentrates on a part of the 
locality rather than the whole locality. Urban social movements are usual examples 
of these kind of partial projects towards the city. They usually but not necessarily 
come into conflict with the dominant project in the city. Yet, as they organise Cý 
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themselves around issues, they disappear when either they achieve their objective or 
they realise that it is impossible to achieve. 
I will discuss local-level projects in detail by referring to six main constitutive 
dimensions. The focal point of the project refers to the way in which urban space is 
articulated into the project. That is, a project might see the urban space as source of 
profit (exchange value), or it can be seen as a space for daily use (use value), or a 
means of expression of an identity (identity value). By type of space, I understand 
either a concrete space as a living place or an abstract space which serves as an 
exchange or identity value. Social base and leading force refer to a social base to 
which the project is directed and to the main social force which leads the project by 
articulating a social base into the project. Locus of consciousness refers to different 
loci such as the individual, household, community, state and class. Institutional 
forms refer to the institutional forms the project is organised into and to the attitude 
taken towards the (local) state. Finally, urban planning constitutes an important 
dimension and battle field of hegemonic struggles. In what follows in this section, I 
aim to provide a detailed account of these dimensions. 
In terms of the focal oint of project, Logan and Molotch (1987) provide a grood p 41: ý C) 
introduction9. The basic points of their approach can be surnmarised as follows: 
Urban space is a social product arising out of the negotiation of the tension that 
9 In their recent study Logan and Molotch (1987) have proposed a theoretical framework for urban 
studies, which aims to overcome shortcomings of existing capital and action-oriented approaches to 
the urban question. Their aim is no less than to overcome the duality between agency and structure as 
well as that between alobal and local for urban studies. In this sense, their work provides a convenient 
starting point for a strategic relational approach to urban studies. Yet, their study is too restrictive to 
contain all the elements of the urban question which I discussed above. There is also economic 
reductionism in their approach. 
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exists between use value and exchange value. They argue that any given piece of real Z--I, 
estate has both a use value and an exchange value. An apartment building, for 
example, provides a bome'for resident (use value) while at the same time generating 
rent for resident (exchange value) (Logan and Molotch, 1987; 2). This duality defines 
the structural location of urban actors. That is, 
r 
individuals and groups differ on which aspect (use or exchange) is most crucial to their own lives. For CI 
example, place represents residence or production site; for others, places represent a commodity for buying, selling or renting to somebody else'(ibid. p. 2). 
In sum, the conflict between use and exchange value constitutes the material basis of 
urban conflicts' 0. They further argue that, 
Ihis conflict closely determines the shape of the city, the distribution of people, and the way they live 
together. Similarly in the light of this tension we can better understand the political dynamics of cities, 
realons and discover how inequalities in and between places -a stratification of place as well as of C individuals and groups- are established and maintained'(Ibid. p. 2). 
I agree with Logan and Molotch in that urban space is 'a battle ground between those 
who wish to use the city as a means for enhancing the use values of citizens and 4: ) 
those for whom the city is an asset in money making, projects involving urban space'. 4D 
However, there is a third kind of purpose in the use of urban space which is not 
directly captured by use and exchange values. There is sometimes a very specific 
purpose of consumption that is to enhance one's identity (see Warde, 1992; 18)" 
Warde argues that: 4 
101n fact, understanding the urban conflict around the conflict between use and exchange value i's 
hardly original. Lefebvre (1979) represents one of the first who pointed to this duality as the central 
conflict of capitalist urbanisation. I will apply his insights in the following parts of this section. 
II In my view, the distinction between use and exchange values employed by Marx belongs to a level C r-1 
of abstraction where there is no place for identity value. I think the employment of identity value Is 
possible in a lower level of abstraction where cultural and political categories also play their part. In 
Das Capital, where Marx discuss the value, exchange and use value there is no discussion of the state 
or cultural issues either. 
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"The sociological literature has some grasp of this -it is embedded in Weber's analysis of' status, Veblen's concept of conspicuous consumption and Bourdieu's notion of distinction. Style, status, 
C group identification, etc., are aspects of identity-value, where people choose to display commodities or 
engage in different spheres of consumption with a view to expressing their identity. Certain objects, 
and participation in certain activities are coveted for their social-symbolic value, placing the consumer 
in a social circle" (Warde, 1992; 18). 
Thus it is possible to argue that the built environment itself and certain (collective) 
means of consumption become not only the source of use and exchange value but 
also 'a positional commodity through which some individuals and groups define their 
identity and mark a distinction (see Bourdieu, 1984)12. One of the striking examples 
of this aspect is the use of urban space by 'marginal groups' such as gay 
communities. While they use urban space as a place of residence, they equally 
emphasise their identity in this use. 
In sum, we can argue that the urban-development process is an overdetermined 
outcome of continuing struggle between the conflicting purposes of various Z: ) 
individuals, groups and organisations. Some of these struggles are specific to the 
urban. I share Logan's and Molotch's view that the principal opposition is between 
those who pursue use values around urban land and certain commodities subject to 
state intervention, and those who see those items as a source of exchange value, by 
adding an identity dimension 13. 
12Nevertheless, identity value should not be considered as something outside economic relations. The 
aeneral relation between different forms of value is ultimately determined by economic struggles. It is 
especially quite fragile against the exchange value. That is, there is convertibility between identity and 
exchange values. Housing, for instance. is an excellent example of these complex relations. Gentrified 
housinc, confers social status, meaning and prestige but has also a use and exchange value. While the Zý 4-1 C 
location, history and architecture of the housing make a distinction for the owner, the very same C, 
features can be convertible to exchange value. This example shows that spatial proximity is also 
important in terms of identity value. 
' Zukin(1992) defines two types of built environments: landscape and vernacular. Landscapes' are Ii 
always constituted by asymmetrical power and forms around institutions such as markets. 
It is the 
place of the powerful. "Vernacular', on the other hand, refers to the 
built environment of the powerless. 
it is more immediate and private whereas landscape is more 
'public'. This extremity is blurred by the 
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On the other hand, while arguing that the localities are constituted and transformed 
by conflicting interests, this does not mean that the changes are not equal for 
different groups. Neither are interests established freely without taking structures 
which are constraining and enabling. As Lake (1990) points out: 
"The case for an 'interest-driven social construction of cities' will always be incomplete if it ignores 
the prior questions of how and why interests are established. Activists are surely important. but only as 
they have become spectacularly adept at exploiting the potentialities offered by capitalist structure. A 
focus on agents and their interests demands elucidation of the structures that provide opportunities for 
the pursuit and realisation of particular kinds of interests through particular ways and means in 
particular times and places" (Lake, 1990; 180). 
In this sense, renters, local capital, residents, politicians and their plans, dreams and 
strategies beg the context. As far as the economic context concerned, I find Harvey's 
approach useful in that it establishes a link between a dornInant regime of 
accumulation and dominant mode of urbanisation. In my view it has heuristic value. 
Harvey argues that there has been a correspondence between a Keynesian (Fordist) 
regime of accumulation and the urban experience of that period. For him, 'the 
Keynesian city was shaped as a consumption artifact and its social, economic, and 
political life organised around the theme of state-backed, debt-financed consumption' 
in line with the dominant regime of accumulation (Harvey, 1985a; 206). This model 
of urbanisation not only reflected the logic of Keynesian economic policies, but was 
also a constituting part of it by opening new investment opportunities for 
over- accumulated capital. He finds similar relationships between a post-Fordist 
(Keynesian) regime of accumulation and a post-Keynesian city. 
intervention of the state but never superseded. There is always a 
battle between landscape and 
vernacular to transform each other. Usually, vernacular 
becomes landscape and loses the battle. Yet. it 
appears in another place. 
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Now my argument is that the potentialities offered by this economic context for 
urban actors who search for use value were relatively high during the long post-war 
period of the Keynesian regime of accumulation. It would not be wrong to argue that 
in the current context of so-called post-fordist regimes of accumulation it is other 
way around. The changing combination of wage/profit and consumption/investment 
rates in favour of capital associated with lower rates of unionisation, reduction of 
internal labour markets to a smaller core workforce, and lower rates of militancy 
created a structural context pressing the urban actors to search for a maximum 
amount of exchange value (Pretecielle, 198 1; 9). Thus, it seems to me quite important 
to understand these structural conditions, both constraining and enabling the actors. 
The type of value dominating urban space is very much related to the A*Pe of space. 
Following Lefebvre, I will define two types of spaces: abstract and concrete spaces 
(Lefebvre 199 1). Gregory surnmarises this conception very succinctly: 
'Lefebvre's account is based on the distinction between exchange value and use value that lies at the 
heart of Marx's analysis of the commodity. Whereas Marx's critique of political economy privileged 
history over geography, however, Lefebvre tries to make the 'silent spaces' of Capital speak. He 
transform Marx's original opposition one between the 'abstract space' of capitalism's economi L- IIII Ic 
and political systems -externalised, rationalised, sanctioned- and the swirling, kaleidoscopic 'lived 
space' of everyday life. The tension between these spaces transcodes a distinction between integration 
and differentiation that admits of no final s olution'(Gre gory 1994; 275). 
In this sense, abstract space is produced by two interrelated processes. The first one 
is the commodification of and through space, which inserts property relations at the 
centre of space whereby space itself becomes a commodity bought and sold in the 
market. The second one is the bureaucratisation of and through space. Space does 
not only become a means of control and surveillance but also itself subjected to these 
processes. On the other hand, concrete space refers to space of everyday life where 
there is a continuous treat of the capitalist economy and the state to colonise concrete 
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space and turn it to abstract space. in this sense, urban space has different uses. It 
might be a subject and arena of capital accumulation and profit. At the same time it 
can be again a subject and arena of surveillance, control and bureaucrat'sation. 
Finally, it can be a space of daily life where, in a capitalist society, its main functions 
appears to be the reproduction of labour power. 
In these struggles, different projects targets a different locus of consciousness. As, we 
discussed in Chapter 1, Harvey defines five loci of urban consciousness: 
individualism, family, community, the state and class. I will agree with Harvey on 
that 'no one locus of consciousness-formation can be understood independently of its 
relation to the others. It is the total patterning of interrelations between them that 
counts'(Harvey 1985b). I will go further, however, to argue that each project towards 
the city implicitly or explicitly proposes a specific patteming of consciousness- 
formation which places some of these loci in front of the others. For instance, a new 
right project proposes a special patterning which places individualism at the centre of 
the locus of urban consciousness, while the family and community stand as second 
tiers of consciousness-formation. The state, except its law and order functions, and 
class have entirely refused to play a role as the locus of consciousness -formation. 
This is perhaps nothing other than reversal of a pattern of consciousness-formation in 
Keynesian city where the class and state as welfare state played central roles 
compared to individualism and the family. 
It should also be noted that there might be a obstructive relationship 
between 
different locus of consciousness. One of the classical examples is the one between 
class and community. It has been shown that in many studies, among the migrant IC I'D 
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population, the formation of consciousness within an ethnic community has played 
an obstructive role for the formation of consciousness on the basis of class (see Rex 
and Moore (1967), also Pickvance (1977)). For this reason, the patterning and 
articulation of different locus of consciousness constitute an important aspect of the 
formation of a project and this articulation plays a substantial role in the success of it. 
It should also be noted that a specific articulation of a different locus of 
consciousness of a certain period might become a obstacle in the following round of 
urbanisation. For instance, while the community based consciousness plays a 
positive role for the capitalist class for a certain period, since it prevents the 
development of class-based consciousness among the working class, the very same 
community-based consciousness might become obstructive itself in another period 
for the same class, since it becomes an obstacle for capital accumulation. 
Creating a pattern of urban consciousness within a social base is very much related 
to the social,, economic and cultural characteristics of the very same social base. One 
of the determinant of the properties of the social base in a locality is the locality's 
succession of roles within the wider national and international division of labour. 
That is, if a locality has been a workshop and production centre, then one of the 
features of the social base would be a working-class existence and culture in the 
social base; and for a finance and command centre, middle-class existence would be 
very pressing in the social base. It is not my claim however that the whole 
characteristic of the social base could be read off from the role of the locality in the 
spatial division of labour. Although we can have some inference for the ethnic and 
gender-based characteristics of the locality on this basis. nevertheless, a satisfactory 
understanding of them requires specific research into the very same social 
base. 
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Another issue regarding the social base Is the relationship between the project 
towards the city and the social base it targets. I will argue that a project targeting the 
whole locality has two different strategies towards the social base. The first one is 
that the project could be a one locality (city) project in the sense that it is expansive 
as much as it could afford towards the social base. The second one is a nvo localities 
(cities) project which targets a core section of the social base and which is central to 
the project and excludes those who would not be economically and politically 
significant for the project14 
In the transformation of the targeted social base into a social base, a hegemonic 
project needs to transcend short-term material interests. By using Gramsci's I 
language, this involves transcending economic-corporate interests for political ones 
(Grarnsci 1971; 161). Any project competing for local hegemony has to achieve this Z: ) 
in order to gain the hegemony. 
In the transformation of the social base into a social force, as is well-known, Gramsei 
devotes a crucial role to 'organic intellectuals' in transcending the economic 
corporate interests in favour of politic o-ideologic al. ones by creating a corresponding 
form of consciousness in the social base. In this sense, we can define a group of 
organic intellectuals for an urban project as well. But I will divert from the 
Gramscian understanding of the role allocated for the organic intellectual for the 
reason that Gramsci creates a strong dualism between the masses and organic C 4- 
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intellectuals in terms of level of consci 15. In my view there might be some ousness 
role for the leadership and organic intellectuals in the creation of a political 
consciousness. But I see their main role in the articulation of different aspects of the 
project and social forces within and around a project. At the local level, the orbeanic 
intellectual contains vast array of groups and people includi ians, ing politici 
bureaucrats, academics, planners and so on. 
Achievements of this objective is also very much dependent upon 'the availability of 
organisational forms to act as vehicles for the social force' (Pickvance 1977; 180). 
We can classify these organisation on the basis of their followers and members 
objectives in local politics: use value, exchange value and identity value-seeking 
organisations. We can also categorise them on the basis of their attitudes towards the 
formalised political system. They can either reject being a part of the formalised 
political system in order to escape the constraint imposed by institutional politics as 
in the case of urban social movements (Castells 1977,1983), or can become a part of 
it and use institutional channels such as local political parties. While the former type 
of organisations puts pressures from without, the latter types advance their interest C) 
within the formal political system. 
14 Of course, both cases are ideal types in the sense that there will always be considerable exclusion 
under a one city project and there will be always concessions to the excluded to keep them under 
control. 
15For a criticism of this elite-mass model see Furedi (1992-, 258-60). Furedi points out that Gramsci 
underestimates the potential of masses and overestimates the capacity of intellectuals to teach. and it 
is a mistake to reduce the learning process to education by knowledge transfer from elite to masses. 
This view ignores the fact that real learning comes from experience. As Furedi asserts 'experience 
shows that consciousness is susceptible to ggeat fluctuations and becomes transformed as reality 
changes' (Furedi 1992; 259). While agreeing with this criticism, I will argue that there is a great role 
played by leadership and organic intellectuals in organising the struggle. This does not simply refer to 
a teaching function. The most crucial function of leadership is to articulate different aspects of the 
project into a coherent whole. 
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In this sense, the local state emerges as the most important institutional structure in L- 
local politics. As Logan and Molotch admit, 'urban governments became battle 
grounds between those who wish to use the city as a means for enhancing the use 
values of citizens and those for whom the city is an asset in money-making projects 
involving urban space'. Yet, their analysis of the state suddenly turns into an 
instrumentalist one when they argue that the space entrepreneurs are hegemon' ic and 
local governments are mere tools to generate growth (Logan and Molotch, 1990; 
87)16. This is more likely but not necessarily the case. From time to time, the local 
state can be captured by those who seek use values in urban space. The local state, as 
a part of state apparatus, is a form-determined social relation in the sense that it is a 
distinctive institutional form as well as a relation reflecting the balance of political 
forces in society. Given this characteristic, it is open to the pressures of those who 
seek use values in urban space. The degree to which the local state responds to these 
pressures are determined by the balance of power among contradictory local forces. 
Likewise it would not be wrong to see the local state, like the overall state 
apparatuses, as a site, generator and product of strategies towards the locality. I will 
not go into detail here as I discussed this issues in the first section, I will only discuss 
those issues which are distinctive in relation to the local state. The local state is a site 
where its structure is more open to some groups than others depending on the Z: ) 
strategies followed by these groups. This refers to the fact that there are different 
changes for different strategies followed by the same forces. For instance, use-value In 
16 Their pessimism is partly due to the fact that they work on the specific case of United States cities, 
where business and local government have had very close relation in local politics. For this reason 
their analysis of the local state is victim to empiricism. 
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seeking groups could demand some changes to have access to the local state with 
certain strategies and no change at all with some other strategies. The local state is 
also a site where strategies are elaborated in the sense that local managers plays a 
crucial role in providing the unity of the local state apparatus vis-a-v, is contradictory 
demands and pressures within and without the local state. Finally, it is a product of 
strategies in that it is a product of past political strategies. 
Local state strategies are the overdetermined outcome of these three dimensions and 
refer to (a) specific form of intervention in the local economy, (b) a specific form of 
representation of interests within the local state apparatus(es) and (c) a specific form 
of the intemal organisation of the local state. A project would become hegemonic to 
the extent that it has a privileged position to determine who would be benefited at 
the expense of others regarding these three areas. In this sense, it would not be an 
exaggeration to argue that the local state constitutes the most strategic institutional 
locus of struggles for local hegemony. 
If the local state represents the most important institution at the local level, urban 
planning constitute one of the most strategic niches within the web of 
instrumentalities of the (local) state. I define urban planning as a means of state 
intervention in the urban development process towards the production, use and 
management of the built environment. It contains such a vast area 
from the 
regulation of the field of collective consumption (Castells 
1977), to the maintenance 
and reproduction of fixed capital including urban 
land (Harvey 1978), and the 
It) 
regulation of spatial organisation which 
facilitates the circulation. In line with its 
function in the production and reproduction of the capitalist city, it is 
like the state, a 
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form-determined social relation. On the one hand, it is an arena of conflicting to 
interests and reflects the balance of political power between these conflicting 
interests such as those who search for exchange value and those who search use 
values. On the other hand, it is an institution with its own organisation, personnel c 
and rules, which provides the planners who monopolise the knowledge with 
considerable power and autonomy. In this context, a successful hegemony 
requires to having a degree of power on the planning processes. In case of the 
establishment of this hegemony on the planning itself, under the guise of the 
'technical neutrality of planning', the development plan regarding the locality can 
become a blue print of the local hegemonic project. However, it would be a fatal 
mistake to consider planning as a simple tool in the hand of locally hegemonic 
forces. Urban planing is a very complex and Janus-faced process which might 
become an impediment for the very same social forces. This is partly due to the fact 
that while hegemony requires continuous redefinition of its objectives and strategies, 
planning is less flexible, as it assign functions and roles to urban space for a certain 
period17. Besides, it is very rare that a project which becomes hegemonic has a 
chance to form its own development plan but inherits a planning framework of the 
previous period. In turn, either it adapts itself by manipulating itself or tries to 
eliminate itself for a new one. In this sense, although planning becomes an important Z-- 
institution for the hegemonic project to capture, it is a conflict-ridden one which 
needs to be tackled by the hegemonic project in due course. 
17 That is partly why there has been a move from a so-called static comprehensive plannincr to a more 
IIIIý is flexible strategic planning In most of the capitalist countries during the last tNvo decades or so. Thi 
ynesian one. change can be considered a response to the transition to post-Keynesian city 
from a Ke 
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11. Ill. Concluding Remarks: 
In this section of Chapter 11,1 have shown that the social relations and processes such 
as the hegemonic project, state and accumulation strategies and their outcomes do 
not take place on the head of a pin. Rather, they take place in countless localities and 
therefore spatially differentiated. Embarking upon this understanding, I approached 
these processes with a bottom-up understanding. I have first illustrated the forms of 
interaction between the so-called general processes and the local one. It became clear 
that the local processes might effect the general one contingently or they can make a 
difference through locally casual processes. What this classification demonstrated is 
that localities are not only the places that can make a difference on the general 
processes such as struggles for hegemony, but they themselves become an arena of 
these struggles as such. In other words, the locality may become a target of 
hegemonic projects of different groups who are fighting for hegemony at the local 
level to advance their interest. 
I have shown that those who see the locality around similar interest may assemble 
around a project to establish hegemony over the locality. A local hegemonic project 
contains various elements ranging from a leadership to a social base. I argued that Cý 
there are two main strategies in front of a project regarding the social base. 
It might 
aim at an expansive hegemony by targeting ideally the support of the entire t-D 
population of the locality (one locality project). Alternatively, 
it can aim at a more 
limited hegemony by excluding certain sections of the social base which is not 
strategically important for the construction of hegemony 
(two localities project). I 
have also argued that the mobilisation. of the targeted social 
base is not an automatic rý Cý 
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process which requires the creation of a pattern of consciousness in line with the basic 
premises of the hegemonic project. In this process, the leadership, institutional 
framework, including the local state, plays a central part. Nevertheless, even when the 
hegemony is established successfully, there will be resistance and alternative projects 
fighting for alternative hegemony. 
In the following four chapter I will analyse the trajectory of the Turkish state (Chapter 
111), Turkish urbanisation (Chapter IV), and the case of state capital Ankara (Chapter 
V, and VI) through the theoretical framework developed in this chapter. 
If the definition of the a bourgeois revolution is restricted to 
successful installation of a legal and political framework in 
which the free development of capitalist property relations is 
assured, there is no necessary reason why a 'bourgeois 
revolution' need to be the direct work of the bourgeiosie' 
(Gareth Stedman Jones; 1977). 
It was Revolution itself that created the consciousness of the 
strata between aristocracy and the people as a middle class or 
classe moyenne ... It was middle class in two senses. 
In the first 
place, the Third Estate, which declared itself to be 'the nation' 
in 1798, was, speaking operationally, not the nation itself but 
what the Abbe Sieyes ... called 'available classes' of that 
Estate; namely in the world of Colin Lucas, 'the solid, unified 
group of professional men', the middle rank of society... That 
they also saw themselves, quite sincerely, as representing the 
interests of the entire nation ... In the second place, the 
'available classes' of the Third Estate who thus naturally 
became the shapers of the new France were in the middle in 
another sense. They found themselves politically and socially 
opposed to both the aristocracy above and the people below 
E. J. Hobsbawn; 1990). 
CHAPTER III: 
THE KEMALIST PROJECT AND ITS TRAJECTORY 
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CHAPTER Ill. THE KEMALIST PROJECT AND ITS 
TRAJECTORY 
Ill. I. Introduction 
The Kernalist project has held a very special position vis-a-vis the other political 
projects in Turkey. Any political project claiming a space in Turkish politics has to 
measure itself against the Kernalist project which has defined the parameters of the 
political system. In a way, the Kernalist project functions as a yardstick by which 
other projects define themselves. In certain cases, it becomes the 'other' of the 
alternative projects. In others, it serves as a point of departure by providing 
guidelines. In turn, it is not surprising to see its marks on other projects. Whereas its 
secularism and so- called revolutionary aspects have appealed to some quarters of the 
left, its nationalism and totalitarian character have seduced the radical right. Even, 
for the religious right, for whom the Kemalist project provided its other, it has 
became a major problem to define itself vis-a-vis the Kernalist project and eradicate 
the secular political system. 
For the same reasons, any study referring to the post-independence politics of 
Turkey cannot avoid an encounter with Kernalism at some point. 
Such an encounter 
is a sine qua non for this thesis too, as it studies the development of the state capital, 
Ankara, as an integral part of nation-state formation. This chapter sets out to 
discuss 
Cý Kernalism as a nation-state fonnation project and evaluate its trajectory in the 
light 
of the theoretical framework proposed in the chapter 
11. 
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There are considerable difficulties in providing a clear definition of Kernalism and its 
project. In the first place, the legend and myth created around Kernalism have erected 
major ideological and political barriers. Likewise, the distorted accounts of Ottoman 
history as the other of the Kemalist project contribute to the problems in providing 
an account of the latter. Secondly, as discussed earlier, the lack of a clear perspective 
on the state - society relationship obstructs a satisfactory theorisation of Kernalism as 
the latter stands at the very cross-section of this relationship. Furthennore, and 
perhaps more importantly, it is difficult to define a hard core of Kemalism which is 
not subject to revision, as even in its very hard core, Kernalism has remained 
vulnerable to manipulation and change in the face of external pressures. It is not 
difficult to see the reflections of these ambiguities and confusions in current 
perspectives on the Kernalist project. In this chapter my objective is to provide an 
alternative perspective on Kernalism by drawing upon the strategic relational 4 
approach. 
Section H provides a discussion on the_ nature of Ottoman society and state as a 
background. Section III turns to the Kemalist project. It analyses the main 
components of this project and proposes to study it in three distinctive periods. 
Section IV concentrates on the fonnation period (1923-1950 ). Section V explores 
the second stage (1950 -1980) which is characterised by an attempt towards political 
and economic consolidation whereas Section VI exarnines the fragmentation of the 
nation-state formation project in the face of emerging alternative projects. The 
concluding Section provides an overall assessment of the Kernalist project. 
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Ifi. IL The Ottoman Background 
I will start with an analysis of the state-society relationship in the Ottoman Empire 
and this will direct us to the question of the nature of Ottoman society. Yet, this is a 
muddy area since, contrary to its Western counterparts, the nature of the Ottoman 
social formation has remained very controversial. Pointing to the obvious differences 
of the Ottoman empire in its political economic and partly cultural orIganisation, the 
main question has been raised as to whether Ottoman society was a feudal one, as 
once Western societies were very commonly defined. By and large the answer to this 
question has been negative,. 
In the case of the liberal tradition, the Ottoman state is largely conceived as a 
military and political organisation where the society and economy are reduced to 
supports of this military- political organisation. The state is then placed in the centre 
of the analysis at the expense of economy and society. While the economy is seen in 
terms of the expansion of the Ottoman military, the society is reduced to the foot 
soldiers of the state and military or taxpayer-subjectS2. It is then argued that in the 
face of this strong state tradition there was no civil society sirrfilar to that of the 
West. 
1 In the West, throu2h Heuel, Enlightenment writers and later especially through Weber's w-ritings, 
different strands of orientalism in the evaluation of the Ottoman Empire became a standard view and 
have not been challenged until recently. Yet, this outlook towards the East in general and Ottoman 
society in particular is not limited to the West; a similar kind of orientalism is a very established one in 
Turkish historiography too. Cý 2 Not surprisingly there has been no major study at all exploring the peasantry until recently, which 
comprised the majority of Ottoman society, in its own right. The main focus remained on the state. 
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On the radical side, the Asiatic mode-o f- production thesis constitutes the Marxist 
version of orientalism in Turkish historiography. Taking its cue from Marx's early 
writings on the 'East' (for his later view, see ShanIn 1986), it Is ar. 1gued that the 
Ottoman social fon-nation was characterised by the Asiatic mode of production and 
Asiatic despotism (Divitcioglu 197 1, Keyder 1976). The main feature of this 
particular formation was the existence of a very developed hydraulic state and a 
homogeneous agrarian social-base which are not divided into classes or other social 
groupings. The absence of civil society, and existence of a strong and despotic state, 
'oriental despotism' emerged as the characterising feature of the Ottoman social 
formation 3. 
The main problem for these perspectives is that they do not distinguish different 
4 
levels of abstraction in the analysis of the nature of the Ottoman Empire .I propose 
to study it at two different levels, that is level of mode of production, of social 
formation. By making these distinctions I believe it will be possible to avoid some of 
the confusions of the above perspectives. 
At the level of mode of production, as Berktay argues, the basic relation is the Cý 
relation of the direct producers to the means of production. Once seen in this way, 
3 The use of the concept of Oriental despotism is not limited to radical circles. It has been largely used 
by liberal circles as well to show the negative character of the Ottoman political structure vis-a-vis its Cý 
Western counterparts. (See, for instance, Ozbudun 1976). He expresses the standard orientalist 
understanding of the Ottoman society in the following way. 'Thus, with no feudalism comparable to 
that of Western Europe, no hereditary aristocracy, no independent church hierarchy, no strong and 
I independent merchant class, no self- governin cr cities, and with a ruline' the 
administration and the army) staffed with slaves, the Ottoman 
Empire represented a close 
approximation of an Oriental despotism (Ozbudun 1976; 28). 
4 On the distinction between mode of production and social formation with regard to the 
Eastern 
question, see: Wickham (1985) and Berktay (1987). 
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there is no reason not to call the Ottoman Empire a feudal society like its Western 
counterparts since, as far as the relationship of the peasantry to the land is concerned, 
there is no difference between them (Berktay 1987). This level of analysis does not 
contain the political and legal aspects, and this is the basic mistake the above theories 
make when they conceive the Ottoman Empire through the legal ownership of the 
land or the political aspects of it such as the role of the state as the pivotal element. 
Where these legal and political elements gain importance is at the level of social 
formation. It is at this level that the specificity of Ottoman social formation vis-a-vis 
other social formations including the Western ones are found. That is once accepted 
that the Ottoman social formation was a feudal one, it is possible to proceed to the 
level of social formation to analyse the specificity and differences of Ottoman social 
formation. Then, we can introduce the important elements of it such as state 
ownership on the land, and the centrality of the state in the extraction and 
distribution of the agricultural surplus. 
Making this distinction between these two levels of analysis is extremely important, 
since it allows us to see the fact that the state itself, which is seen as almost an 
independent and determining element of the Ottoman Empire when this distinction is 
collapsed, is subsumed under the very same relations of production and its laws. 
Thus, as opposed to conventional historiography, it is more fruitful to study the 
Ottoman Empire by not only placing the state at the heart of economic relations, but 1-n 
also inserting the latter in the heart of the former. The history of Ottoman social 
formation can then be seen in a different light as a history of struggles around the Cý Z=ý 
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extraction of the surplus rather than the struggle for political domination in its own 
right without diminishing the specificity of the political domain. 
An appropriate starting point is to challenge the dominant view that due to the lack 
of hereditary aristocracy, the state was the only social force in Ottoman social 
formation. In fact, contrary to this view, there was a hereditary aristocracy which 
consisted of traditional notables and clan chiefs, which was a part of the ruling class, 
which lay outside the state structure until the 1420s (Holdon 1993). After the 
military success and following strengthening of the state apparatus, their autonomy 
was weakened vis-a-vis the state. As Holdon (1993) shows, the conflict between the 
state and the hereditary aristocracy was mainly over the extraction of agricultural 
surplus, and the introduction of the institution of 'levy boys' by the state was a 
conscious strategy to place limits on the political and economic power of the 
traditional Turkish aristocracy. Although this strategy proved effective in limiting the 
power of this group, it never led to the total demise of this group. This was a tuminc, It) Z-: 1 
point in Ottoman history in terms of the relationship between the economy and 
society. The administrative and class structure of Ottoman society became 
interwoven in such a way that the ruling class became organised largely within the zD In 
state. 
As pointed out above, this can be seen as giving enormous strength to the state. Yet, Cý 0 
there is another dimension to this claimed strength. With this intertwining, the state 
became not only the locus of political conflicts emanating from its own logic, 
but 4=1 
also of the conflicts resulting from the extraction and appropriation processes of the 
surplus. A careful reading of the conflicts and struggle 
between the different Cý=4 
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segments of the state apparatus would show that most of them were over the 
appropriation of agricultural surplus. This is not the case within the different factions 
in the political centre but more importantly between the political centre and the local 
potentates. In this sense the subjection of the state to conflicts at two different 
domains was a source of weakness and continuous instability. 
It is clear that during the period from the thirteenth to sixteenth century, when the 
Ottoman Empire was expanding these conflicts were minimised by the increasing 
nlý aDSOlute surplus, and therefore strengthening political centre. Yet, once this growth 
came to an end, the contradictions and struggles within the state came to the fore 
immediately. 
The analysis so far has showed that the intermingling of the state and economy, as a 
result of a particular strategy of the state 61ites, created a condition of the 
organisation of dominant classes within the state. As I showed, despite the claim that 
the structural involvement of the state in the economy constituted its strength, it also 
created vulnerability for the state since the state itself became a 'direct' arena of 
conflicts stemming from the process of the extraction and distribution of surplus. 
The sixteenth century represents a clear break in the history of the Ottoman empire. 
On the one hand, the struggles between the central and local forces over the 
extraction of surplus, which itself started to decline due to the lack of improvement 
in agriculture and in the face of increasing; population; and on the other hand, the end Cý C) 
of military expansionism brought about the decline of the Ottoman empire and 4": ) 
started a process leading to its integration into the European world economy as a 4-: ý 
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peripheral economy (Islamoglu-fnan 1987). 
The long period, starting from the sixteen century up to the demise of the Ottoman 
empire in the wake of the World War 1, should be understood as the history of 
struggle between central and local forces on the one hand and conflict and 
accommodation of the Ottoman empire to the European world economy on the other. 
While the former conflict developed around the centralisation/restoration of central 
authority or the decentralisation/strengthening of local forces which underlies the 
tension in the processes of surplus extraction, the latter took the form of resistance or 
accommodation to the integration into the European World economy. In turn, this 
double pressure weakened the authority of the political centre progressively. At the 
beginning of nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was on the point of collapse. 
In response to these external and internal pressures, the idea of reforming the 
political and economic structure started to come to the fore. At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, two different strategies emerged at the political centre. Whereas 4D 
the conservative Sultan and his entourage followed a damage-limitation strategy in 
the absence of a long-term project, a group of bureaucrats, inspired by the political 
and economic structure of the West, started to contemplate economic and political 
reform. The purpose of the reforms was to restore the weakened authority of the 
centre vis-a-vis the local notables, as well as to rationalise and modernise the 
political centre itself by strengthening the position of the bureaucracy vis-a-vis the 
ruling dynasty within a constitutional framework. 
Thus, the penetration of capitalism into the economy created an important tension 
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between the economy and political structure since the Ottoman political structure 
obstructed the development of capitalism. The attempts, starting from the Tanzimat 
until the proclamation of the republic in 1923, were in the direction of resolving this 
tension. After 1908 these attempts became more systematic and aimed at the 
structural transformation of Ottoman society towards the formation of a nation-state 
and capitalist economy. War conditions endowed the reformist political centre with 
considerable strength, enabling it to centralise political power, which was itself a 
condition of nation-state formation. Yet the War ended with the defeat of the 
Ottomans, and the CUP domination and its project came to an end. 
To what extent then does the Kernalist project represent a complete break with the 
Ottoman tradition? This review shows that so far as the basic concern of the 
Kernalist project, that is, nation-state formation, is concerned, there is a continuity 
rather than a break with the earlier period. In the following section I will look at the 
very same relation during the Independence war. 
1/1.111. The Kemalist Project as a Bourgeois Revolution 
Those who did not see the Ottoman social formation as a feudal one, with a similar 
reasoning, did not see the Kernalist revolution as a bourgeois revolution which aimed 
at brin ing an end to the feudal society in favour of a capitalist one. The Kemalist 9 ltý
revolution was seen as a continuation of the Ottoman patrimonial state tradition. 
In 
that sense Kernalism was not a bourgeois revolution. Rather it was seen as an 
impediment for the development of a bourgeois class. The etatist policies of the 
1930s were evoked as the main evidence of this supposedly obstructive attitude 
8 
towards thecapitalist class (Kansu 1997). 
The modernisation perspective might be considered as an academic reflection of the 
Kemalist project's official discourse. In line with this discourse, the modemisation 
perspective perceives the Kernalist project as a definite rupture from the Ottoman 
predecessor towards the building of a modem nation in the image of the West. 
Hence, under the Kernalist leadership the Ottoman past, which was stagnant, 
religious, irrational and anti-modem, was rejected in favour of a modem and Western 
society which is developmental, secular and rational. The Kernalist project is 
contemplated as a revolution inwardly against the Ottoman elements and outwardly 
against the Western powers to raise the country to their level'. While Kemal Ataturk 
(father of Turks) was treated as a genius, the Kemalist state is considered to be the 
motor force behind the creation of a new society. In the very same sense, the 
boundary between the former and the latter is lifted and they are treated as one by 
giving a prime role to the state as a father figure. In this perspective the Kernalist 
project is seen as a non class-based project which aims to watch the interests of the 
nation as a whole. 
In my view both perspectives perceive the Kemalist revolution as a state centred 
one. They both did not attach a class connection to it. Contrary to this view I will 
The source of this view can be found in the Kernalist project itself and it has been disseminated 
throuahout society by different means from school textbooks to state radio and televisions 
for years. 
4n 
(See Karal J981) and Kili (1980) for the most sophisticated academic representation of this 
perspective 
6A radical version of this perspective, largely inspired by the etatist policies of the 
1930s, 
contemplates the Kemalist project as a state based revolution against the imperialist centre to create an C 
independent economy at the periphery. In line with the Kernalist claim of being above classes, 
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places the Kernalist project into a class perspective as a bourgeo, revo ution. The Is I, 
Kernalist project, in the first place, as a particular appropriation of the 'prOJect of 
modernity' at the periphery, and then, to proceed to conceive it more specifically as a 
nation-state formation project. This might seem to be a very controversial argument 
partly due to the fact that some of the important elements of this project, such as the 
promotion of freedom and democracy, did not exist in the case of the Kernalist 
project. 
The association of Kernalism with the modernity project has been denied by some 
writers on the basis of its totalitarian and anti-democratic nature (Koker (1991). The 
weakness of this view is that it treats modernity as a monolithic and even project in 
space and time. The point is that like its most prominent element and motor force, 
capitalism, modernity itself is an uneven project and once emerged in Europe it 
found its way to the rest of the world through different paths. This unevenness is not 
only related to the diffusion paths of modemity but also involves an unevenness in 
the basic components of modemity. In the case of Turkey, like many other peripheral 
countries, it is not odd to assume a relationship between the top-down, extemally 
induced but internally led, nature of modemity and the authoritarian nature of the 
Kemalist project as the promoter of this project. It is in this sense that, I will argue 
for a view placing the Kernalist project within this global but uneven project7 . As 
Kemalism is seen as a classless project. In this perspective too. the Kernalist project represents a 
complete break with the Ottoman past. 
7 Related to this point, it is also another mistake to assume always a positive role to the Enlightenment 
project as the promoter of freedom and democracy. In the first place, violence and anti-democratic 
means were largely used in the West itself, especially in its early stages, and as Habermas reminded 
us, the enlightenment pr ject always had a dark side. Given the fact that, especially during the etatist 0j 4n 
period, the Kernalist regime was largely inspired by Fascist experiences in Europe especially that of 
Italy, recognising the dark side of the Enhahtenment -ains a special importance for a better 
understanding of Turkish experience. Another misconception of this view is to see the establishment 
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Therborn (1995) shows there are different paths to and through modernity and the 
case of the Kernalist project this was a top-down one. 
There remains to be answered, however, the question of the class nature of the 
Kernalist project. An alternative view which this thesis proposes, is to understand the 
Kernalist project in the context of a regency relationship between the Kernalist elite 
and the bourgeoisie where the project of modemity was carried out by the former due 
to the premature development of the latter 8. Due to this very relationship, there are 
more far-reaching dimensions of the Kernalist project than a nation-state formation 
project in that the Kernalist project played a role which a hegemonic project would 
not normally play by not only targeting the nation-state formation, but also a 
formation of a modem economy as well as aiming to create a consensus around this 
transformation. Nevertheless, as we will see in this regard, the continuity of the 
Kemalist project was based upon coercion rather than consensus. In this sense, the 
Kemalist project became a dominant rather than a hegemonic project. 
Yet, it is not enough to label the Kernalist project as a modemist project with special 
emphasis upon its nation-state formation mission. We need to define the basic 
components of this project. That is, a satisfactory account of the Kernalist project 
of democracy as a natural dimension of the pr ject of modernity rather than seeing it as an outcome of 01 Zý) 
political struggles. Above all these, rather than binary oppositions, it is more proper to see modernity ý r-I 
as a global pr *ect. and *udge it, not only on the basis of what it achieved in the West, but also in the C 01 11 
ýrest'. 
8 The analogy of Regency is drawn from Oilman (1993). Oilman applies the concept of regency to the Cý 4: 1
former Soviet Union to explain the relationship between the Communist Party and the working class. 
His analogy strictly refers to the legal meaning of the regency whereas my use of the concept refers to Cý ltý 
the structural relationship between the state elite and the bourgeois class. In this sense there is no 
proclaimed representation of the bourgeoisie by the Kernalist elite. Instead, there is a structural 
representation of the bourgeoisie, which is also relatively autonomous 
from the latter, as laroely 
referred by the Marxist corpus. 
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requires us to illustrate its distinctive features both in general and with regard to its 
particular mission of nation-state formation. 
I would like to distinguish three different higher order features of the Kemalist 
project. In other words, the Kernalist project has three crucial components. These are 
state formation in the polit; cal domain, nation formation in the cultural domain and 
developmentalism in the economic domain9. 
It is of course possible to contain all these three features under the rubric of nation- 
state formation since in most of the newly formed nation-states, particular 
development strategy and cultural/ideological framework within which the new 
imagined community is formed, have been present. Nevertheless, keeping their 
interrelated nature in mind, I would prefer to analyse the analytically different 
features of the Kernalist project by concentrating on different phases of the Kernalist 
project. 
It is possible to identify three different stages in this trajectory. The first one 
is the 
formation years, which lasted from the end of the Independence War to the 
beginning 
of the 1950s. The second period represents an attempt towards political and 
economic consolidation between 1950 and 1980. The third one 
is the period since 
then, within which the Kernalist project has become fragmented and started 
to 
disintegrated, although it has not yet completely dissolved. 
In what follows in this 
9 As a matter of fact. these are the main issues which 
have emerged in most of the late Third World 
nation-states (Hawthorn 1991). Nevertheless, there are important 
differences among them in terms of 
their relative importance. 
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chapter I aim to analyse these three consecutive periods respectively. 
III. IV. Formation of a Turkish Nation-state ( 1923-1950) 
The previous section has shown that Kernalists took over the nation-state formation 
mission of the CUP in a more radical way and carried it to an extreme by denying the Cý 
entire heritage of the Ottoman empire. Whatever its continuity with certain trends 
towards nation-state formation, the Kernalist project also contains important 
elements in its imagination and practices which were not inherited from its 
predecessors and deserve some attention 
As a largely cultural process, nation formation contains the formation or more 
properly discovery of a national identity. In the case of the Kernalist project, this was 
a Turkish identity which was defined as opposed to an Ottoman identity. Yet, in the 
public front the presentation of this process of the creation of new identity was quite 
different. In the first place Kemalists argued that the Turkish identity was not an 4-: ) 
innovation but a discovery in that it was already there but repressed for centuries by 
the forced Ottoman identity. It was an identity waiting to be emancipated from the 
Ottoman establishment. In this very same sense. the Turkish identity was a relational 
identity defined with reference to Ottoman identity. Whereas the latter was religious, 
barbarian, oriental and decaying. the former was a secular, civilised and Western 4- 
identity with its language, alphabet, manners, dress and life style. In reality, the 
former was nothing other than a particular and orientalist perception of the Western 
identity rather than a repressed Turkish identity. Thus, the Turkish identity and the 
community of which the former is the founding stone were an imagined identity and 
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community. Once the Kernalist rhetoric is left aside, there was no Turkish identity as 
such could be defined without referring to the identity which was condemned by the 
Kemalist as the Ottoman identity. 
With respect to State formation, the main issue for the Kernalist project was the 
displacement of the Ottoman patrimonial political structures, which were largely 
interwoven with Islamic rule, in favour of a republic equipped with the institutions of 
Western societies. Not surprisingly, the political structure of the West, particularly 
that of France, was the model. One of the striking features of this transformation was 
the secularisation of the political system by severing the relation between the state 
and religion. Furthermore, the patrimonial structure was to be replaced by a 
constitutional and parliamentary political system based on the rational- bureaucratic 
authority. In turn this was nothing less than a political as well as a cultural 
revolution. 
As a third dimension, the establishment of a capitalist economic structure was 
another target for the Kernalist project as the driving force of the newly emerging 
nation-state. The dominant idea in line with the overall ideology of nation-state 
formation was the formation of a bourgeois class among Turks by using the 
experience of the West. As discussed, the leaning towards the formation of a national 
economy with its own national bourgeoisie had emerged as an idea and had to an In ZD 
extent developed during the last years of the Ottoman empire. During the war, the 
replacement of the bourgeoisie constituted by the minorities by a Turkish one gained 
pace. Nevertheless, its size and the scale of its capital accumulation were too 
limited 
to be the driving force of the new nation-state. Furthermore, the overall economic C 
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structure had been paralysed by the long war. In this sense the formation of a modem 
and capitalist economic structure was a task waiting to be fulfilled in the new period. 
In what follows in this chapter I will first look at the social and economic base as the 
reality dimension and the state and accumulation strategies as the means of the 
creation and imposition of this project on this reality. 
The Kernalist project was committed to the modernisation of the country and the 
formation of a modem, urban and secular individual and society around this 
imagined Turkish identity. Yet the social base did not match the one imagined by the 
Kernalists. Whereas the imagined Turkish identity was constituted by an entity which 
was urban and secular with its life style, dress, manners and political and social 
opinions, the real population over which this identity was to be imposed was mainly 
rural, conu-nitted to Islam as its religious, patriarchal and traditional social base. 
As the Kernalist leadership was quite aware, the transformation of this social base 
could only take place through top-down processes. Yet, this was not an easy task at 
all. There was no well developed bourgeois class and culture which could serve as a 
driving force for this transformation. During the war years, the minorities which t) 
constituted the bourgeoisie had left the country, and although important steps were 4- 
taken in this recrard, Moslem-Turkish groups were still premature to replace the 
former group. Furthermore, whereas the reforms and westernisation policies of the 
Tanzimat period were actively backed by western powers and supported by the 
bourgeois class of Istanbul -constituted minorities, for the Kernalist project, though 
having more strong desire in this direction, there could not be similar support in the C) Cn 
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wake of the Independence War. 
As far as other active social forces are concerned, the situation was equally bleak for 
the Kernalists to get support for their project. In the wake of the Independence war 
the main social forces constituted by the military and political elite, large landlords 
and the merchant bourgeoisie of Anatolia were gathered around the Independence 
movement and were largely represented in the Assembly. Ironically, however, the 
main bulk of the independence movement and the Assembly in Ankara did not 
follow the line of the Kernalist leadership in its contemplation of the future. The 
Kernalists, in fact, constituted a tiny minority of the movement and in the Assembly, 
and held the leadership thanks to the personal prestige of Mustafa Kemal as the 
military and political hero in the eyes of the public. For the majority, represented 
mainly by the local notables and landlords as well as the newly rising native 
bourgeoisie, the main objective was to liberate the country from invasion and to 
restore the old order from which they had considerably benefited. Even if they gave 
consent to the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, the religious authority of the 
Caliphate was not in question, and around this authority, the majority of the 
independence movement, which was also majority in the first parliament, was 
expecting to gather after the independence. 
As far as the economic base is concerned, it was not any better to 
facilitate the 
formation of a modem capitalist-economy which would have been the material 
base 
Z-) 
of the new nation-state. Agricultural production, which 
had declined during the Iong 
war constituted the backbone of the inherited economy. 
There was little industry in 
the Western part of the country. The Kernalists were aware of the 
fact that the 
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transformation of the society in the direction of their project could not be realised. by 
only superstructural reforms. There was a need for an urban economy based upon an 
industrial sector. Yet, the main group which could be the agent of this 
transformation, the entrepreneurial minorities. were forced to leave the country and 
despite the slow emergence of a Turkish bourgeoisie their accumulation and 
experience were too limited to be the driving force of the transformation towards an 
industrial economy. 
In sum, there was a big gap between the social and economic bases of the imagined I- 
community of the Kernalist project and the real communities. The only way to bridge 
this gap was thus the intervention of the state in every domain. In the following 
section, I will provide an account of how a distinctive pattern of modernity from 
above emerged when this imagined community, which was typically inspired by the 
experience of the West, met the real community through state strategies. 
I will start with the reorganisation of the political system since through this 4. 
restructuring the Kernalists not only redefined the state structure and its internal 
organisation but also used them as a way of taking the control of the whole state Zýý 
apparatus in the face of considerable opposition within and without the political 
system" 
Thus, a clash between the majority and the Kernalist faction was inevitable. For 
10 As mentioned before, the main bulk of the independence movement, which was represented in the 
first Assembly, was not in line with the Kernalist leadership in the contemplation of the 
future of the 
post Independence society. For the majority, despite their 
denouncement of the authoritv of the Sultan 
in the face of his hostility to the independence movement, there was no radical thought about 
the 
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Kernalists, a restoration of the old order was unacceptable. Exploiting Kemal's 
prestige as the leader of successful Independence War, the Kernalists started to 
eliminate the opposition through anti-democratic methods. The People's party was 
established as the only party (later it became the Republican People's Party ( RPP )) 
of the mono party-period with the membership of most of the newly elected MPs. 
Then, power gradually shifted from the parliament to the party over which Kemal 
exerted great control. The important decisions were first taken in the party, then 
approved by the assembly. 
These changes did not totally remove the opposition but they did put the Kemalist 
leadership in a more comfortable position to embark upon its project. There was still 
an opposition to the Kernalist leadership within parliament as well as society". There 
was a campaign organised by Istanbul-based groups which were suspicious of the 
Kernalist leadership and its project. Basing its power in Ankara, the Kernalist faction 
dealt its most important blows to the Istanbul-based opposition with the 
proclamation of Ankara as the seat of the government on 10 October and of the 
republic on 29 October 1923. These decision exacerbated the hostility between the 
Istanbul-based opposition and the Ankara-based Kernalist government. In the 
following months the focus of the opposition shifted to the status of the Caliph. They t: ý 
started a campaign for the restoration of the authority of the Caliph who was still 
restructuring of the whole political system. Most of the representatives in Ankara were in favour of a 
restoration of the old order with minor changes (Ahmad 1993). 
The opposition to the Kemalist regime was not limited to the political system. There was 
considerable dismay at the grassroots level due to the top-down reforms. The secularisation of 
political and social life was creating important tensions among the public. The first big explosion 
came in 1925 from the Southeast where the Kurdish population constituted a majority. As Keyder put 
it 'this was a full scale insurrection with religious and separatist o-ý,, ertones, whi I ing C! ich aimed at challeng  
the tribal oligarchy and the central authority which was in implicit alliance with it' (Keyder 1987: 83). 
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legally the head of the state and of the Islamic World. In response, the Kemalist 
regime abolished the caliphate as the last big institutional opposition stronghold. 
Having curbed the power of opposition within the political system as well as at the 
grassroots, the cultural revolution gained pace inwardly towards the state and 
outwardly towards the nation after 1925". 
The nature as well as the way in which the reforms were carried out by the Kernalist 
regime created considerable discontent among the public. The resistance to the 
reforms was repressed by force. During this period, as Zucher notes, 'under the Law 
on the Maintenance of Order nearly 7500 people were arrested and 660 were 
executed' (Zucher 1993; 18 1). Among them, ironically, there were members of the 
CUP which provided the social and political base for the rise of the Kemalist project 
as well as ordinary members of the public who did not comply with the law which 
had prohibited the fez. Towards the end of the decade there was a very tense 
situation throughout the country. However, the rising discontent of the public was 
not only due to the superstructural reforms of the Kemalist regime, the state of the 
economy was also to blame for the rising discontent. 
There was a similar dilemma for the Kernalist regime in the economic sphere. The 
II Power centres of the religious order outside the state system such as religious shrines and the 
dervish convents were closed down in 1925. While criminal law was seculansed by severing its 
relation with the Seriate, the Swiss Civil Code was adopted in 1926, giving women equal civil rights 
with men. In the same year, the Western calendar was introduced. Finally in 1928, an article of the 
constitution asserting that Islam was the religion of the state was deleted to constitutional ise the 
secular nature of the state. Moreover, Arabic script was replaced by the Latin one along with the 
adoption of European numerals. The Kernallst project did not stop short with these reforms which 
basically targeted the public sphere but also intervened in the private sphere too, for instance, by 
forbidding the fez, which was considered to be a symbol of Oriental-Ottoman dress, in favour of the 
hat which ýxas used by 'civilised' nations. 
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main pillars of the Independence Movement were the large landlords and rural-based 
merchant capital in alliance with the dissident state and military elements of Ottoman 
bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, the accumulation strategy of the early years reflected 
the alliance between the state elite and large landlords and agriculturally based Cý 
merchant groups. To determine the economic strategy to be followed, an economic 
congress was held in 1.923 in Izmir with the active participation of merchant capital 
and large-landed interests. A common desire for a liberal accumulation strategy was 
expressed and resolutions of the congress more or less guided the economic 
strategies of the early years" 
However, these policies and the alliance with large farmers and agriculturally based 
merchant groups were in contradiction with the industrial, urbanised and western- 
looking society which the Kernalist elite had in mind, though the superstructural 
reforms were in line with the former. Spatially speaking, the Kemalist elite of the 4: ) 
early years was pro-urban with an anti-urban economic strategy. Policies such as the Z__ 
establishment of the land tithe in 1925 making 
"the development of industry and the growth of urban areas much more difficult" was an outcome of 
"the implicit alliance which had been formed between the government and large farmers during the Z-- 11-^ War of Liberation... There was.... also an element of concession aiven to large farmers to secure their 
complicity in the face of superstructural reforms by the bureaucracy during, this period" (Birtek and 
Keyder, 1975: 45 1). 
The pragmatic and piecemeal approaches of the 1920s, started to come to an end at 
13 As Gulalp points out, according to the resolution of conggess, 'the Turkish economy was to remain 
open; foreign capital was to be welcomed; the motto was liberalism, the encouragement of private 
enterprise' (Gulalp, 1985: 334). In this period, in the search for modernisation and westernisation 
relied upon a capitalist economy, though aggriculturally based; the principal role of the state was 
defined as the creation of a national bourgeoisie through measures such as tax exemption, credits and 
the contracting of public works by the state. In sum, the years between 1923 and 1930 were C 
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the end of the decade in the case of economic policy. The economy was faced with a 
double difficulty. Internally, not surprisingly, the continuous encouragement and 
development of an agricultural periphery, had not brought about the structural 
transformation in the economy to which the political centre was deeply comm-itted. 
Likewise, as Ramazanoglu points out 'Turkish private capital had little incentive to 
invest in the development of Turkish industry when quicker and easier profits could 
be made under the liberal foreign-trade regime imposed by the Lausanne Treaty, 
through import and export trade' (Ramazanoglu, 1985: 6 1). Externally, the 
difficulties of the economy were compounded by the impact of the Great Depression 
(Keyder 198 1). Worsening economic conditions in the form of decreasing export 
earnings and a trade deficit were followed by an extensive discontent in every section 
of society. 
Before discussing the changes taking place in the economic and political domains, a 
brief examination of thefOrms of interest representation in the early years is in order. 
As the previous debate has shown, despite the establishment of liberal democracy 
from the beginning,, while pluralist representation was out of the question due to the 
rejection of plurality of the society in favour of a unitary identity represented by the 
state itself, parliamentarian ism remained a formal and ineffective channel of 
representation (due to the lack of a multi-party system). Instead corporatism emerged 
as the dominant form of interest representation. The Economic Congress held in 
Izmir in 1923 to determine the economic strategy of the early years was an early 
indicator of this tendency. While there were representatives from all organised Cý 
characterised by an open economy and active state support for private accumulation (Boratav. 198 1: 
167). 
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groups in society including the working class, the real members of this corporatist 
structure were the bourgeoisie and big landlords, the two principal allies of the 
Kemalist regime since the beginning of the Independence War. In line with this 4: ý
corporatist structure, the state used the raison d'etat whenever necessary to silence 
the opposition. The heaviest form of this repression was used against the proto-social 
movement type of organisation as in the case of the Kurdish uprising. The Kemalist 
regime disseminated one of the principles of the Kernalist project, that politics could 
be made only within the institutional structure defined by the regime 14 . 
Nevertheless, there were important contradictions in the dominant mode of 
representation. The alliance formed with the big landlords was creating important 
anomalies as far as the overall project, which assumed an urban and industrial 
economy and society, was concerned 15 . As emphasised earlier, important concessions 
were given at the expense of urban sectors of the economy and society to overcome 0 
the discontent created by the reforms on the rural sector. However, once the 
economic crisis deepened at the end of the 1920s, the contradiction of this alliance 
came to the fore more sharply and ended with a loosening of the alliance, if not to the 
total exclusion of the land-owning classes. 
In sum, the Kernalist regime and its project came to a crisis point at the end of the 
Cý I ive 
14 This understanding imposed upon society usually through coercive means has become very effect' 
in constraining the politics within institutional channels. The scarcity of the social movements in the 




15 One of the strategy of the Kemalist regime was to keep control over the rural classes through the 
bicr 
landlords. In this the clientalistic relations between the peasants and the landlords played an important 
1ý -en now role by creating an informal form of representation in the state through the 
big landlords and eý, 
continues to play a considerable role in the integration of the rural classes into the political system M 
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1920s. In the political domain there was considerable discontent and disturbance 
among the public due to the nature of the imposed reforms and the worsening 4D 
economic conditions. The failure to create a bourgeoisie which could be the driving ID ID 
force of the economy created a declining belief in the liberal acc umu I ati on- strategy C-) 
of the early years. The world economic crises of 1929 strengthened this suspicion 
and created an environment for a more closed and state-led accumulation strategy. 
With the realisation that the future of the Kernalist project largely depended upon 
strengthening the economy, the statist group started to take control and the Kernalist 
regime started to head towards a new accumulation strategy at the very beginning of 4-n 
1930s. Under the so-called etatist policies, the state, step-by-step started to take 
control of the economy. The crux of this change was that the role of the state 
changed from being the subsidiser of the capitalist class to the direct provider. In 
other words, the state was taking over the regency role on the grounds that the 
capitalist class was still too weak to take control after a period of trial of the latter as 
the driving force of the economy. C7 
The main feature of the new accumul ation- strategy was import-substitution based 
upon domestic inputs and substitution of imports of basic consumer goods through 
domestic production carried out by state enterprises. This policy was pursued 
successfully during the first decade of the etatist period. As Birtek points out 
"the increase of the share of industry and its domination of economic expansion is clear: The overall 
economic expansion in money terms, between the averages of 1925-29 and 1933-41 is 9.8%, and in 
comparing these two periods the share of industry increases by 81.1 percent" (Birtek, 1985: 410). 
Thus, state sponsored liberalism was replaced by the direct involvement of the state 
in the economy. Priority for agriculture %vas replaced by priority for industry. As C) 
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Birtek points out, in this structural context 
ýetatism may be viewed as the culmination of a search for structures to support a particular political 
centre. The success of Etatism can be construed as the effort to restructure economic forms to match the political transformations of the previous period ( 1923-30) under the direction of the political 
centre' (Birtek, 1985: 409). 
Even though there were a highly centralised economy in the hands of the Kernalist 
bureaucracy and a considerable deviation from 'free market' ideology, the policies of 
the 1930s did not represent a so-called 'non-capitalist path'. As Pamuk points out 
'during the 1930s the nascent bourgeoisie benefited from etatism by obtaining marketing monopolies 
through the state economic enterprises, exclusive import licenses, credit from state controlled banks 
under very favourable terms and lucrative contracts from state firms to undertake major construction 
projects' (Pamuk, 1981: 26). 
In this sense, even if the entrepreneurial characteristic of the state is quite clear for 
this period, it was complementary rather than contradictory to the interests of private 
capital since the distinguishing feature of the state enterprises was their scale in 4-: ý 
terms of invested capital, which was beyond the capacity of private capital for the 
time being. The First Five Year Indus tri ali sation Plan had emphasised this 
complementary relation". 
In one sense, the state was still promoting a capitalist class, but in that case, in the 
front seat and for industrial rather than agricultural or trade sectors. One of the c 
interesting points in relation to the recruitment of an entrepreneurial class is that the 
state bureaucracy itself took a very active part in this and a considerable number of 
entrepreneurs were recruited from the bureaucracy itself during the 1930s. In this 
16 Is Bankasi, the officially promoted private bank, provided the link between the state bureaucracy 
and private capital. As Keyder puts it: 'Its board of directors consisted of thirteen 
deputies and its 
links with public banks and state enterprises were intricate and strong. 
Industrialists regarded the bank 
as their platform when bargaining 
had to be carried out with the bureaucracý-' (Keyder. 1987: 106). 
The Bank's 'participation in national industry had grown to 50 per cent of all national banks and 
bv 
1937 it held 38 per cent of the deposits in the national 
bank' (ibid: 106). 
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period, 74.2 per cent of the all entrepreneurs came from the state bureaucracy while 
in previous and later periods this proportion was well below this figure (Soral 1974). 
As the economy got stronger the state gained more power in the political domain as 
well. After the failure of the strategy to contain the growing opposition within a 
controlled opposition party, ' 7 the Kernalist fraction started to take a more 
authoritarian attitude which found its reflection in the forms of representation and 
internal organisation of the state. While the reform programme continued to be 
enforced, raison d etat remained the main strategy to suppress the opposition, but in 
a more aggressive way". The main channels of representation within and without the 
state were closed to all groups but the capitalist class which continued to be 
represented within the state through corporate channels. In sum, in terms of 
representation, the interest-representation etatist period strengthened the state 
corporatism of the 1920s by excluding the land-owning classes and by fortifying it 
by raison d'etat. 
In line with those changes, the state apparatus became more centralised in its internal 
organisation. The performance of many economic functions through the 
establishment of the state enterprises in addition to the construction of road and rail 
17 As has already been mentioned, the discontent arrived at a peak at the end of the 1920s in the face of 
economic problems and authoritarianism of the Kernalist state along with the enforced socio-cultural 
reforms. Unaware of the growing opposition, the Kernalist fraction attempted to control it throueh L_ - 
channelling it to a -controlled opposition party' (the Free Party ). However. the support, especially in 
the urban centres, for the Party reached such a level that the Party was banned by the Kemalist regime 
for fear of losing control. 
18 A press law was passed by the Assembly enabling the government to prohibit the opposition press 
from damaging 'national unity'. In 1933. around a hundred members of the teaching staff of Istanbul 
University were expelled. In 1935 the Turkish Women's Association was banned. 
ý4ore 
strikingly, in 
1936, strikes were outlawed and the political rights of the working class were limited. Cý -II 
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links, energy and communication facilities provided the state with greater autonomy 
and an economic and political basis for further centralisation. In turn, once such a 
centralisation started, the interrial logic of the bureaucracy stimulated further 
development towards the centralisation and domination of executive branches over 
the others. 
While state structure became more centralised during this period, to increase the 
control of the political centre over the localities, the establishment of local 
government in every locality with a population over 2000 became obligatory. This 
was nothing other than a part of the attempt to establish the authority of the political 
centre over the localities. In a similar vein, the political centre attempted to establish 
new institutions within and without the state structure to spread reforms, and in turn, 
to gain the support of the masses. Whereas the Institute of Turkish Language and 
Institute of Turkish History were established to work in the processing of the 
formation of a new Turkish national identity, 'People's Houses' in cities and towns 
and 'People's Rooms' in the villages were established to disseminate these ideas and 4-n 
policies at the grassroots level. 
If etatism had enjoyed considerable success during the 1930s, it started to decline at 
the beginning of the 1940s and disappeared by the end of the decade. One the one 
hand, the weakening alliance between the capitalist class and the increasing C 
discontent of the public, the adverse conditions of the world economy, and following I 
the world war on the other hand. etatist policies and the position of the state as the 
promoter of etatisrn had weakened. 
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As has been mentioned before, etatism facilitated a great deal of capital accumulation 
in the hands of the bourgeoisie through tax exemptions and other incentives. The rate 
of accumulation by the Turkish bourgeoisie accelerated in the War years through the 
black market and the heavy taxation of non-Muslim groups and the agricultural 
sector. Thus, at the end of the Second World War, there was a capitalist class asking 
for a more liberal economy 
With the challenge of the bourgeoisie the Kernalist elite's failure to set up a social 
base for its power became clear. The main problem for the Kernalist regime was its 
failure to distribute the benefits of the considerable industrialisation to the popular 
classes. In the urban areas, neither working class nor petty bourgeoisie were happy 
with the etatist policies which largely excluded them. Large landowners as well as 
the small peasantry had suffered from falling prices throughout the period of etatist 
policies. The austerity policies of the War years contributed hugely to the discontent 
of the public. 
Likewise, the increasing authoritarianism of the Kemalist regime was another source 
of extensive public discontent. Thus, due to its lack of any major allies the survival 
of the Kemalist regime and its project relied on anti-democratic means, though 
World War 11 had ended with the defeat of the fascist regimes in Europe and the 
victory of liberal democracies. Having taken its place within the 
Western World 
after the war, there was not too much choice for the 
Kernalist regime other than to Cý 
introduce a multi-party system. 
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III. V. An Attempt to Integrate Society into the Kemalist Project ( 1950 - 1980) 
The preceding chapters have demonstrated that the Kernallst project emerged as a 
nation-state formation project by ignoring the real communities in favour of an 
imagined community which was distinctively modem, secular and Western and 
failed to establish its hegemony in society. Due to its lack of a social base, the 
Kernalist regime chose a totalitarian and non-participatory strategy towards the 
masses to remain in power. Yet, when the transition to multi-party rule became 
inevitable in the wake of the World War H, the official party of Kernalism, the RPP, 
eventually had to pay the price by losing office to the Democratic Party in 1950. This 
was a challenge to the statist and secular aspects of the Kernalist project by the 
bourgeoisie and land-owning class with the support of traditional popular classes 
including the peasantry. 
This power shift brought an end to the First Republic and marginalised the Kemalist 
project between 1950 and 196019. However, this interruption did not bring about the 
demise of the Kernalist project. While the military intervention of 1960 led to the 
establishment of the Second Republic, it also opened the way for the restoration of 
the Kernalist project with a new vision. 
During the Second Republic which started with the military intervention of 1960 
19 As far as the economic domain is concerned, the modernisation programme of the 
Kernalist project, C 
which was mainly urban-biased, was turned upside down in favour of the modernisation of rural areas. 
Perhaps, an unintended consequence of this change was the continuation, rather than abandonment, 
of the modernisation programme initiated by the Kernalist project, in this case, in rural 
Turkey. 
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and lasted until the occurrence of another military coup in 1980, the Kemalist 
project underwent an unprecedented transformation with the revision of some of its 
main pillars, but it remained an important element of the political system until the 
1980S. 
In this second phase, the Kernalist project can be considered as an attempt towards 
the completion of the modernisation programme with the introduction of multi-party 
democracy. In this sense, whether the introduction of a multi-party system was a 
conscious choice or the result of external pressure, in its second phase, the Kernalist 
project became a systematic programme to lead the democratisation processes in 
addition to its commitment to economic consolidation. 
To comprehend the Kernalist project in its second phase, it is necessary to understand 
it in the context of three developments, since its main opposition in this phase took 
shape as a response to these changes. The first one is, as I partly discussed the 
military, the economic and political integration of Turkey into the Western world 
under US leadership. The second is the economic and political consequences of the 
policies of DP governments in office between 1950 and 1960. The third is the Cý 
changing social and economic base of political power starting in the wake of the 
World War III. 
Since the first point was briefly discussed in the previous section, I will discuss the 
others in the next sections. The first section provides an overview of the 
DP period 
(1950-1960 ), while the second analyses the changing social and econontic base and Cý 1.1ý 
main forces. The third section examines the 1960 constitution as a 
blueprint for the 
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neo-Kernalist project, while the fourth section turns to a discussion of the 
implementation of the project during this period. The concluding section provides an 
over-view of the period with reference to the successes and failures of the neo- 
Kemalist project. 
'In the previous section, it was arcrued that the DP was born within the RPP as a new party which 
represents, by and large, the landed and bourgeois classes, and its challenge was carrying the marks of Z-1 
an opposition to the statism and secularism of the RPP. In other words, the rhetoric upon which the 
Democrats dwelled was a programmatic negation of the RPP period' (Ahmad 1993). 
In effect, the DP represented a populist mobilisation led by the strengthened 
bourgeoisie and land-owning classes, incorporating the peasantry and other popular 
classes into its anti-statist and anti-secular discourse. When it came to power with the 
support of these groups, the emphasis placed upon a liberal accumul ation- strategy in 
favour of the bourgeoisie was accompanied a religious rhetoric appealing to the Cý 
traditional section of the society. 
In its early years in office, the DP government was relatively comfortable. The 
liberalisation programme had already started to gain pace 20 . The emphasis shifted 
from industrialisation to export oriented agriculture thanks to the Marshall Aid of 
this period. The Turkish economy enjoyed considerable growth during the early years Z: ý
of the DP government as a result of the increase in the price of agricultural products C) 
on the world market. On the political front, enjoying broad public support, the 
DP 
looked more democratic than the RPP of the previous period, although there was no It) 
substantial change regarding the dernocratisation of political 
life. 
10 - In fact the shift from state-led industrialisation 
to export-oriented agricultural growth had already 
started in the Turkish economy as early as 
1947 into joining the Marshall programme, In this sense the 
power change can be seen as an accommodation 
with the changing economic strateav 
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Though the DP govemment was re-elected in 1954, difficulties in both economic and 
political spheres were on the doorstep. The economic boom came to an end as a 
result of changing international economic balances at the expense of the agricultural 
sector in that there was no longer any big market for agricultural products. 
Consequently, the Turkish economy started to enter a recession as early as 1953. 
As soon as difficulties appeared in the economic sphere, the dilemmas and 
contradictions of the DP came to the fore. At the heart of these contradictions was 
the incompatibility between the expectations of the urban and rural sections of the 
DP base. 
While the rural classes enjoyed the priority given to the agricultural sector, and the 
populism of the DP targeting the religious orientations of these classes, the DP in 
power did not bring about any substantial improvement in the political sphere. The 
promise of decentralising political power, increasing the rights and freedoms of 
individuals, remained largely unfulfilled. Thus, contrary to its promises, the DP did 
not change the political system inherited from the RPP. While its challenge to the 
latter remained superficial, the DP government took advantage of centralised 
political and economic powe The unfulfilled promises regarding dernocratisation r", L- 
and the priority given to the rural areas started to create disillusionment especially 4 1ý 
21 As far as the DP-led challenge to Kernalism is concerned. it remained at the level of the Kemalist 
pr Ject and hardly stretched the Kernalist state structure. Even at the former level, the challenge was 03 
limited to the RPP and intelligentsia. The arm remained totally outside the target of the DP whereas yC 
the penetration into the bureaucracy remained limited. During its ten years in office, the DP remained 
ever increasingly apprehensive towards these a oups within the state apparatus and failed to establish C, rIIII 
its hegemony over the all branches of the state structure. Two strategic elements of the state 
apparatuses, a considerable section of the bureaucracy and the military remained loyal to the Kernalist 
project. 
among the urban groups during the mid- 1950s In the face of ever increasing Z-- 
opposition, the DP became more and more authoritarian. 
Likewise, having faced the difficulties of the agricultural based economy, the 
liberalisation of the early years was replaced during the mid- 1950s with state 
control. Yet, the DP government used the decentralised power in a very arbitrary way 
to solve urgent problems and had no long term perspective. Towards the end of the 
decade even the Istanbul-based capitalist class started to withdraw its support from 
the DP government. Nonetheless, the election held in 1957 ended in the victory of 
DP thanks to its continuing popularity in rural Turkey, which constituted more than 
60 per cent of the total population. Nevertheless, the election results showed an 
increasing split between urban and rural sections of the population. 
In this sense, the election did not solve the political crisis but deepened it. While 
unrest and opposition were growing in the large cities, the DP government did not 
avoid the use of the same anti-democratic means such as banning newspapers and 
arbitrary arrests which had been used before by the RPP governments. Moreover, the 
DP government became more aggressive the more widespread unrest and opposition 
became and vice versa. There was a crisis of the political system at the end of 1950s 
in the sense that there was a progressive increase of discontent in the urban centres 
whereas in rural areas the support for the DP was intact. At the end of the 
1950s 
there was a rural-urban divide in Turkey and a political crisis as a reflection of 
it. 
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The 'solution' came from the military. Like the urban-based groups, the military was 
dissatisfied with the instability of the economy and the political situation 22 . 
Despite 
its formal separation from politics, there was a close link between the army and the 
RPP via the personality of Ismet Inonu, who came from a military background, and 
due to the deep commitment to the Kernalist project among the military cadres 
(Zurcher 1993). The policies of the DP were se, 2n largely as a deviation from 
Kemalism. In the face of increasing unrest in the large cities, the military started to 
see itself as the only power capable of salvaging the Kernalist project. Eventually, 
when demonstrations started in Ankara and spread to the other major cities at the 
beginning of 1960 and the government responded to these protests by employing 
more force and violence, the way for military intervention was open. The military 
seized power in May 1960 with a coup which opened the way for the Second 
Republic and of the second phase of the Kernalist project. 
Thus, with the intervention of the army in 1960, the second republic period started 
and the Kernalist project took a new turn with the emerging alliance between the 
RPP- led civil wing and the military. As indicated earlier, the second republic and 
t) 4 the second phase of the Kernalist project lasted for more or less twenty years, starting 
with the military coup of 1960 and ending with another coup 
in 1980. This period 
can be divided into two stages with contrasting degrees of stability. 
Whereas the first 
decade (1960-1971) witnessed the stability of the alliance and institutionalisation of 
2' There was another reason for the increasing discontent among the military cadres. 
It was related to 
c condition of the military staff. The econo ic the progressive worsening status and the economi 
m 
situation of the military was worsened startinc, 
from the beoinning of the World War II, and there was 
no improvement during the 
DP power. Especially in the lower ranks of the military there was a 
widespread discontent and will to change 
the decline of the military. This factor immensely effected 
the decision of the military to take over power 
(Varier (1987). Ahmad (1993) ). 
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the basic objectives of the Kernalist project, the following decade (t971-1980 ) saw 
the destabilisation of the Kernalist pr ject with the breaking up of the military and 01 0 
the RPP and the start of a process of the fragmentation of the Kemalist project. 
In the economic domain, the Kernalist project renegotiated its economic programme t-ý 
with the capitalist class once again. It was true that the agricultural-based liberal 
accumulation strategy of the DP period had failed. Yet, this did not mean a return to 
the etatist policies of the 1930s as happened after the failure of liberal accumulation- 
strategy of the 1920s. There was now a considerable degree of capital accumulation 
in the hands of the capitalist class. Thus, both sides had to negotiate their roles in the 
new strategy. The emergence of the import-substitution industrialisation-strategy was C) 
a product of this negotiation between the state and the capitalist class in the early 
1960s. 
The 1960 Constitution is quite revealing in respect of understanding the Kernalist 
project in its second phase. For this reason it is appropriate to exanune the 
constitution briefly with reference to the three components of the state strategies: 
namely, forms of interest representation, internal organisation, and intervention in the Cý 
economy. 
In terms of the internal organisation of the state structure, the most important feature 
of the new constitution, as a reaction to the almost unlimited power of the DP in the 
previous period, was its determination to balance the power of the executive, 
especially of the government, vis-a-vis the 
judiciary and legislative institutions, by 
strengthening the latter. 
To serve this aim an independent constitutional court was 
1 14 
established and endowed with the power to prevent the violation of the constitution 
by the political parties in power. A senate, whose members were partly elected and 
party appointed by the president, was created in addition to the existing assembly to 
balance the power of the latter. 
The most novel but also most paradoxical aspect of the Kernalist project, which was 
concretised in the constitution, was related to the field of interest representation. It is 
generally agreed that the 1960 constitution opened new channels of representation 
for groups who had not found them in the earlier periods. But it is also true that, as a 
reaction to the DP period, there was a suspicious attitude towards certain forms of 
interest representation particularly among the army section of the alliance. Despite its 
commitment to representative democracy in general, the army fraction was very 
suspicious of parliamentarianism. As discussed above, to limit the power of elected 
politicians, numerous new institutions and mechanisms were introduced through the 
constitution. More importantly, the army retained certain powers, some of them 
constitutional and others tacitly accepted by everybody, as the raison d'etat to 
interfere whenever necessary. 
One of the most important aspects of the constitution and of the Kemalist project of 
this period regarding interest representation was the intention to move from state 
corporatism to societal corporatism. In the first phase, Kernalisin largely excluded Cý 
the working class from representative mechanisms. The recognition of the worker's 4 
right to strike (which had been forbidden in the first period) in the new constitution cl: ý 
was important in this regard. This move was in line with the RPP's desire to create a 
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social base in urban areas2'. With respect to the Kernalist claim to be 'above social 
groups', it was not contradictory, but more complementary in that it was aiming to 
include a social class which was mainly excluded during the First republic. In line 
with the 'above the classes' politics the establishment of parties and other 
organisations a liated with communism remained outlawed in this period too. With 
regard to religion the constitution remained very vague despite the fact that one of 
the reasons behind the military intervention was the extensive use of the religious 
themes by the DP in office. This was in fact a trend started at the end of the World 
War by the RPP to gain support. In its second phase the Kemalist project preferred 
not to use the restrictive and bold approach of the first republic period which had 
alienated it from the masses. The strategy shifted towards keeping religion under 
control rather than totally dismissing it. 
In relation to the forms of intervention, the distinctive aspect of the Kernalist project 
was institution alis ation of the idea of planned development through the constitution. 
This was a reaction to the chaotic economic policies of the previous period. The 
establishment of a planning organisation was required by the constitution to organise 
and co-ordinate economic strategies. To serve this objective, five-year development 
plans became compulsory and their preparation was assigned to the State Planning 
Organisation. This pointed to the new division of labour between the state and 
capital. The state was no longer in the driving seat of the economy as it was in the 
23 Two important factors affected the RPP's rethinking of its identity and social base during the multi- 
party period. The first was that the RPP realised that. given the massive Support of the DP in rural 
areas, its own potential strength lay in the urban centres which were more in tune with its project. 
The 
second was the massive migration that started with the mechanisation of the agriculture in 
1950s as a 
result of Marshall aid. Large urban centres 
became the main targets of this migration. Apart from the 
dynamism created by this massive migration, there was also a considerable middle-class existence in 
large cities. These changes led the Kernalist elite to consider itself as an urban-based party. 
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1930s, yet, it was strong enough to resist leaving the economy to the capitalist class 
around a liberal accumulation-strategy. Thus, the state became a primary regulatory 
institution of the economy in addition to its direct involvement in it through the state 
economic enterprises. 
The Kernalist alliance completed the restructuring of the political system and the 
refon-nulation of the Kernalist project in a year and half. First, the constitution was 
put to a referendum. Although the constitution was approved by the public, the high 
percentage of 'no' votes (40 per cent) with a 17 per cent level of non-voting was a 
blow to the Kernalists since it showed that there was no widespread support for the 
new project, especially in rural areas. The problem became more obvious in the first 
elections held in 1961. Yet, once again the elitist modernism of the Kemalist project 
faced the same problem; a lack of popular support. The civil arm of the Kernalist 
alliance, the RPP, failed to win a majority in the elections, receiving 37 per cent of 
the votes, while the two opposition parties, which were heirs of the banned DP, 
secured approximately 48 per cent of the votes. Rural Turkey especially, stayed loyal 
to the DP, whose policies had favoured the r-ural sector of the economy during its 
reign. This voting behaviour showed that the Kernalist project had fallen short of 
providing itself with a large enough social base to facilitate the full implementation tý 
of the Kernalist project under democratic conditionS24 
24 As mentioned, rural Turkey had not forgotten the policies of the DP which faN. oured the rural 
classes. For the Kernalist alliance however, there was not the same kind of clear choice. Its 
commitment was more to the urban middle-class and the intelli-gentsia. Thus, once acgain the Kernalist 
project faced an identity crisis which was evident from the lack of popular support and remained an 
elitist movement in the early years of the second phase. 
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Although the RPP was the largest single party, the parties which were the heirs of the 
DP were holding more seats in the assembly. Yet, the military had not withdrawn 
from political process despite the restoration of party politics. The main heir of the 
DP, the Justice Party, was forced by the military to form a coalition government with 
the RPP. As a result of this pressure from the military, the RPP managed to remain in 
power until 1965 by forming coalition governments whose legitimacy was dubious 
in the public eye because of the implicit support given to the party by the army. After 
a disastrous local election performance in the 1964 local election, the RPP lost 
further ground in the 1965 general elections and left the office to the JP which was 
the clear winner. Nevertheless, during this period the fundamental structures and 
institutions proposed by the constitution were put into effect. 
One of the most important was the institutionalisation of the 'import-substitution 
industrialisation-strategy' which was thought be a base for social 
democratic/corporatist consensus. It is difficult to argue that the second objective 
was achieved, but import substitution created an inward-oriented market strategy 
which favoured industrial capital at the expense of small capital and the petite 
bourgeoisie. Surrounded by structural constraints, and extensive institutional 
regulations, the subsequent JP dominated governments remained tied to this strategy 
reluctantly despite the resentment of their social base (Keyder 1987; 147). 
Nevertheless, the unprecedented growth of the economy between 1960 and 1970 
helped the continuation of import-substitution industrialisation in an increasingly Cý 
tense political environment. 
I Is 
Starting from early 1950s, and gaining pace during the 1960s. the urban areas, C) 
especially large cities, started to undergo a major transformation as a result of the 
massive migration from the rural areas. The squatter settlements, as will be discussed 
in detail in the following chapter, housed almost half of the population of the large 
cities. In other words, the social base of the cities was quite different from that seen 
in the 1930s and 1940s. 
In the face of continuing failure of the RPP, the second half of the 1960s witnessed a 
new attempt by the RPP to recapture a social base by appealing more and more to the 
newly emerging groups in the cities as a result of rapid migration from rural areas 
and industrialisation. Towards the end of 1970s, the official position of the party was 
redefined as "centre of the left"21 . There was 
however a strong conservative group 
within the party who were suspicious of the change the party was undergoing and 
their resistance was obstructing the progressive wing's efforts to define a clear 
identity for the party. 
The new accumulation- strategy and the changing social base of the cities 
did not only 
cause changes within the RPP (Gunes-Ayatal993). It started to change the overall 
political climate of the country dramatically, especially in the second 
half of the 
1960s. For the first time in the political history of the country the radical left started 
to emerge from the shadows of the repressive political conditions. 
Radical 
C) 
mobilisation started within the intelligentsia then 
developed among the students, and t: ý 9 
25 For the RPP, this was the first time a clear attempt 
had been made to go beyond traditional Kernalist Cý 
'above the class'politics. Yet, as the term, *centre of the 
left'shows there was still the same concern to 
control. in this case all the 
left, by staying in the middle, if not above. 
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radical left ideas started to flourish among the workers. The socialist "Workers 
Party" and the first radical confederation of trade unions, "Confederation of 
Revolutionary Workers'Union (DISK), were products of this mobilisation at the end 
of 
1960S26. University students also got organised through clubs, and then political 
movements. Towards the end of the decade, the radical left was strong enough to 
shake the political and economic establishment. DISK succeeded in organising a 
large section of the workers in a very short time and became a major power centre for 
radical politics, while the WP, for the first time in the Turkish history, succeeded in 
electing an MP in 1967. 
The radicalisation of the urban centres had its most dramatic effect on the RPP wing 
of the Kernalist project. The shift towards the left, which had already started, gained 
momentum at the end of the 1960s. The RPP started to use more radical language 
and rhetoric. This time, the RPP had to compete with a socialist movement which 
was absent in previous decades. "This order should change" became the motto of the 
RPP. This move was aimed at restrainino, the rise of the radical left (Gunes-Ayata Z: ý 
1993). In order to broaden its social base the RPP continued to apply a populist 
strategy appealing to the masses with an anti- elitist rhetoriC21 . 
There was an increase 
in the votes of the party even if it was not enough for the party to gain power. 
26 These were the first successful political organisation on the left to be established out of the 
Kernalist 
establishment. Yet, as I will show they failed to distinguish themselves 
from the RPP after the further 
shift of the RPP towards the left in the early 1970s. 
ion to its own 27 Ironically, the anti elitism of the RPP during the 1970s was nothin other than a react 
history. Yet, there was no such self-criticism amon 'a the rank and 
file of the RPP. Instead, the anti- 
hetoric employed to impress the masses. In reali elitism of this period was a very 
loose and vague rII ty 
the RPP remained an elitist organisation. 
The promise to create a Scandinavian type of social 
democracy was an example of the elitism of the RPP (see 
Ecevit 1975). 
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However, there was a cost of this move towards the left for the party. In the face of 
the radicalisation of the party on the one hand, the party came to a split point, on the 
other, the historical alliance between party and the army reached at a point of break- 
up. 
The unrest was not however limited to the Kernalist alliance. Towards the end of the 
decade the urban centres started to witness unrest mainly led by the students. The 
intensity of this unrest and violence increased in the early 1970s. The workers also 
started to express their discontent. The problems were not limited to the political 
domain. In the economy, the easy stage of the import-substitution industrialisation 
had came to an end at the beginning of the 1970s; and the fast growth of the 1960s 
was no longer available. The capitalist class which was reluctantly accepting an 
enforced peace with labour, was not happy with this balance and expressed its 
discontent with the deepening economic crises. Nor was there consensus on the right. 
The JP was challenged from nationalist and Islamist wings. At the beginning of the 
1970s, the JP government was in a very shaky position as it tried to handle the 
deepening economic and political crises in the country. 
This economic and political unrest found an echo within the military. 
Its 1960 
intervention, and the subsequent involvement of the military in politics at least in the 
first half of the 1960s, led the military to see itself as the " final protector of law and 
order. " With the spreading violence and unrest the view that the time was right 
for 
Cý 
another intervention gained popularity. After a short struco), gle 
between the left and 
right-wings within the military, the 
latter which held the left including the working 
classes responsible for the chaotic situation of 
the country took the initiative and 
12 1 
intervened on the 27 th of March 197 1 through a military coup. 
Thus, in terms of its ideology and consequences the 1971 military intervention was 
very different from the 1960 intervention in many respects. This time the left leaning 
faction within the military lost the leadership to the conservatives and was 
completely excluded from the leadership. This meant the total domination of the 
section within the military which was hostile to the move of the RPP to the left, thus 
ending the long term alliance between the two as the main pillars of the Kernalist 
project and eroding the hopes of certain sections of the intelligentsia which expected 
another progressive coup from the military. In other words, while the 1960 
intervention had laid the foundation of the Kernalist project, the 1971 coup started a 
process of fragmentation of the Kernalist project and the political forces behind it. 
The collapse of the Kernalist alliance led to an important turn in the trajectory of the 
Kernalist project. There was no longer a single project. Instead there were two 
projects, one promoted by the RPP, and the other championed by the military. 
The military restricted its objectives to the immediate restoration of law and order in 
the political domain, and stability in the economic domain. The main target turned 
out to be a different section of the left, ranging from intellectuals and students to 
working class. While the overt objective was the restoration of law and order the 
covert agenda was the restriction of workers rights which had resulted from the 
consensus seeking 1960 constitution. Despite imprisonments and other repressive 
measures. the efforts to curb the power of the left, and especially the radicalised 
working class, in favour of the capitalist classes were 
ineffective. The military 
imposed covernments were all too short-lived to implement anv long-term project. 
In 
Cý - Z: ý
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its search for legitimacy, the military did not dissolve the parliament. Instead, it 
imposed technocratic governments on parliament. Although the country was 
governed by these governments for almost three years, they were all insecure and 
ineffective due to the lack of strong support from political parties. Eventually, the 
military intervention came to an end with the 1973 elections without bringing any 
substantial change to the political and economic structures. 
The collapsing alliance with the military brought about important changes in the 
RPP. When the leadership of the party gave support to the technocratic government 
promoted by the military in the wake of the military intervention, the veteran leader 
of the party, Ismet Inonu, was successfully challenged by the leader of the left-wing 
group, Bulent Ecevit (Gunes-Ayata 1990). The changing leadership meant a further 
shift to the left and led to the departure of the conservative group from the party. It 
also underlined the irreversibility of the collapse of the alliance between the RPP and 
the military. The dominance of the left in the party created a bolder emphasis upon 
the popular classes as the social base for the party. Following a populist strategy the 4: ý 9 
emphasis was placed upon all the exploited groups from the urban working-class to Cý 
the small peasantry28. 
When the general elections were held in 1973 the RPP was the main beneficiary 
with 34 per cent. The party had progressively attracted the support of the squatters 
and middle class in the large cities as well as of the small peasantry. Opposite to the 
left, the votes were not divided on the left. In order to topple the right, the left 
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gathered around the RPp29 The obvious loser was the JP with a 30 per cent vote 
down from 46.5 per cent in 1969. This was largely because of the fragmentation of 
the votes on the right among the various parties. 
Although the RPP became the largest party in the parliament, it was short of forming 
a government by itself. Ironically this party, which had a history characterised by 
secularism, approached the National Salvation Party which was mainly a moderate 
religious-based party. The coalition government formed by these two parties 
survived less than a year and was replaced by a coalition government formed by the 
major right-wing parties in the JPs leadership. The so called "National Front" 
governments remained in power until the 1977 elections, even if they did not have 
enough strength and integrity to bring any solution to the mounting political and 
economic crises of the country. In the absence of a long-term vision or project, the 
National Front applied very eclectic policies which undermined the integrity of the 
state apparatus itself. The lack of direction in the economy reached such a level that 
the anti-statist bourgeoisie itself started showing signs of discontent (Zurcher 1993). 
The general discontent was reflected in the 1977 election results. The RPP benefited 
from the disastrous performance of the National Front by increasing its vote to 42 per 
cent. Yet, this result did not secure enough seats for the RPP to win power. The JP 
28 Nevertheless. for the RPP this was a populist move rather than a move towards becoming a class 
based party. The leadership always put a distance between its social democratic orientation and 
socialism. 
29 Startino-,, from late 1960s, a large section of the socialist left in Turkey supported the RPP in order to 
prevent the right from capturinc, power, and this strategy continued until recently. 
Furthermore, the 
socialist left also collaborated with the 
RPP when the latter held the power at the national and local 
level. In this strategy the ambiguous political strategy of the RPP, which contained radical elements 
along with the statist ones, played an important role. 
I will provide rich examples of this collaboration 
IIiI Cý in the discussion of the Ankara experience of this period 
in the following chapters. 
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also increased its vote as a reaction to the divisions of the right to 37 percent. There 
was still a majority of the right in the parliament, and the Second National Front was 
formed again under the JPs leadership. Amidst the political and economic instability 
it did not survive long and was replaced by a RPP government with the aid of 
defectors from the JP in January 1978. Yet, like the National Front governments, the 
Ecevit CYovemment collapsed in October 1979 leading to Demirel's return to power Z=ý 
(Ahmad 1993). 
The 1970s was thus a decade of economic and political instability in Turkey. As far 
as the political domain is concerned, there was no longer a dominant, or hegemonic, 
state project due to the collapse of the alliance between the military and the RPP- 
intelligentsia in the early 1970s. Likewise the strategy of the JP to embrace the whole 
right stretching from big capital to the conservative popular elements, proved to be a 
failure from the beginning of the decade. A similar fragmentation process was 
experienced on the right as well. The result was short-lived coalition governments 
which were not able to implement any long-term strategy in their fight for daily 
survival. 
The most dramatic consequences of this political instability was in the economic 
domain where the import substitution industrialisation strategy had reached the limits 
of its easy stages in the late 1960s. Yet, there was no clear state strategy to intervene 
to solve the emerging crises. Planned development had been abandoned due to 
ideological reasons, and partly due to the weakness and short-terms of the coalition 
governments (Ahmad 1993). 
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The striking consequences of the fused political and economic crises were an overall 
discontent in almost all sections of the society and ever-increasing political violence 
and terror (Zurcher 1993). Large cities, including Ankara and Istanbul, had become 
the target of political violence and terror. The army, which now had a well- 
established vision in its own ranks as well as in the society as the guardian of the law 
and order, was not happy with the developments and once again intervened in 
September 1980 to fulfil a task which had not been fulfilled after the 1971 coup. 
While the intervention interrupted the democracy it also brought an end to the second 
republic which itself ironically emerged out of another military intervention in 1960. 
/I/. V. Towards Fragmentation and Marginalisation ( 1980 and After)! 
In this thesis three main phases are identified in the trajectory of the Kernalist 
project. Whereas the Kernalist project emerged as a challenge to the heritage of the Z-ý 
Ottoman tradition in order to give a new direction to society in its second phase, it 
became more moderate with respect to its leadership mission by tuning itself with the 
emerging trends in the society. The third phase represents a continuation of this trend 
in that the Kernalist project became fragmented and marginalised and to a large Z: ) 
extent began to lose its leadership role in the face of emerging projects 
in the period 
4-: ) 
Zý 
starting with the military coup of 1980. 
The njilitary coup brought the Second Republic to an end and started a period 
of Z: ) 
fragmentation and marginalisation of the Kemalist project 
despite its claim to 
salvage the Kernalist republic which was 
threatened. It is not true on the other hand, 
zn 
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to claim that the fragmentation and marcrinalisation process of the Kemalist project 
started with the military coup of 1980. The beginning of this process goes back to the 
military coup of 1971 when the political and military wings of the Kemalist project 
split due to increasing ideological and political differences. The military coup of 
1980 on the other hand, represents the culmination of this process. If the point of 
fragmentation and marginalisation is taken as the military coup of 1980 rather than 
that of 197 1, it is also because of the fact that, whereas during the 1970s there was no 
serious alternative vision and projects strong enough to challenge the Kernalist 
project despite its weaknesses, the process starting with the military intervention of 
1980 led to the emergence of alternative visions and projects which have been strong 
enough to challenge the basic premises of the Kernalist project. In what follows in 
this section, contrary to the previous ones, the emphasis is placed upon these 
alternative visions and projects rather than the Kernalist project in order to 
understand the fragmentation of the latter. 
The post military-coup period gave rise to the formation, or more accurately 
strengthening, of three alternative projects which have undermined the basic 
premises of the Kernalist project, namely statism, secularism, and nationalism. These 
are the challenges of the bouraeoisie tooether with alobalisation, the rise of Islamic 4 tn 
movements, and of Kurdish nationalism. Nevertheless, it is still too early to argue 
that Kernalism has been totally defeated since the result of these confrontations 
remains to be seen. Yet, one thing is clear: even if the Kernalist project survives. it 
will be very different from its predecessor in scope and content. In what follows in 
this section I would like to analyse the material context of the rise of these alternative 
projects and their interaction with the Kernalist project. 
127 
In the first place, ironically, world capitalism in its globalisation processes started to 
arrive at a point in the late 1970s where it began to undermine its own product, the 
nation-state, in favour of a more open economic and partly political units. At the 
national level the increasing power of the bourgeois classes starting from the early 
1970s attempted to break the induced alliance of the 1970s and aimed to fight for the 
hegemony of a two nation project ( For a different view see Keyder 1987). 
The IMF and World Bank-induced stabilisation programme of 1980 which was 
implemented mainly under the military governments served this aim; the import- 
substitution industri alis ation- strategy came to an end in favour of an export-oriented 
growth strategy. The changing strategy pointed to two facts: firstly, while the idea of 
developmentalism remains intact, the national characteristics of the 
developmentalism has marginalised vis-a-vis the international forces as well as a 
section of the capitalist class which were integrated with those international forces; 
the second fact related to this, the relative autonomy of the state vis-a-vis these forces 
was largely reduced and the state became more instrumental with those forces than 
under the partnership model. 
Thus, in the mid-1980s, it became apparent that there was now a two-nation project 
-nted growth strategy as opposed to the one-nation project based upon an export-orie 0 
of the post- 1960 period raised upon a import substitution industrialisation-strategy. tD 
'The implementation of the structural adjustment programme in 
Turkey was accompanied by a 
significant increase in income inequality and 
by a marked decline in the share of workers and other 
fixed-income groups. Real wages fell dramatically. The transfer was achieved 
by legal and 
constitutional restrictions on union activity in 
the 1980-3 period. The process of redistribution 
assumed a more subtle form 
in the post-1983 phase, with a rising rate of inflation acting as a forced 
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saving-mechanism, thereby transferring Income to both the Government and business sectors from fixed-income groups" (Kirkpatrick and Onis 1991; 35). 
The real beneficiary of this redistribution was the-export oriented section of the 
capitalist class. As a matter of fact, most members of this group were industrialists of 
the import-substitution industrialisation period" 
The post- 1980 period not only witnessed the rise of a bourgeois class and global 
capitalist forces. In line with rising nationalism throughout the world, it also 
witnessed the upsurge of Kurdish nationalism starting from early 1980. The Kurdish 
uprising became a serious threat to the territorial integrity of the Turkish republic. 
Moreover, the Kurdish question and uprising not only constituted a threat to the 
territorial integrity of the Turkish republic but also to the Turkish identity in that one 
of the prime ideas of the Kernalist project was of an imagined Turkish identity for the 
whole population living within its territory. In sum, Turkish nationalism is under 
threat in this case, not by a global but a rather 'regional movement', that is, Kurdish 
nationalism. 
The third threat is the rise of the Islamic movement in Turkey. Given the fact that the 
Kemalist revolution was a cultural revolution against the Islamic tradition of the 
Ottoman Empire, the irony of the rise of the Islamic movement for the Kemalist 
project is self-evident (Gulalp, 1992). The irony turned to a sour reality for the 
30 Eralp point to this fact in following way: 'Those who were supposed to be the main actors in the 
different development policies were the same industrialists who, with substantial support from the 
state had been transformed from merchants into industrialists in the 
1950s. Auain, it was throuah state Z: I Cý 
support that import-substituting industrialists were transformed into exporters in the years 
following 
1980' (Eralp 1990-. 220). 
129 
Kernalist establishment as the pro-Islamic Welfare Party took control of many 
municipalities in the local elections of 1994, including the Ankara and Istanbul 
metropolitan municipalities just before becoming the largest party in parliament in 
the 1995. 
In sum, by the mid-1990s, the Kemalist project has become fragmented and, the 
integrity of the nation-state, which is a historical product of the Kernalist project, is 
under attack from at least three different fronts: global capitalism, Kurdish 
nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism. 
Given the fact that each of these challenges has historical roots and attempted to 
challenge the Kernalist project in different periods, then, whether these challenges 
represent the return of the repressed, rather than the outcome of recent developments 
emerges as an interesting question waiting, to be answered. 
III. V1. Conclusion 
The processes leading to the rise of political Islam in the post- 1980 period is not just 
a maturation of a historical movement or, put differently, does not simply represent 
the return of the repressed which had so long suffered under the hegemony of the L- 
Kernalist project. There is of course a historical dimension. But the answer as to why 
there has been a breakthrough for political Islam in the early 1990s needs to be 
sought in the political, economic and cultural dynamics of the post- 
1980 period. 
In the economic domain, the dynamics of the recent rise of political 
Islam lies in the 
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changing accumulation strategy from a ISS which provided larger segments of the 
society with a share from the economic growth to an export-oriented strategy which C 
is exclusionary towards the working people and traditional petty bourgeoisie. In the 
political domain, in the absence of a new vision and project, the Kernalist left, 
contrary to the previous period, failed to be the voice of these latter groups. The 
success of the Welfare party comes largely from the fact that it was the only party 
having a radical rhetoric which opposes the opening of the economy to the 'West' 
and its consequences, not only for working people, but also for those sections of the 
capitalist class which are oriented to the internal market. 
CHAPTER IV: 
ON THE TRAJECTORY OF URBANISATION IN TURKEY 
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CHAPTER IV: ON THE TRAJECTORY OF URBANISATION IN 
TURKEY 
IV. I. Introduction 
By placing a special emphasis on the Kernalist project, the previous chapter overviewed 
the economic, political as well as cultural contexts in which Ankara had flourished and 
developed as the state capital. This chapter aims to complete the discussion on the 
contextual features -of Ankara's development by examining the macro-spatial 
contextual features of the relevant period with a special emphasis on the processes of 
urbanisation. In reviewing the general pattern of urbanisation, this chapter also aims to 
provide an introduction to the discussion of the case of Ankara as well as a measure 
against which the distinctive and common features of the Ankara experience can be 
assessed. 
Turkey has a very rich history of urbanisation. During the Ottoman empire, Istanbul 
represented a unique case. Using Braudel's description of it, "it was not a town; an 
urban monster and composite metropolis" (Braudel 1972; 253). Likewise, Ankara 
exhibited another unique and interesting example of urbanisation as the state promoted 
capital in the early years of the republic. The processes of rapid urbanisation 
in the wake 
of World War H brought a grassroots dimension to this urban experience with 
the 
unprecedented influx of the rural masses into 
large cities. Finally, the 1980s witnessed 
the enrichment of the urban experience with the rising 
interest of global and local capital 4-: ý 
to the cities, along with many groups including political 
Islam. C) 
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Despite this urban experience, the literature on this subject has not been developed until 
quite recently. Although there existed a limited literature on the cities before being 
dominated by the architects and foreign experts, the first systematic literature started to 
emerge in the mid-1960s as a response to rapid urbanisation starting from early 1950s. 
The newly emerging literature followed two currents: one concentrated on the societal 
aspects of urbanisation; the other on the political/institutional aspects of it. 
On the societal side, the first systematic analysis of Turkish cities came from an 
approach that was inspired by the Chicago school. This inspiration was more than a 
coincidence in that the scale of urbanisation and the problems this massive urbanisation 
brought was seemingly similar to those experienced in Chicago at the turn of the tý I 
century. Despite considerable differences between these two experiences, problems such 
as the location of the new groups in the cities, their political, cultural and economic 
integration as well as their mobility in the city, which once inspired Chicago 
sociologists, were common themes and played an important role in the penetration of 
this school of thought into Turkish urban-studies literature. 
Consequently, while the agenda of urban-studies literature during the 1960s and 1970s 
was determined largely by the rapid urbanisation of the large cities, with a special t-: ) C) 
emphasis on the new immi4c-rr nts and their problems, the theoretical tools of these ,a 
investigations were mainly provided by the Chicago school (See Kiray 1967,1975, Z: ý
1982). 
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Undoubtedly these studies made important contributions to the understandinto-4 of internal 
structures of the cities during this period. Yet, they were not without their problems. In 
the first, place they suffered from the well-known problems of the Chicago school such 
as empiricism and positivism. Further, there were limitations in applying a framework, 
which was developed out of the experience of a US city, to Turkish cities. Not 
surprisingly, many basic premises of this approach were challenged from within 
(Senyapili 1978-, 1981) as well as from without this approach (Ersoy 1985). 
Nevertheless, the study of the social structures of these cities have been dominated by 
the sociological problematic of the Chicago school. 
The study of the political and institutional processes in Turkish cities has been 
dominated by mainly Weberian and radical Weberian frameworks which problematised 
the role of the state in urban development with a special emphasis on the central-local 
government relationship ( see Keles (1993 ), Tekeli ( 1992 )). In the face of a heavily 
centralised structure, the main concern was with the decentralisation of power. The 
strengthening of the municipalities came to be a dominant concern of this literature 
dating from the late 1960s and gained momentum during the 1970s with the increasing 
conflict between the left wing controlled municipalities and central government. 
Yet, 
lacking a theoretical debate on the state and local state, this strand of 
literature was 
guided by a normative bias towards the decentralisation of power on the 
basis of a faith 
in local government as a democratic form of governance'. In I 
C7 I The problem of lack of a theoretical perspective on 
the local state became clear when the right took 
control of most of the municipalities in mid-1980s 
and it became clear that the local government was not 
inherently more democratic than 
the central government. 
I1 34 
The t9gOs witnessed a different phase in the urbanisation processes in Turkey. While 
cities became theatres of accumulation, the number of urban actors and their conflicts 
increased and diversified in comparison to the previous periods. In the face of this 
challenge, it would not be an exaggeration to talk about a crisis of urban studies as an 
ill-equipped and under-theorised discipline. Dominated by an empiricist and micro-level 
understanding of urban phenomena, the current literature has a great deal of difficulty in 
understanding these macro-level challenges. 
If there is a crisis in the understanding of urban processes in Turkey, one of the prime 
reasons for this is the marginal penetration of a politic al-economy perspective into the 
urban studies discipline as a macro-level framework. In the absence of a political- 
economy perspective which problematises capital accumulation, the reproduction of 
labour power, as well as role of the cities in a global world, it seems to be hardly 
possible to study the urban experience of the 1990s. 
Yet, the current tendency seems to be taking us in another direction. Once again 
following on the footsteps of the West, postmodernist approaches are becoming popular 
in Turkish urban studies ( Isik 1995). In search of recognition of difference and 
vernacular, they not only have the potential to obstruct the 
development of macro 
approaches, but also provide the current urban studies 
literature, characterised by 
empiricism and micro-level approaches, with 
justification and legitimisation. 
methodological and theoretical 
This chapter is an attempt to make a counter argument. 
It aims to bring a macro Cý 
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perspective- to the study of Turkish citieS2 . However, it does not claim to provide a 
comprehensive theory. Instead, it aims to periodise the urbanisation processes in Turkey 
as a preliminary step to a more comprehensive framework and proposes a preliminary 
theoretical guideline to approach each period by drawing upon the strategic relational 
approach to urban politics developed in the second chapter. 
IV. Il. A Periodisation of the Urban Experience of Turkey 
Theoretical discussion in chapter II made it clear that spatial structures are neither 
independent nor simple reflections of social processes, but integral to them. Likewise, 
one should not see the urban experience of Turkey as an isolated development or as 
simple reflections of accumulation strategies and state strategies. Instead, the former 
should be understood in the context of the latter without reducing it to the effect of the 
latter. 
For this reason neither accumulation nor state strategies can be the sole base of the 
periodisation of the urban processes. A more sensitive approach, which takes these 
variables into account without diminishing the importance of spatial elements, is one 
which treats the changing balance of power in the political arena of the cities as the 
main deten-ninant in the periodisation of urban processes. It is important, however, to 
2 The idea that every macro-level totalising theorisation is inherently repressive and inattentive of Cý II 
difference is one of the misconceptions in the recent *postmodernist' literature. Along with such repressive 
theorisation within Marxist tradition. there are quite successful totalising ones which are neither repressive C 
iculation of nor incapable of accommodating the difference. The theories of uneven 
development and arti I 
importance of mode of productions are two examples of totallsing theorisation which 
do not diminish the i 
difference. 
136 
point out that the changing balance of political forces in cities itself depends on different 
factors including the state and accumulation strategies. 
By following this understanding, I have identified three distinctive periods in the 
development of Turkish cities 3; 
Period 1: Urbanisation of the State: 1923-50 
Period ll Urbanisation of Labour Power: 1950-80 
Period IH: Urbanisation of Capital: 1980 and after 
It is necessary to make a few important points in order to avoid possible 
misunderstandings on the periodisation of urbanisation above. The first important point 
is that although every periodisation, including the one proposed in this thesis, 
necessarily implies breaks between periods, it does not mean that these breaks are clear. 
Even in the most radical breaks, it is possible to recognise the residues of previous 
periods. Such is the case in the above periodisation. Although I have divided the 
processes of urbanisation into three periods, each characterised by a distinctive logic, 
this does not imply that each period eradicated the actors and structures of the previous 
period, or worse, that it emerged out of nothing. Rather, I will argue for a dialectical 
relationship between the structures and actors of different periods. By this, I mean that 
while the structures and actors of a given period were bom during the preceding 
3 From this overlapping it does not follow that urban processes are the simple reflection of the Kemallst 
pr *ect or strategies. In reality they both are part of the same processes, and the impact between them is 01 C 
not one-directional. As we saw in the previous section that in the reformulation of the 
Kernalist project 
one of the factor playing an important part was the rapid urbanisation of the 
1950s and 1960s. In that 
sense as, I discussed in the theoretical section, the social is inherently spatial though there is a value in not 
reducing them each other. 
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of this period, the successful challenges brought the dominance of certain actors and 
structures to an end rather than eliminating their influence completely. In sum, by 
perceiving each period as a layer which has been covered and changed, but not totally 
eradicated by new rounds or layers, I argue for a certain degree of continuity as well as 
change between successive periods 4. 
A second point, which is related to the previous one, is that the periodisation is based on 
the characterisation of the political agenda of the cities by a particular group and/or 
logic. I use the concept 'characterisation' rather than 'hegemony' or 'domination' 
deliberately to avoid leading to the false conclusion that in each period one particular 
group is the main beneficiary in economic as well as in political terms. As I will show 
later, this is not necessarily the case. Being politically active, for instance, does not 
necessarily always mean being the winner in economic terms. Secondly, in either case, 
'domination' or 'characterisation' of a period by a group does not mean that other groups 
are passive and receptive. Though a certain group(s) may place its/their mark on the 
city, other groups overtly or covertly place their resistance against the dominant order on 
the space or in certain situations where they adapt themselves to the prevailing strategy 
or project in the city. That is, although there appears to be one group at the centre of the 
political arena of the city, there are other groups taking part in the constitution of the 
city. Table IV. 1 sums up the main contours of the production and use of urban space in 
Turkey in line with the above mentioned understanding which is discussed in more 
detail in the theoretical section. 
4 On this point, I have Doreen Massey's 'geological metaphor' in my mind (see Massey 1984). 
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Table IV. I. Production and Use of* Urban Space 
First Period: 1923-50 Second Period: 1950-80 Third Period: 1980- 
Characterising 
Element The State Labour Power Capital 
Focal Point Identity Value Use Value Exchange Value 
Type of Space Abstract Space Concrete Space Abstract Space 
Consumption/Use Surveillance & Reproduction of Capital 
of Space Control/ Labour Power Accumulation 
Bureaucratisation 
Locus of Urban The state Community/ Class 
Individual 
Consciousness 
In what follows in this chapter, I will analyse each period in turn. Having provided a 
brief overview of Ottoman urbanisation and the Ottoman urban system as a background 
in section 111,1 will discuss the urbanisation of the (nation) state, labour-power, and 
capital in Sections 1111, IV and V respectively. The concluding section provides an 
overall evaluation of Turkish urbanisation. 
In the analysis of each period, I will review the social base of the cities, and strategies of 
the central and local governments towards the cities. In doing this I will show the forms 
of the administrative structure of the cities, the forms of interest representation 
in these 
structures and the forms of 
intervention in urban space by local and central 
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goverriments. While the first two components of the state strategies towards urban space 
provide an account of local political processes, the forms of intervention concentrate 
upon the two other key spheres of urban politics, namely, urban land and collective 
consumption. 
IV. III. Urbanisation and the Urban System in the Ottoman Empire 
To begin with, the conventional wisdom that, whereas the cities of the West were power 
containers, the cities of the east, including Ottoman ones, did not have an autonomous 
status, or a relatively autonomous administrative structure in the face of highly 
centralised political systems, needs to be confronted 5. In the preceding chapter, I have 
challenged certain aspects of this alleged dichotomy at the political and economical 
levels. Here, I shall continue to do so by arguing that there are important distortions in 
both aspects of this comparison. 
In the first place, the argument that cities in the West were autonomous and corporate 
entities is a highly disputed one in that the supposed dichotomy 
between town and 
countryside is largely superficial and in that the supposed corporate 
identity and 
autonomy of European cities was immensely diminished 
by the absolutist states 
(Merington 1976). 
On the Ottoman side of this comparison, there 
is a similar distortion regarding the 
'It See Giddens (1985) and Saunders (1984) for the power-container argument 
For a counter view see 
Katznelson 1992. For the Ottoman cities see Heper ( 1989), 
Nfardin ( 1995). 
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corporate structures of the cities. The arguments that *in the Ottoman polity the 
periphery was totally subdued by the centre'(Heper 1989), and that, they lacked a 
corporate identity (Ozbudun 1976) are highly misleading .6 As an alternative to these 
views, I shall seek to demonstrate that the authority and control of the Ottoman political 
centre gradually weakened from the centre towards the periphery and that, there is 
enough evidence indicating that at least some of the cities enjoyed a certain degree of 
autonomy vis-a-vis the political centre, even in the most centralised stages of the 
Ottoman political system (Faroqhi 1993). 
The hierarchical organisation of the cities in terms of their administrative structure is put 
forward as one piece of the evidence in favour of an argument for non- autonomous Cý 
cities. In order to counter the argument, it is necessary to begin with this point. At the 
top of the hierarchical, administrative and city system was Istanbul -as the seat of 
empire starting from 1453 up until its collapse. The city was the residence of the sultan 
as well as being the centre of the administrative, military, and fiscal institutions and 
other bureaus of the empire. Indeed, Istanbul was incomparably superior to other cities 
and towns in terms of size, population and built environment (Braudel 1972; 252). 
The remwning territories of the empire were divided into sancaks which were under the 
rule of sancakbeyis who were appointed from Istanbul. The sancaks were part of a 
larger unit, namely provinces whose highest appointed officer was the 
beylerbeyi 
Cý Cý 
(provincial governor ). Sancaks were divided into smaller units called kazas . 
In this 
6 In a recent article, Mardin (1995) explains the 
difference between the East and the West with regard to 
the development of civil society with the presence and absence of corporate cities. 
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administrative system the sancak stood as the basic administrative unit in which under 
the sancakbeyi there were a number of government officials including the fiscal and 
military registers, the kadi, responsible for justice, as well as the subast who was the 
head of the security organisation (Ortayli 1978). 
It was through this hierarchical organisational structure that the flow of surplus and 
military manpower from the localities to the political centre in Istanbul was said to be 
secured. In this respect, the uneven economic and spatial development between the 
capital and other localities are given as further evidence of the highly centralised 
organisation of the empire. It is beyond any doubt that Istanbul presented itself as a 
urban monster throughout the Ottoman period vis-a-vis the other cities and towns under 
Ottoman rule, and that there was a great deal of uneven development in favour of 
Istanbul. Yet, this evidence does not show that the other towns enjoyed no autonomy 
and lacked a corporate structure. 
Once the empiricist and official lines of historiography are questioned, another picture 
of the cities with their administrative and political organisations starts to come to light 4: ý 4: ) 
which denies the findings of official historiography. In the first place, the hierarchical 
organisational structure of the Ottoman state, which assumes a chain of command 
starting from Istanbul down to the remotest kazas, remained by and large on paper. In Z: ) 
reality, the relationship between the political centre in Istanbul and other localities was 
more complicated and less hierarchical. The crux of the matter is that those who filled 
the so-called administrative positions were not simple functionaries of the political 
4-: ) important officials came 
from locally centre. By and large, these governors. and other * 
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powerful groups who were at times in conflict with the political centre, which in turn, 
had to negotiate with these groups to retain control over these localities. Zubaida 
succinctly points to this fact as follows: 
The starting point for most Middle Eastern countries iIII orcranisation '* 1z 
I is some kind of segmented political Cý consisting of a ruling dynasty whose direct rule does not extend far beyond capital or seat of power, but 
which exercises some ( variable) authority over its (theoretical) territory by uneasy alliances with local 
power structures in different parts of the territory, and the manipulation of structures in different parts of 
the territory, and the manipulation of antagonisms between different magnates, war lords, tribes, and so 
on. The rulers may develop close ties to the social and economic life of the major cities which are their 
seats of power, as was clearly the case of Istanbul and some other major Ottoman cities, but not to the 
bulk of the population in the rural and tribal areas, who remain generally tied to local networks and 
powers with various relations to the centre (Zubaida 1993; 124). 
In this respect, the relationship between the localities and the political centre varied 
according to the balance of power between the local magnates and notables and the 
political centre. Therefore, it is difficult to establish an overall pattern for the Ottoman 
cities with respect to their autonomy from the centre. However, what stands out is that 
the relation between them was far from being, a simple superior-subordinate Z=ý 
relationship, as far as most of the Ottoman cities and towns outside the vicinity of the 
Istanbul are concerned. 
It is possible to see the impact of these complicated relations with the political centre in 
the internal political and economic organisation of the cities. It is for instance a well- C. 
known fact that the non-payment of the locally collected taxes by the local officers to 
the political centre was a very common practice and, in return, the tolerance of this kind 
of violation by the local representative of the centre was the usual solution. 
As far as the economic structure of the cities are concerned, 'the craft guilds (ahi-isni) I 
were the main organisation. Especially in the early penods when the political centre was 
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weak, 'ahis performed a number of public functions and become a politIcal force In the 
cities' (Inalcik 1973-, 152). With the strengthening of political authority during the 
classic period (1300-1600) the centre followed a strategy of undermining the power of 
the guild organisations. Nevertheless, even after this recentralisation, they still kept a 
certain degree of autonomy from the centre in performing the local functions such as Z: ) 
negotiating with merchants of other cities and protecting their cities. In this respect, 
Faroqhi (1993) considers them semi-dependent rather than dependent on the political 
centre. 
Urban services and functions were likewise largely under the control and responsibility 
of the foundations (vakifs). Despite some control by the political centre, vakifs were 
financially and administratively autonomous foundations. They were especially strong in 
big cities whereas their existence was continuously undermined by the political centre in 
other cities. In this respect, it is not possible to see a local government organisation 
which is responsible for the urban services in the Ottoman empire until the end of 
nineteenth century. Only then was the first municipal organisation established in 4- 
Istanbul to provide urban services. In other cities the provision of urban services 
remained the responsibility of vakif organisations. The lack of a strong, local- C 
govemment organisation in localities is generally taken as evidence and consequence of Z) 
strong centralisation (Heper 1989 ). As a matter of fact. the same evidence, in my view, tý 
is compatible with a weak central authority unable to insert its authority and power in 
localities. In this respect, under Ottoman rule, quoting Zubaida once again, C 
,... with the already noted exception of the major cities, the state remains external to the communities and 
social structures over which it rules, and in this respect constitutes a major contrast to the modern state' 
(Zubaida 1993; 125). 
This point is important in distinguishing the modem nation state and the imperial state. 
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Then it is in order to turn to the republic period to see the difference the modem nation 
state makes to the cities and their politico-administrative organisations. 
IV. IV. The Territorialisation and Urbanisation of the (Nation) State: 1923-50 
In the theoretical chapter it became clear that social processes do not take place on the 
head of a pin. They not only occur in space but also through space. The formation of the 
nation state is a case par excellence in this regard. In other words, the territory of a 
nation-state is not just an arena in which nation-state formation projects are unfolded, 
but also a medium through which they are produced and put into effect. As already 
discussed in the theoretical section, although national states define themselves in a 
more larger territorial unit, urban space is an important dimension of this spatiality. My Z71 
argument in this section is that in the study of the territorial politics of Turkey between 
1923 and 1950, including the urban level, needs to be studied in the context of nation- 
state formation. In what follows in this section, I would like to first look at the spatiality 
of nation and state-formation processes briefly at national and regional levels, and then 
move to the urban level. 
At the national level, the most important spatial element of nation-state formation is the 
idea of a homeland. As the idea of a homeland is against the expansionist nature of the 
Ottoman empire, there was no emphasis on a particular territory as the homeland during 
Ottoman rule. Contrary to this strategy, Anatolia played an important role as the 4 
&& mythical" homeland of the Turkish nation in the process of nation building in the 0 
republic period. The dichotomy between the homeland, Anatolia, as the victim of 
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neglect of the thousand years of Ottoman rule, and Istanbul, as the symbol of the old 
order, was extensively used by the Kernalist elite in the creation of a national identity 
and consciousness. As I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, one of the 
reasons behind the emergence of Ankara as an alternative to Istanbul was its association 
with Anatolia as opposed to Istanbul's established rivalry. Anatolia as the homeland 
was the foundation stone of the new territorial identity of the new republic (Rivkin 
1965). 
The Kernalist elite, step-by-step became aware of the fact that the success of the 
formation of the nation and the state in this homeland largely depended on the C$ 
deployment of the authority of the state throughout this homeland. This required the 
penetration of the state into the civil society by means of consent and force. While the 
centralisation and territorialisation of political power are seen as preconditions of the 
deployment of state's authority, they came to realise that they had to be armoured by 
consent. This was circumscribed by the creation of citizenship. 
It is possible to observe these concerns in two key aspects of the spatial policy of this 
period; the location decisions of state economic enterprises, and the creation of a 
transportation network. Almost all of the state economic enterprises were located 
outside Istanbul and other developed areas of Anatolia in a dispersed pattern (Compare 
Figures PV. I and IV. II ). Thus, especially after 1930, with the etatist policies, the spatial 
location of industrial enterprises, to a large extent, followed a pattern reflecting the 
'denouncement' of Istanbul in favour of Anatolia. By spreading out state economic 
enterprises all over the country, this action continued to support the change in the Z: ) 
Figure IV. 1. Industrial Investments and Railways in 19 18 
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population distribution, already created by the transfer of the state capital to Ankara, in 
favour of Anatolia (Compare Figures IV. III and IV. IV). The small cities like Nazilli, 
Kirkkale and Eregli in this period, where state enterprises were built, were the most 
dramatically growing cities. While overall annual growth of these cities was 5.0 per cent 
during this decade, in large cities like fzmir and Istanbul (with the exception of Ankara), 
population increases remained around 1.4 per cent (see Table IV. 11). 
Table IV. 11. Urban Growth in Laree Cities and Industrial Centres 
Provinces 
(city centre) 1927 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 
Ankara 74 784 122 720 157 242 226712 288537 451 241 
Istanbul 690 857 741 143 793 949 860558 983041 1 268771 
Izniir 153 924 170 959 183 762 198396 227578 296559 
Adana 72 577 76 473 88 119 100780 117642 168628 
Kirikkale 14496 15750 27807 
Eregli 5 180 5843 5415 6360 7 132 7 878 
Nazilli 9325 12005 16478 18986 25 106 31 487 
Source: State Statistical Institute, Statistics Annual, 1959 
The strategy of dispersing industries was expressed in the Republican Party Program as 
follows: 
the industnal undertakings shall not be concentrated in certain parts of the country, 
but shall instead, be 
spread all over the country taking into consideration the economic 
factors" (Party Program of RPP, t935. 
quoted in Rivkin, 1965). 
One of the explanations of this spatial policy lies 
in the relative autonomy enjoyed by 
the state during this period, especially vis-a-vis the capitalist classes. 
Nevertheless, this 
does reach the point where the voluntaristic and idealistic explanations 
such as the 
Cý 'above the classes' nature of the state or the egalitarianism of the 
Kernalist recrime 
explain these policies. Although it is necessary 
to acknowledge a degree of voluntarlsm 
in these decisions, It is also necessary to emphasise two causal 
factors, one from above 
0 
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and the other from below. From above, these spatial policies were part of nation and 
state-building processes to which the Kernalist elite committed itself; that is, the 
formation of a new nation state -which is also different in its spatial organisation from 
the Ottoman Empire- required a certain degree of penetration of the state into civil 
society not only through force but also by consent. Equally as important however, there 
was also a bottom-up pressure that forced the state to divert its attention to those parts of 
the country which had been neglected for a long time. The Kurdish uprising in the 
Eastern part and general discontent throughout the country were important in 
strengthening the Kernalist elite's belief that modernisation, mainly through 
industrialisation but also through urbanisation, was a condition of 'national unity'which 
is an important prerequisite of the nation and state-building process. 
The impact of the Kemalist regime's concem for legitimacy and control over the 
Anatolian population was also obvious in the railway policies of this period. During 
Ottoman rule the railway network was concentrated in the western part of Anatolia. 
Especially during the etatist period, there was a conscious effort to expand the railway 
network to the neglected parts of the country in line with the location policy of the state 
economic enterprises (Compare Figures IV. I and IV. H). Given the discontent of the 
masses this policy was a result of both legitimacy and control over the territory of the 
new nation state. 
In search of integration and control over the territory of the new nation state, the efforts 
of the Kernalist regime were not limited to national and regional levels. Similar policies Cý 
started to dominate the urban level, especially during the etatist period. Two of these I= 
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policies are worth mentioning: the establishment of local govemment units in localities 
with a population of over 2000, and an extensive planning activity in many localities. 
As discussed earlier, during the Ottoman period only Istanbul had a structured local 
administration, and a similar administrative structure was set up in Ankara in the early 
years of the republic. There were no similar units in other localities. The provincial 
governor was the principal agent of the political centre in cities. In 1930, the first 
comprehensive municipal law was introduced to allow the establishment of municipal 
administrations in those localities with a population over 2000. While the law proposed 
an administrative unit with numerous functions, the financial and technical means were 
left to the central government to facilitate the control of the political centre over 
localities. Given the fact that there was considerable opposition to the Kemalist regime, 
especially in small localities, it is not difficult to see the rationale behind the policy to 
reduce the role of local government to that of a local agent of the political centre. Zý 
The etatist period also witnessed considerable activity in the planning domain. 
In the 
early years, the main planning activity was concentrated upon Ankara and a 
few other 
cities destroyed during the war. In line with the planned development approach of 
the 
etatist period, the planning was extended to other cities. 
The preparation and 
implementation of development plans were defined as compulsory 
duties of 
municipalities by the municipal law of 1930. In effect, this regulation was nothing 
other 
than the preparation of a development plan for each 
locality with a population over 
2000 (Tekeli, 1980). This is striking evidence of the political centre's intention to 
insert 
its authority over localities in the sense that development planning represents 
a powerful 
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expression of political authority. Through development planning, the political centre not 
only aimed at regulating urban space but also created a condition of surveillance by 
coding the urban space from the streets and roads to the location and numbers of the 
houses. 
Yet, in effect, the insertion of authority from the political centre into the localities 
required tremendous financial and technical resources, which the Kernalist regime could 
ill-afford in the wake of a long war and following the World depression of 1930, In the 
face of scarce resources, the priority was progressively given to industrial development 
at the expense of secondary and tertiary circuits. In the case of development planning, 
the obligatory preparation of the plans for those localities over a population of 2000 was 
dropped and development plan preparation was made compulsory only for the localities 
over 20 000 (Tekeli, 1980). In fact, the preparation of plans did not take place in all 
these localities, and even when a plan existed, the implementation remained limited due 
to the lack of financial and technical resources. At the end of the 1950s, for instance, 
only 58.5 per cent of municipalities had prepared development plans while the 
implementation of these plans were quite rare (Keles and Payne 1986). 
These limitations were also clear in the case of municipal finance. As discussed the 
municipalities became responsible for numerous functions following the municipal law 
of 1930. Yet, due to the lack of finance and personnel, municipalities failed even to 
fulfil their obligatory functions. Most of them were in debt during this period and had CO 
difficulty in paying., the salaries of their staff (Tekeli 1978). 
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exert its authority and control in localities throughout this period in the process of 
becoming a nation state. Yet, at the end of World War H, especially in large cities 
already weak and the authority of the state started to be challenged by the massive influx 
of the rural population into urban areas, and the focus of urban conflicts started to shift 
from the state to the society. In the following section I will discuss this second phase of 
urbanisation. 
IV. V. Urbanisation of Labour Power: 1950-1980 
The most important spatial features of the DP power, in office between 1950 and 1960, 
as discussed earlier, were its anti-urban and pro-rural accumulation and state strategies. 
Yet, this does not mean that urban areas were not affected by these policies. Ironically, 
the impact of the agriculture-oriented policies was as large in cities as in the rural areas 
(Keyder, 1987). While the modemisation of the agricultural sector created surplus 
labour in this sector, the cities, especially the large ones, became the target of this 
surplus population starting from the early 1950s and continuing during the 1960s and 
1970s at an increasing pace. In this sense, the rapid migration and urbanisation of the 
peasants to form massive labour pools in the large cities was the single most important 
characterising feature of the period between the 1950s and the late 1970s (See Table 
IV. 
1110. 
Table IV. III. Urban Population Growth 1927-1980 
Percentage of Total Urban P n (and Number of Cities 
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Population I 
of Urban 1927 1945 1975 1980 
Area(000) 
10-20 24.0 (38) 23.2 (58) 12.5 (154) 10.8 (166) 20-50 28.9 (23) 25.0 (30) 16.5 (89) 15.2 (112) 50-100 9.3 (3) 11.5 (6) 9.5 (24) 10.7 (23) 
Over 1000 37.8 (2) 40.3 (4) 61.5 (25) 63.3 (29) 
Total 100.0 (66) 100.0 (98) 100.0 (292) 100.0 (330) 
Source: Keles and Payne, 19,84, P. 178 
The rapid urbanisation brought important changes in the spatial, social and political 
structure of the large cities. In terms of the spatial structure of the cities, the most 
important dimension of this transformation was the challenge of a new form of social 
space; that is, space of vernacular of the new comers to the dominant landscape. The 
mushrooming squatter settlements on the outskirts of the cites as well as inner areas, 
which had been left empty due to their unsuitability for development, created striking 
contrasts between the authorised and unauthorised housing areas. Thus, the large cities 
started to display very awkward and conflict-ridden spatial structures as early as the late 
1950s with the mushrooming of the squatter areas in and around the existing built 
environment (See Table IV. IV for the Growth of Squatter Dwellings and Squatter 
Population) 
The juxtaposition of two contradictory spaces next to each other was the spatial 
dimension of an emerging conflict between exchange and identity value on the one hand 
and use value on the other. The invasion of urban land by squatter settlers for the 
intention of use was nothing other than annihilation of the state authority which 
guarantees private property and market exchange. In other words, this violation 
amounted to a challenge to the abstract space of the state which were characterised 
by 
15 " 
identity value and of private capital characterised by the exchange value in favour of a 
concrete space of the squatters which was characterised by use value. 
Table IV. IV. The Growth of Gecekondus and Gecekondu Population 
Year Total Urban Gecekondu Total Urban Number of 
Population Population % Housing Gecekondus 
(000s) Units (000s) (000s) 
(1) (2) (211) (3) (4) (413) 
1955 5324397 250 4.69 1 050 50 4.76 
1960 7307816 1 200 16.42 1440 240 16.67 
1965 9395 159 2 150 22.88 1 880 430 22.87 
1967 10437233 2250 21.56 2100 450 21.43 
1970 12734761 3000 23.55 2800 600 21.43 
1980 20330065 4750 23.36 4500 950 21.11 
Source: Keles and Payne, 1984, P. 181 
I will argue, however, that this challenge from squatter areas was an unintended 
consequence of macro processes rather than the result of a project of squatters to 
challenge the political order and its space 
7. The transformation taking place in the 
agricultural sector had forced them to move to cities where neither jobs nor 
accon=odation were available. Thus, invasion of land appeared as an inevitable move 
for newcomers in search of survival in large cities. In this respect, even 
if the emerging 
built environment and the way in which it emerged constituted a threat to the state and 
logic of capitalist urbanisation, it was not a full-blown challenge of an emerging 
alternative project; the project of squatters was not an alternative either 
in its scale or in 
its objectives. It was rather micro-scale, one aiming at 
becoming urbanites at any cost, 
as the return to the village was not a viable option anymore. 
7 This is a very striking example and evidence of why space Is important 
for and Integral to social 
processes and why the former cannot 
be reduced to the latter. That is, even if the squatter residents 
did not 
intend to create a challenge to these space, their creation 
leads to a contradiction which cannot be either 
reduced to or isolated from social relations. 
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This argument is consistent with the voting behaviour of the squatters. In the early years 
of their arrival in the cities they voted for the right-wing parties, but gradually their 
support shifted to the left-wing parties. The most common explanation for this votino, tý 
behaviour is that while squatters in the early years of their arrival at cities saw 
themselves as well-off with reference to their conditions in the village, their point of 
reference shifted to native residents of the cities, so they turned to the left-wing parties 
which promised social justice and improvements for the urban poor (Senyapili 1978, 
Keles and Danielson 1985). 
If the newcomers were not able to develop an alternative project collectively despite the 
potential of the act of invasion as a challenge to the dominant political and spatial order, 
it can not be explained with reference to their level of consciousness, since their level of 
consciousness is not shaped by only objective conditions but also by political 
8 
organisations . In this respect it is apt to look at the attitude of political parties and other 
political organisations towards the squatters. As was discussed in the previous chapter, 
in the 1950s and early 1960s there was no serious left wing mobilisation. It was only in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s that left wing parties, including the socialist ones, 
targeted the squatters and squatters responded overwhelmingly by giving support at the 
national and local elections. For this reason, it is necessary to understand the political 
transformation that the squatters underwent should be understood in the context of both 
their objective conditions and the political structure surrounding them. 
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am referring here to a collective project which challenges consciously political and economic order and 
its space. Otherwise, the squatter settlers had their projects at household and neighbourhood 
levels which 
aimed at becoming an integral part of the city, and as will be discussed in the 
following pages, they 
followed very carefully drawn strategies from the beginning. 
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In this respect it is also useful to look at government policies towards the squatters from 
the early years. It is however necessary to look at, first, the state and accumulation 
strategies of this period with respect to urbanisation. As discussed in the earlier section, 
after ten years of agriculture-oriented accumulation and state strategies, import 
substitution industrialisation came to the fore until the end of the 1970s. One of the 
prominent features of this developmentalist strategy was to contain the resources in the 
primary circuit as much as possible. In line with the emphasis on production the main 
component of the spatial policies of this period, especially during the 1960s and early 
1970s, was regional planning. A number of regional plans were prepared during this 
period to overcome regional inequalities (Rodwin 1970; Rivkin 1965). 
The consequence of this strategy for urbanisation was the minimisation of the flow of 
state and private investments into urbanisation. In terms of state strategies, this strategy 
found its expression through state intervention, in the form of minimum intervention in 
collective consumption and the continuation of centralisation in relation to the internal 
organisation of the state9. Thus, while the state and private capital were not eager to 
invest in urbanisation and support the ever-increasing need for housing and other urban 
services and infrastructure, the initial reactions of the state to the mushrooming squatter 
areas -which were nothing other than a solution of the newcomers to the 
housing 
problem initiated on their own- were prohibition and demolition as a deterrent. 
9 If minimum state involvement was possible in the key areas of collective consumption, this was partly 
possible because of the fact that, especially in the early years of their arrival in cities, the squatters 
restricted their horizons to the gaining of the state recognition of their settlements rather than pressing 
for 
the active involvement of the state in the provision of the means of collective consumption. 
(Karpat 1976). 
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towards the provision of enough housing for the newcomers. Yet, there was a reason 
behind this prohibition and demolition policy as the squatters were violating both the 
very basis of private-property and therefore state authority as the guarantor of the 
protection of private property rights. Therefore, the prohibition and demolition of 
representational spaces next to the spaces of representation were part of an attempt by 
the state to remind the newcomers of the authority of the state and the primacy of 
exchange value over use value in the production of urban space. 
In the face of massive migration it would be optimistic to expect these policies to stop 
the invasion of the outskirts of the cities by the squatters. The squatter settlements 
continued to mushroom at an unprecedented pace despite the threat of demolition. 
While the examples of demolition and prohibition existed in some areas, state policies 
towards the squatter settlements started to be more favourable starting from the early 
1960s. 
There were different factors behind the changing attitude of the state towards the 
squatter phenomenon. In the first place, demolition and prohibition might help the state 
to remind the newcomers of state authority and power as well as the rule of capitalist 
urbanisation, but the lack of any alternative solution produced by the state to squatting 
could create a legitimisation crisis for the state. Furthermore, the number of squatter 
dwellers had reached a level where it was not possible for any political party to 
ignore 
their bargaining power in the early 1960s with the restoration of a multi-party system. 
Finally, it also became clear to the state as well as to private capital that squatter 
housing, as an alternative to the other forms of housing provision was 
functional for the 
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state and private capital (Keyder 1987). 
The first comprehensive positive approach to squatter housing can be found in the First 
Five -Year Plan for national development prepared by the State Planning Organisation 
in 1963. The plan proposed improvement rather than demolition as a solution to the 
housing problem of the newcomers (Danielson and Keles 1985). This approach found 
its reflection in the Squatter Law of 1966. 
The legalisation of squatter settlements, and provision of basic services such as 
electricity and water can, in one sense, be seen as a success for squatter settlers in 
imposing their demands upon the state. Yet, there is another dimension which seems to 
be missing in the relevant literature. It is that the policies of recognition of the squatters 
by the state, through the giving of title deeds, the provision of main urban services, and 
even numbering the squatter dwellings, imply an attempt on the part of the state to 
reassert its authority and control over these settlements and to reintegrate the squatters 
under the logic of capitalist urbanisation in which exchange value subdues use value. 
Once this process had taken place, the squatter dwellers not only received recognition 
and services, but also became tax payers in respect of their officially recognised 
dwellings and land plots, registered in municipal records and could sell and buy squatter 
plots and dwellings in the legal market. 
I would not claim that the changing attitude of the state towards the squatters 
brought a 
complete solution for both sides and integrated squatter 
dwellers into the formal 
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political and economic structure of the cities once and for all. My point is rather to show 
the complexity of the problem. Otherwise, the tension and conflicts between squatters 
and state continued to dominate the political agenda of the cities during the late 1960s 
and in the following decade by taking on new dimensions as explained below. 
In its third stage, the squatter dwellers, having gained certain rights, raised their 
expectations regarding the state to a new level. Their point of comparison was no longer 
the rural area; by comparing themselves with the other sections of the city and built 
environment, they now claimed to be full citizens with the same rights not only to the 
basic services such as electricity and water but also to roads, schools, and other services. 
In other words, they were demanding an extension of the state recognition of their 
settlements with title deeds and basic services to the planning of their neighbourhoods 
as in the authorised part of the city. 
Now that the squatter dwellers constituted almost more than half of the total population 
of the large cities, it was not surprising to see splits within the state created by the 
squatters. As a matter of fact, starting from the early 1960s, there was a certain degree of 
inconsistency in state policies regarding squatter settlements especially between the 
central and local governments. Yet, such inconsistencies were a reflection of 
opportunistic differences rather than ideological splits among different branches and 
levels of the state apparatuslo. The real split within the state, which was rooted in the 
10 One of the common examples was that when municipalities were trying to 
deter the squatting by 
demolition and prohibition during the general-election periods the central government would refuse 
to 
provide a police force to support the municipal 
demolition teams. 
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1970s with the ideological shift in the RPP to the left. The RPP concentrated on the 
squatters and urban poor in its urban policy programme. To start with, the local 
politicians in the RPP ranks started to propose, though not programmatically, policies to 
solve the squatter housing problem on the one hand and to improve the conditions of 
the existing ones by providing services and infrastructure to these settlements on the 
other. Although it was not systematic at the beginning, new programmes which 
prioritised the squatters and their needs against the established dwellers, and which 
placed use value against exchange value began to emerge in large cities. The RPP did 
not wait to pick up the fruits of this shift towards the squatters. In almost all of the large 
city municipalities the RPP took power in the local election of 1973 (See TabJe FV. V. ). 
The RPP kept control of municipalities in large cities including Istanbul, Ankara, and 
Izmir between 1973 and 1980 by renewing its local election success in 1977. During this 
whole period, the large city municipalities started to advance more large scale and 
systematic policies for running the municipalities. In the second half of the 1970s, they 
had a strategy towards the cities they controlled. This strategy involved the 
decentralisation of power to the municipalities from the political centre, opening up of 
the representative channel to the masses, primarily to the squatter dwellers, and the 
collectivisation of the means of collective consumption, that is, prioritising use value 
over exchange value including urban land. The main components of this strategy, which 
was named 'the New Municipalism', was developed 
in the as it was implemented rather 
than being planned in advance (Tekeli 1992 ). 
Table IV. V. The performance of the RPP in the 1973 Local Elections 




























Source: Turkcan, 1982, p. 212 
The changing ideology and practices of municipalities during the 1970s created 
important tensions and antagonisms between the left-wing municipalities and the 
successive central government which were controlled by conservative parties with the 
exception of two short intervals. One the one hand, the political centre did not respond 
positively to the demands coming from municipalities to decentralise the political 
system to strengthen municipalities. If the political centre made any change during this 
period in this respect, it took place in the other direction to further centralise and curb 
the power of municipalities. On the other hand, when municipalities attempted to 
initiate new projects by using their existing resources and power, the central government 
usually attempted to obstruct them. In this respect the 1970s witnessed the turning of the 
large cities into battlegrounds between the central government and the municipalities 
(Tekeli and Ortayli, 1978). 
Nevertheless, the RPP-controlled municipalities brought a new dimension to urban 
politics of large cities despite the persistent obstruction by the political centre. 
They 
managed to initiate important projects in various areas of collective consumption 
ranging from housing to transportation and continued to place pressure on the political 
centre to decentralise power. In this manner, they contributed to the 
deepening of the 
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crisis of the political system during the 1970s. In turn, when the military took power, all 
mayors of the large-city municipalities were sacked and city councils were dissolved. In 
other words, the military intervention of 1980 brought an end to the new Municipal'sm 
movement which developed as a response to the needs of and pressures from rapidly 
urbanising urban poor. 
IV. V1. The Urbanisation of Capital: 1980 and After 
In the preceding chapter the transition from an import-substitution industrialisation 
strategy to an export-promotion strategy was discussed. One of the features of this 
transition was that the military played a key role by repressing political opposition. 
Economic and political restructuring started during the early 1980s as part of world- 
wide changes promoted by international institutions such as the IN4F and The World 
Bank. These also marked a new stage in the urban experience of Turkey with regard to 
the economic, political, cultural as well as the spatial structure of the cities. 
The changing of accumulation strategy from import-substitution to export-promotion 
changed the relationship between primary, secondary and tertiary circuits of capital 
accumulation. The withdrawal from industrial investments in the primary sector, both in 
state and private sectors, created an interest and tendency to invest in the secondary and 
tertiary circuits. 
One of the important consequences of this redressing of the balance 
between the circuits 
of capital accumulation was that the large cities became one of the main 
loci of private 
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and state investments. Nevertheless investment in the cities had been very selective. 
While the built environment and infrastructure, especially communication and 
transportation, were favoured ones, investments in the means of collective 
consumption, except housing, remained very limited during this period. The shifting 
interest of capital in the cities was a novel development in Turkey since during the 
previous periods, the interest of big capital, in both private and public sectors, remained 
in the primary circuit, that is, in industrial investments, while the cities were left to 
small-scale capital. The post-1980 period witnessed a diversification of interests and 
political forces in the cities. The increasing centrality of cities to capital-accumulation 
processes attracted various groups, from big construction companies to foreign banks 
(Eraydin 1987). 
This change brought a new logic to the urban experience of Turkey. The profit motive 
represented by exchange value and spaces of representation, had started to prevail over 
all other logic and spaces, including representational space which was characterised by 
use value. The domination of use value and representational space by exchange value 
and spaces of representation led to the emergence of new political, cultural and spatial 
forms in cities. 
The change in state strategies from urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism 
had 
emerged as one of the prominent feature of the newly arising political 
forms in urban 
space. The military regime played a prominent role 
in this change by removing elected 
politicians and key officers from municipalities, and 
then, starting a rationalisation and 
privatisation of municipal services and activities. 
In this regard, this period needs to be 
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period which was dominated by urban entrepreneurialism. In this restructuring of the 
municipalities, the objective of the military regime was two-fold. On the one hand, 
considering the cities, especially the large ones as the main sources of chaos and 
disorder, the immediate aim of the military regime was to re-establish law and order. Its 
second aim was a rather long-term objective to displace the managerialist policies of the 
previous period, such as the state provision of means of collective consumption, which 
were also seen as one of the dynamics behind the anarchy and terror in the urban 
centres, in favour of more entrepreneurial urban administrations and practices (Tekeli 
1992). 
It is possible to see the marks of these two concerns in the strategies of the military- 
regime period towards the cities. Concerning representation, one of the first actions of 
the military regime was to remove most of the elected mayors and to dissolve city 
councils. The elected mayors were replaced by the mayors appointed by the Ministry of 
the Interior in large cities and mayors appointed by provincial governor in the small 
cities. In many cases appointed mayors were ex-army officers and retired governors 
(Acaroglu and Atauz, 1982). In relation to the internal organisation of city 
administration, the main aim was directed toward to the centralisation of the 
municipalities by strengthening their executive branches against the elected 
representatives. During this period, many small municipalities around large-city 
municipalities were annexed to the latter as part of a rationalisation and centralisation 
strategy. With regard to state intervention, the main strategy appeared to 
be a 
rationalisation and privatisation of provision together with 
full-cost charging for urban 
163 services. In the provision of urban services the subsidies were abolished in favour of 
true-cost pricing. Again as part of the rationalisation, the number of personnel working 
in municipalities was reduced gradually (Sengul 1993). 
When the military regime decided to return to democracy in 1983, the authority of the 
state were reasserted in the urban spaces, and the basic principals of the transition from 
urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism were drawn up and to an extent put 
into effect (Sengul 1993). 
Following the success of the Motherland Party, which was established by the main 
architects of the liberalisation programme, local elections were held in March 1984. 
Just before the local elections, the municipal administrations of the metropolitan cities 
were restructured on the basis of the constitution of 1980 which allowed the 
establishment of special administrations in metropolitan cities. These included a two-tier 
administrative structure (a metropolitan municipality and number of district 
municipalities ) with additional powers in comparison to other municipalities. While 
both metropolitan and district municipalities had elected mayors and councils, the 
former were dominant over the latter. For example, many of the planning decisions as 
well as budgets of the district municipalities required the approval of the metropolitan 
municipality. 
In the local election following this restructuring, the Motherland Party took control of 
most of the municipalities, including all metropolitan and district municipalities . Since 
the Motherland Party was the most keen promoter of the liberalisation programme, its 
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strengthening of entrepreneurial practices in the cities. One of the distinguishing feature 
of municipalities in this period as opposed to the military period was the considerable 
increase in municipal incomes and expenditures after the Motherland Party came to 
power. Between 1980 and 1984, the revenues of the municipalities coming from the 
Bank of Provinces increased threefold. There was a similar increase in the revenues 
coming from the central government. This was an important deviation from the 
municipal policies of the military period as well as from the experiences of Western 
countries (Keles 1992; Tekeli 1993). 
This deviation is an important indicator of the fact that the cities became central to 
accumulation and state strategies. As I argued above, the withdrawal from productive 
investments had created a shift to the secondary and tertiary circuits. This does not 
however explain why public investment shifted to these sectors and particularly to the 
built environment rather than lead to a state policy of austerity. This question can be 
answered by referring to the political role of the cities in the establishment of the post- 
1980 order. I will argue that, especially after the return to the democracy, the cities were 
used in the strengthening of the accumulation and state strategies of the post-1980 
period which were inserted from above under the military regime (Sengul 1993). In 
terms of state strategies, investment in the built environment massively contributed to 
the formation of a social base for the political and economic order of the post-1980 
period in a democratic environment. Through contracting out and other methods, 
municipalities transferred substantial amounts of resources to the 
locally powerful 
groups to create a social base for the Motherland Party which 
did not have a grassroots 
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organisation' 1. Furthermore, the motherland party used urban investments in the cities. 
and the obvious inadequacies of the infrastructure, housing and other services, to divert 
attention from the tensions created by the liberalisation programme. 
Behind this urban populism, investment in urban areas was not only used to create the 
political forms of the post-1980 order, but also as a novel way of transferring income to 
certain sections of the capitalist class, which had taken place previously in the primary 
circuit through the import-substitution industrialisation strategy. 
One of the dramatic impacts of the increasing importance of the cities in capital 
accumulation processes was that various groups which had not been previously involved 
in urbanisation started to turn their eyes to the cities. The big construction companies, 
both national and international, became involved in big construction projects such as 
underground railways, mass housing, and infrastructure. The flow of big-scale capital 
was not limited to state contracts. Once the cities became central to capital accumulation 
and urban rents became an important source of capital accumulation, private capital also 
started to invest in the built environment. Shopping malls, five star-hotels, and business 
centres started to cover the horizons of the large cities at an unprecedented speed. 
The interest in cities was not limited to big capital. The entrance of powerful actors 
into 
the urban arena did not, at least immediately, marginalise the other social groups such as 
squatter dwellers. They remained important actors 
in the urban domain. What changed 
II For a case study which looks at the privatisation of municipal services 
in relation to party formation see 
(Sengul 1989) and Sengul and Aksoy (1991). 
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capital started to dominate the cities. The urban populism of the Motherland Party 
played an important role in this process. In this period, all existing squatter settlements 
were not only legalised but a process was started of preparing development plans for all 
squatter neighbourhoods. These plans aimed to transform them into apartment blocks 
through private development (Municipal Action Plan 1992). In turn, the squatter 
residents were to acquire a few flats from these apartment blocks. Thus, squatters 
suddenly found themselves in a potential renter position. Although in uneven and ad hoc 
ways, this scheme is currently being implemented. The importance of this 
redevelopment scheme in the squatter areas was the integration of the squatter residents 
into the logic of capital in urbanisation by bringing them into the urban land market as 
12 land owners 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume a complete integration of squatters into the 
logic of capital in urban areas for two reasons. In the first place the squatters, like all 
other groups, do not act only on the basis of their interest in one area, that is, their 
property ownership. The other reason is that the squatter settlements and their residents 
do not constitute a homogenous group in terms of their political and cultural values, and 
their economic situations are in terms of their location in the cities. From the very 
beginning, squatters have constituted a very heterogeneous group with regard to their 
ethnic, political and economic background. But, the changing accumulation and state 
strategies of the post- 1980 period created further fragmentation and 
differentiation 
12 It is not difficult to see the similarity between this policy and the 
home-ownership policy of Thatcherism 
through the sale of council houses. 
among the squatters on the basis of their position in the production sector. 
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The differentiation and fragmentation of the post-1980 period is not limited to the 
squatters. It also created important divisions and fragmentation and differentiation 
among the capitalist class as well as the middle class and in return, this fragmentation 
has reflected upon political processes. One of the consequences was the fragmentation 
of political parties. In the previous section, I illustrated that the political system based 
upon two parties had come to an end in favour of a more fragmented political structure. 
This became especially obvious in the early 1990s. At the urban level, this 
fragmentation and instability appeared in the form of a shift of power among the 
different political parties. For instance, in the local elections of 1984, the Motherland 
Party took control of almost all of the metropolitan municipalities, while in the 
following elections in 1989 the Social Democratic Populist Party won almost all 
metropolitan municipalities. The local elections of 1994 not only removed this party 
from power but also created a more complicated and fragmented situation. In the first 
place, massive shifts from one party to another throughout all the metropolitan 
municipalities came to an end in favour of a more pluralistic power division among the 
political parties. For instance, while control of the Istanbul and Ankara metropolitan 
municipalities was won by the pro-Islamic Welfare Party, the Motherland Party took 
control of the Izmir metropolitan municipality. More interestingly, in some of the 
district municipalities of these large cities, other political parties such as the Republican 
People's Party and the True Path Party won control. In this respect, it would not be 
wrong to argue that the fragmentation and diversification processes were intensified by 
the state and accumulation strategies of the period found in the local political processes 
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A short consideration of the spatial dimension of the increasing interest of capital in 
cities and the following diversification and fragmentation is necessary in order to 
complete the debate in this section. I would argue that the post-1980 period witnessed 
the diversification and fragmentation of urban space in line with the social and 
economic fragmentation and polarisation. So-called dual cities became more fragmented 
and multi-layered in respect to their centres as well as their residential areas. In terms of 
residential differentiation, the duality of squatter-apartment blocks had been replaced by 
more diversified housing areas. The middle and upper middle-income groups had started 
to move outside the cities to newly emerging satellite towns (Ayata and Ayata 1996). 
Likewise, the squatter areas became more diversified due to development plans, which 
created a hierarchy among squatters on the basis of their suitability for the 
transformation into apartment blocks. Nevertheless, the most clear appearance of 
fragmentation and diversification in the urban spaces became obvious in the city centres. 
The dual-city centres of the previous period had been replaced by polycentric structures 
with the emergence of alternative centres and sub-centres as a response to residential 
diversification and fragmentation. 
While the increasing interest of capital in the cities created more diversified and 
fragmented political, economic and spatial structures and processes, it also contributed 
to the inequalities at the expense of the urban poor. Social and economic inequalities, 
which had been already deepened by export-oriented accumulation and state strategies, 
were increased by entrepreneurial policies at the urban level. A careful analysis points to 
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a polarisation along with this fragmentation and diversification of social and spatial 
structures of the cities during the 1990s (Ayata and Ayata 1996). 
Given these ever-increasing inequalities and polarisation, ironically there seems to have 
been no emerging project on the left to represent the urban poor. In this respect, one of 
the distinguishing features of the 1980s and 1990s compared to the 1970s is that, while 
there was mobilisation within the RPP and other left-wing organisations in order to 
represent the urban poor, the left in general lost this mission in the politically and 
ideologically muddy environment of the 1980s. Yet, the failure of the left to come up 
with a radical project at the national and local levels reflects the impact of the 
ideological and political onslaught on these avant guard rather than the social base. The 
most dramatic and ironic evidence for this argument is that the representation of the 
urban poor had been picked up successfully by the pro-Islamic Welfare Party, starting 
from the mid- 1980s, around a radical ideology which emphasised social justice, equality 
and similar themes which were capitalised by the left during the 1970s and brought the 
control of the many municipalities, including Istanbul and Ankara under metropolitan 
13 
municipalities 
IV. V11. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have sought to give a synoptic account of urbanisation in Turkey. In 
doing so, I have provided a periodisation which divides the urban experience of 
Turkey 
into three distinctive periods as well as some theoretical tools to analyse each period. 
13 However, it should also be noted that the Welfare Party partly owes this success in 
the local elections to 
the fragmentation of the votes among various parties. This 
fragmentation allowed them to win the 
municipalities with about 20 per cent of the vote. 
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between stages, each period has peculiar aspects which distinguish it from the others. 
For the first period, this was the assertion of the nation state over its territory in general 
but also in urban space in particular. In the analysis of urban space with regard to the 
territorialisation of the nation state, I have claimed that while the state is the home 
domain of the analysis of urban processes, the entry point is identity value. During the 
second period, on the other hand, a different logic became dominant in urban processes. 
Rapid urbanisation as a result of a massive population influx from rural areas turned the 
cities into labour pools. This sea of change brought a new logic to the urban scenes. 
While labour power became the home domain of urban analysis, this time use value 
constituted the point of entry. The early 1980s witnessed another stage in the urban 
experience of Turkey. Changing accumulation and state strategies in line with the 
globalisation tendencies of the World system led the cities to become more central to 
capital accumulation processes. In turn, while capital became the home domain of urban 
analysis, the point of entry was exchange value. 
Throughout this chapter I have attempted to prove the validity of this periodisation and 
usefulness of the theoretical means I have proposed for the study of individual cities. In 
this sense, the level of analysis employed and the evidences drew upon were macro 
level.. In what follows in the next three chapters, in line with the periodisation provided 
above, the development of Ankara is analysed in a more micro scale; each chapter 
focuses on one of the periods discussed above and through the theoretical framework 
developed in the theoretical part which is partly employed in this chapter. It should be 
noted however, that the development of the city cannot 
be read from the macro-level 
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evaluation of urbanisation provided above, since each city and each level of analysis has 
its own specificity which cannot be derived from the macro level. 
If the fundamental premise of Brasilia's foundation is that it 
should signal the dawn of a new Brazil, then it is precisely its 
exemplary uniqueness among Brazilian Cities that defines it as 
a blueprint of development. This utopian difference between 
capital and nation meant that the planning of Brasilia had to 
negate Brazil as it existed. Thus, the Master Plan presents the 
founding of the city as if it had no history . Similarly, the 
government intended to unveil the built city as if it were 
without a history of construction and occupation' (Holston 
1989: 199). 
CHAPTER V: 
ANKARA 1923-50: URBANISATION OF THE STATE 
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CHAPTER V: ANKARA 1923-50: URBANISATION OF THE STATE 
V. L Introduction 
In Chapter III, I have analysed the nation-state formation processes which led to the 
transfer of the capital of the new Turkish republic from Istanbul to Ankara. We saw that 
relying upon an ideologico-cultural, framework characterised by western, modem and 
secular values, the Kernalist regime tried to create an 'imagined community' and 
'national identity' which in practice were nothing other than a rejection of 'real 
communities'and 'identities' within the territory of the new nation-state. Having shown 
the main contours and contradictions of the Kernalist nation-state formation project I 
concentrated on the spatial dimensions of this project. Though I emphasised certain 
aspects of Ankara's role in this process, I did not elaborate on the development of the 
city itself at a micro-level. 
This chapter takes up this issue and examines the development of the city itself at a 
rather micro-level from the vantage point of the Kemalist nation-state formation project. 
It is worth noting however, that while the chapter examines the development of the city 
in the context of the nation-state formation project. it does not treat the former as a 
reflection of the latter. Instead, the development of the city at the micro-level is 
considered as a process integral to nation-state formation processes and as 
having 
distinctive aspects which cannot be derived from the latter. In other words, the chapter 
aims at linking the micro-level analysis of the development of the city to the macro-level 
discussed in the previous chapter'. 
I In doing so, it challenges two dominant tendencies in the literature on the 
development of Ankara. The 
first tendency is the empiricism which dominates the dominant literature. 
Although there is a -great 
deal of 
study over the development of Ankara, they are mostly empirical, and 
these lack a theoretical rigour. In 
this sense. the theoretical evaluations do not go 
beyond common sense conclusions. The second 
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Section 11 covers a brief examination of the dynamics and reasons behind the relocation 
of the capital of the new Turkish republic in Ankara. This analysis reveals the main 
contours of the Kernalist project towards the city at a macro-level. Realisation of these 
macro-level intentions requires the Kernalist elite to confront the realities of that the city 
of Ankara was by no means a clean slate with its long history. Section NJ provides a 
brief history of the city as a backdrop to the later developments including the years 
covering the Independence War. Section IV concentrates on the development of the city 
after becoming the capital and provides a detailed account of how the Kernalist regime 
sought to implement its project on the city in the face of opposition from different 
quarters. The final section provides a balance sheet of the Kemalist project at the end of 
the period, comparing initial intentions and actual outcomes. 
V. 11. Ankara as the Capital of the New Turkish Republic 
In Chapter 111 have argued that the formation of a nation-state does not take place on 
the head of a pin. It is not created only in space but also through space. In other words, 
the territory of a nation-state is not just an arena in which nation-state fon-nation projects 
are unfolded but also a medium through which they are produced and implemented. 
The Kernalist nation-state formation processes are no exception in this regard. I have 
shown in Chapter IV that from the very beginning the Kernalist regime was quite aware C_ rý 
of the spatiality of nation-state formation and this fact played a central role in its 
policies. In what follows in this section, my objective is to discuss this spatial 
shortcoming which is quite related to the former, is rather ideological in that there is a tendency 
to idealise 
the Kernalist project and explain the failures in a voluntarist manner with the individual mistakes. 
ii ng Contrary to this interpretation, I will show that there are structural along with strategic 
factors determini 
the fate of the Kernalist project towards Ankara. 
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awareness in the case of Ankara as the city that exhibits the most central element of this 
spatiality. 
To begin with, it should be stated that if the Kernalist project towards the creation of a 
new Society should be studied with reference to the Ottoman past, the role and position 
of Ankara as the new capital needs to be studded with reference to the old capital 
Istanbul. 
As is well-known, the opposition between Istanbul and Ankara (Anatolia) started with 
the denouncement of the authority of the Istanbul government by the Kernalist-led 
independence movement due to the collaboration of the former with the Allied forces. 
In turn, the Istanbul government outlawed the resistance movement and its leadership t-11) 
cadres, including Mustafa Kemal. This led the resistance movement to move to 
Anatolia, and to establish a defacto government there. Spatially speaking, starting from Cý 
the beginning of the Independence War, there was a clear division between Istanbul and 
Anatolia (Ankara). 
After the congresses held in Erzurum and Sivas with the participation of nascent 
Turkish merchants and large land-owning classes as main forces, the Grant National 
Assembly was formed which consisted mainly of the same groups established in Ankara 
in 1920. The location of the Independence Movement in Ankara was the first step of the 
process of Ankara's becoming the state capital. 
The location of the headquarters of Independence Movement in Ankara was not an 
arbitrary decision. Despite its archaic physical structure, the city was centrally located in 
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Anatolia. Apart from this creographical advantage in terms of co-ordination and Cý ID 
centralisation of the ad hoc regional resistance groups, Ankara had better 
communication and transportation networks with railway and telegram connection. The 
antagonism between the Istanbul government and Ankara reached its peak point after 
the gathering of the Great Assembly in Ankara. 
When the war ended in 1923, the location of the new capital as well as the nature of the 
new regime were still question marks. With regard to the location of the capital, there 
were two options: restoration of the capital status of Istanbul, or creating a new capital 
in Ankara. 
These two alternatives were nothing other than spatial expression of two conflicting 
projects. The conflict was between the intention of conservative groups to restore the 
old regime in Istanbul and the desire of the Kernalists to create a nation-state by making 4: ) 
a radical break with the Ottoman past. In the view of Kernalists, going back to Istanbul 0 
was the first step towards restoration of the old regime. 
Ironically, however, the main bulk of the independence movement was not in line with 
the Kernalist leadership in this respect. The Kernalists, in fact, had constituted a tiny 
minority within the movement. For the majority, represented mainly by the local 
notables and landlords as well as a newly rising native bourgeoisie, the main objective 
was to liberate the country from invasion and to restore the old order from which they 
once benefited considerably. Even if they gave consent to the abolition of the Sultanate 
in 1922, the religious authority of the Caliphate was not in question and around this 
authority, the majority of the independence movement, which was also majority 
in the 
first parliament, was expecting to gather after independence. lt: ý 
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For the Kemalist circle on the other hand, Istanbul was the capital of the multi-national 
Ottoman empire and the seat of the Caliphate as the head of the Islamic World with 
which the Kernalists wanted to make a complete break. The British Ambassador to 
Istanbul reported the view of one of the Kernalist MPs in the Assembly in the 
following way: 
'Jelal Nuri Bey [a Kernalist MP] concluded by stating that Constantinople had been the capital of the International Ottoman Empire while Angora was the capital of a free state' (From Hamderson to Foreign Office, E. 10370/199/44-Pub. Rec. Off. ). 
For a Kernalist, Istanbul was the symbol of a corrupt Ottoman empire and identity. On 
the other hand, Ankara was going to be a clean slate for a fresh start for and symbol of 
the new, modem nation-state. Yet, Ankara was not contemplated only as a symbol of a 
new nation-state. It was, more importantly, going to be a laboratory where the Kernalist 
regime would create a new cultural identity and export it to the remaining sections of the Z-- 
society. 
The Kernalist's insistence on Ankara, however, had more material reasons alongside the 
symbolic ones. Kernalists were well aware of the fact that the creation of a new Turkish 
identity and imagined community very much depended upon the penetration of the state 
into civil society. This was to a large extent lacking in the case of the Ottoman empire2. 
2As we saw in Chapter IV, there was little investment by the Ottoman state in the interior and eastern part 
of Anatolia. Almost all of the industrial investments and a considerable part of the transportation network 
was in the Western part of the country and the ever- I ncreasing economic and political dominance of 
Istanbul was the main factor reproducing this unevenness. 
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Hence, as we partly saw in chapter III the transfer of the political centre could be a step 
to reverse this tendency. By doing this, the Kernalists were expecting also to reverse the 
alienation of the Anatolian population. That is, the Kernalist from the very beginning 
saw the city as a growth pole for the reversal of the backwardness of Anatolia, and this 
was one of the main themes during the assembly debates as to the transfer of the capital 
to Ankara. In the Assembly, according to a British High Commissioner, Kemalists had 
brought up this point as follows: 
'They must resist and endure the mud of Angora in winter and its dust in summer in order to work for the 
welfare of Anatolia. Jelal Nuri Bey continued that, with Constantinople as capital, little thought was given 
to Anatolia, and instanced the construction of railways, not to meet local governments, but as a result of 
Anglo-German relations... From the economic point of view there was no need for the chief centre of trade 
of country to be the capital' (ibid). 
In sum, the transfer of capital to Ankara was not only symbolic but was also a political 
and economic dimension of the nation-state formation project. By doing this the 
Kemalist regime was aiming to penetrate into the civil society. 
Along with these political and ideological concerns, there was a more immediate 
political reason behind the Kernalists' insistence on Ankara. As we saw earlier 
Chapters, the Kernalists were a minority within the Independence Movement and had a 
tiny majority in the Assembly. Under these circumstances for the Kernalists, going back 
to Istanbul was political suicide and the first step of restoration of the old order. Thus, 
Ankara was the most strategic trench in which Kernalists were determined to fight t: ) 4: -: ) 
against the conservative elements. Kemal and his narrow circle saw the transfer of 
capital from Istanbul to Ankara as a means of crushing the opposition and a 
first step 
towards the creation of a modem nation-state. 
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On the other hand, this was a difficult project, if not impossible. There was no faith in 
Ankara even within the Kernalist faction. Atay, a witness of this period and a close 
associate of Kemal, points to the belief, even within the Kernalist group, that Ankara 
was a transitory capital and that when the time came, they would return to Istanbul or, at 
least, to a more convenient place (Atay, 1968: 419)3. 
It was not difficult to understand this lack of commitment to Ankara in the face of the 
dramatic differences between the two cities: Istanbul, with a population exceeding 870 
000 by the end of the 18 th century and with a cosmopolitan population was the economic 
and political as well as the cultural heartland of the Ottoman Empire. Ferdinand Brudel 
describes the Imperial Capital, Istanbul, in following way: 
'Istanbul was cast in the image of the immense Turkish Empire which was so rapidly created. The city as a 
whole developed at the same rate as the Empire. It numbered perhaps 80 000 inhabitant after the conquest 
in 1478; 400 000 between 1520 and 1535; 700 000 according to westerners at the end of the century; it 
foreshadowed the development of London and Paris in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries... 
Constantinople was not a town; it was an urban monster, a composite metropolis. Its site made it a 
divided city and this was the source both of its greatness and its difficulties, certainly of its greatness7 Z-1 
(Bruadel 1972; 252). 
Increasing contact with the West during the Tanzimat period brought a European 
dimension to economic and cultural life. The first modem municipal organisation was 1. 
set up in 1854 in the most cosmopolitan part of the city to provide the basic urban 
services. Urban services such as electricity, gas water supplies and a tramway were in 
service, at least in modem parts of the city. Thus at the beginning of 
1920s, Istanbul was 
4P 
still incomparably magnificent, despite the adverse conditions of the war years. 
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Ankara, on the other hand, posed quite a different picture at the end of the War. As we 
will see below in detail, it had been a traditional town in Anatolia with a population 
never exceeding 30 000. Though the city was a relatively important mohair production 
and processing centre at the cross-section of caravan routes with a trade potential and 
first sani . ak, - then a provincial centre in the Ottoman administrative system - the 
transfer of the surplus to the primate city Istanbul had not led the city to be urbanised. In 
this sense, in the late Ottoman period, the city had a poorly built environment and 
physical infrastructure. Furthermore, a major fire had destroyed a considerable part of 
the city. 
When the centre of the Independence War moved to the city, it was, by no means, ready 
to host the newcomers. As I discuss in the next section, in the face of the acute housing 
crisis for the new groups as well as the 'archaic'social and cultural life led many of the 
Istanbul-originated elite to think of the city as a temporary shelter in the face of the war 
conditions. A prominent figure of the Kernalist regime portrays 1920s' Ankara in his Z-: ) 
memoir as follows: 
'I do not think that a tiny backward Anatolian town of today is more archaic than Ankara of those days. 
Apart from the Assembly, there was no place to spend the day. The centre was so primitive that it was 
impossible to a decorate table with a set of plates and the same set of cutlery' (Atay 1968; 352). 
Reluctance to accept Ankara as the new capital was not restricted to the Turkish groups. Zý 
From the very beginning, almost all of the foreign countries started to make objections tp tý 
to having their embassies move from Istanbul to Ankara. Britain was the most reluctant Cý 
3 In fact, most of the members of Kernalist fraction were native Istanbullans and many of them 
had left 
their families when they joined the Independence cause. Even in 1927, the number of married men was 
180 
one among others. A Foreign Office communication revealed the reason for the 
impossibility of opening an embassy in Ankara due to the archaic physical and social 
infrastructure of the city. In a letter written to the French and Italian ambassadors by the 
British Foreign Minister, Lord Cruzon, after asking what strategy was going to be 
followed in case of such a relocation. he emphasised that: 
'It will probably be thought desirable in any case that the diplomatic missions shall remain at 
Constantinople rather than at Angora, where local conditions will render it practically impossible, at any 
rate for some time to come, for the Diplomatic Corps to reside with any degree of dignity or comfort' (F. Cý 0.371/9163/E. 7948n734/44). 
Except for the Soviet Union, most of the foreign countries took a similar position 
against the decision to transfer the capital to Ankara. Of course, there was some truth in 
the reluctance of foreign embassies against Ankara due to the archaic conditions of 
Ankara. But to a large extent, there was also a suspicion against the Kemalists and their 
intentions. The restoration of the old order would have been more preferable for the 
Western countries. 
Despite the opposition coming from different quarters, the Kernalist group was 41-n 
determined to make Ankara the permanent capital of the country. Mustafa Kemal's 
close associate, Ismet Inonu initiated the process which led to the 
declaration of Ankara 
as the new capital: 
'The outstanding event of the past week has been the acceptance 
by the Grand National Assembly of a 
motion submitted by Ismet Pasha for the inclusion in the 
Constitutional Charter of a special clause fixing 
Angora as the seat of the Government of the new Turkey. After 
having been fully discussed in committee 
and secret party meetings, the draft clause was 
finally submitted at a plenary session of the Assembly on 
the 13th instant. Few voices were raised in favour of 
Constantinople. and the speakers who did so were 
subjected to frequent interruption. The debate was therefore 
brought to a speedy conclusion. and thou, -h 
some twenty Deputies abstained from votina, the motion was accepted 
by a large majority', (From 
Handerson to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Public Record Office, 
London, E. 10368/199/44). 
more than married women in 
Ankara (Population Census of 191-7). 
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Thus, Ankara was proclaimed as the new capital of the new Turkey on 13th November. 
1923. The same correspondence also notes that the Assembly's decision was welcomed 
and greeted in the new capital with scenes of great rejoicing. However, it is claimed, 
these scenes and the acceptance of the majority were misleading: 
'It may, however, be noted as one more proof of the control still exercised by Mustafa Kemal over the 
present Assembly, that at the close of the sitting one of the Deputies who had disclosed himself opposed 
to the return of the capital to Constantinople is reported in the press as having, announced that at heart 
everyone was in favour of the former capital, but that they had to conform to the decision taken at the 
secret party meeting' (ibid, p. 62). Cý 
The correspondence also reports the closer control and repression over the leaders of the 
opposition during this process: 
'Although undoubtedly growing bolder, the opposition groups are, however, still walking with 
considerable worries. Reouf Bey.... is at present the guest of Refet Pasha. Both are stated to be closely C 
watched by government agents. Nevertheless, Reouf is reported to be about to proceed to Angora... 
He 
has abstained from making any public declaration' (ibid, p. 62), 
Whatever method they used, the proclamation of Ankara as the new seat of the 
government was a boost to the morale of Kernalists and blow to that of conservatives, 
and a historical Point marking, the irreversible change in the 
balance of power in favour 
of Kernalists. It also opened the way for the Kernalists to create a 
"modem" nation-state. 
This review has shown that for the Kernalist regime, 
Ankara was a pivotal element in 4: ý 
the new society the Kernalist project aimed to create. 
This was a modem. secular, 
Westem-looking society. Ankara was not simply a symbol of this society. 
The city at its 
very heart along with being a symbol of the new regime 
and its aspirations as the new 
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capital, was seen as a model for the new society. For the Kernalist project the city was 
an arena where its project would produce and unfold. 
This was partly due to the fact that the Kernalists' control was limited to the higher 
levels of the state apparatus. In the lower levels of the state apparatus as well as in the 
society, support for the Kemalist project was very limited4 . Being aware of this fact, the 
Kernalist regime started to apply a top-down perspective which sought to conquer the 
society with an avant-guard strategy. Ankara was important in that sense. By 
concentrating its limited power, the regime was going to create a model society in this 
city, and then the same model was going to be exported to the rest of the society within 
time. In this sense, the success of the city was very vital for the success of the regime 
and its society projeCt5 . Thus the city was reflecting all the main features of the 
Kernalist nation-state project. In this sense apart from its use value as the capital where 
republican regime function through public offices etc., the city had a identity value in I 
the production of a new society by being a model of it. 
The problem however was that the society project of the Kernalist elite was very 
different from the existing social and spatial structure of the city. Ankara was a city I= 
with a Muslim population and traditional way of life matching the Ottoman way of life 
4Thjs is a very common situation in post(semi)colonial societies where similar modernisation and 
westernisation strategies were put into implementation by the political 611te. For India, 
for instance, see 
(Kav 1 raj; 199 1 
5Ankara did not represent a model for the urbanisation of the rest of the country. As a 
laboratory, it aimed 
to create models for the whole country on even non -urban issues. 
For instance, Mustafa Kemal had 
bou, ght land just outside the city to establish a model farm to introduce modern techniques and methods 
to i 
the Turkish farmers. 
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rather than a western and modem one as the Kernalist 61ite contemplated to create. 
Likewise, the built environment in the old town part showed a village characteristic 
rather than a modem western city. In other words, there was a considerable gap between 
the Kernalist imagination and the realities of the city. The social and spatial base of the 
city did not match the one proposed by the Kemalist project towards the city. In order to 
understand the contradictions and problems the Kemalist regime faced in the following 
periods it is necessary to look at the historical evolution of the city. 
V. 111. Ankara as a Small Anatolian Town: Historical Background 
It has become clear in the previous section that the refusal of Istanbul as a part of 
Ottoman heritage was the main reason in Ankara's becoming the capital of the new 
republic. That is, Istanbul was identified with the Ottoman and partly with Islam as the 
centre of Calipethship, whereas Anatolia was seen as the territory of the Turkish identity 
and victim of the Ottoman political centre in Istanbul. Thus, this section also sets out to 
question this assumption of the Kernalist elite with reference to Ankara. 
There is no precise information as to when Ankara first emerged as an Anatolian city. 
The existing evidence however suggests that the city was established around 
20th 
century BC by the Hittites and since then, unlike many other Anatolian cities, 
Ankara 
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has been continuously inhabited. After the Hittites, the city was controlled by Lydians 
and Galatians, for whom the city served as the capital for a short period6. 
The city was taken over by the Romans during the first century BC, and enjoyed 
considerable prosperity as a trade and military centre (Figure V. 1). In the prosperous 
periods it is believed that the population of the city exceeded 100 000. However, after 
the 3rd century BC, the city started to fluctuate with the decline of the empire and never 
recaptured the prosperity it had once enjoyed. 
The city fell under the control of the Selcuks in the II th century and the Ottomans in the 
14 th century. During the Ottoman period, the city became a provincial centre. Due to its 
strategic location, the city also preserved its trade-centre function. Around 30 boarding 
houses and inns existed in the city during the 16th and 17 th centuries showing the 
importance of the function of the city as a regional centre. Mohair production and 
processing were also important to the economy of the city. At the beginning of the 17th 
century the population of the city was around 30 000 (Akcura 1970). 
The decline of the empire during the 17 th century and the shift of trade routes towards 
the oceans affected the city adversely, but the city did not decline like many other 
Anatolian cities, thanks to mohair production and export. The population of the city at 
the beginning of the 19th century was still over 30 000 (Akture 1978). Yet, the trade Z-- 
61t worth notinc, that during the 1930s, the official historical doctrine attempted to impose the view that 
IIIII is was a the early roots of the "Turkish race" goes back to the Hittites and other early civilisations. Thi 
conscious attempt to dissect the relationship between Turks and Ottomans as well as to create a territorial 




















agreement of 1838, which lifted protective measures on domestic production, made a 
devastating effect on mohair production in the hinterland of the city. However, the city 
managed to survive and at the end of the century its population was still around 30 000. 
However, the already stagnating economy of the city was gravely hit by the adverse 
conditions of World War 1. While the city tried to survive the negative conditions of the 
war years, the final cut came from a big fire which wiped out a considerable part of the 
housing stock of the city. Thus at the beginning of the 1920s, Ankara was a city with a 
population which had fallen to 20 000 and a shrinking economy (Akcura 1970). 0 
Before turning to the Independence War years of Ankara, it is necessary to look at its 
social and ethnic structure in order to understand the social basis of the Kemalist 
project. It is a well-known fact that the so-called Turkification and Islarnisation process' 
started in Asia Minor in the II th century and by the end of 13 th century, almost all of 
Asia Minor was controlled by Turks, and the majority of Asia Minor's population was 
Muslim (Wagstaff 1985; 186-8). However, this process did not eliminate other 4: ) 
nationalities and ethnic groups. Throughout the Ottoman period, the non-Muslim 
minorities comprised an important part of the population. In many 
Anatolian cities 
minorities constituted a quarter of the population. 
Ankara was no exception to this trend. The city had a very cosmopolitan ethnic 
population structure until the end of the 
Ottoman period. During the I 91h century a third 411) 
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of Ankara's population was constituted by non-Muslim minorities which mainly 
consisted of Jews, Armenians, and Greeks (Denel 198 1; 132). 
According to British counsellor Bernham, at the end of the I 9th century, in the economic 
life of the city there was a clear division of labour amona, ethnic groups: the Muslim C) 
groups were mainly in the agricultural sector and traditional craft business while the 
Greeks and Armenians held control of trade and prestigious professions such as lawyers 
and doctors. A similar description is given the for the early twentieth century by Vehbi 
KOC7 in his memoir as follows: 
'The population of Ankara consisted mostly of Moslem Turks, with Christian and Jewish minorities. The 
Christians worked hard, made a good living, ate well, dressed well and had pleasant houses. They kept 
their holidays on Sundays. Before the declaration of the Republic, The Christians were not drafted into the 
army, but paid a tax instead. Because of this exemption they had an advantage in business. The Turks 
were mostly hodjas, grocers, night watchmen and shopkeepers ..... The only tradesmen in Ankara at that 
time were the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. The Moslem Turks, although they were the real rulers of the 
country, were usually the employees of these three minorities, and generally led simple lives. The best 01 
homes shops and summer houses belonged to the non-Moslems. On Sundays they strolled about dressed 4ý 
in fine clothes, ate and drank well, and enjoyed themselves. In the spring and fall the main streets of L, 
Ankara thronged with well-dressed Christian and Jewish families (Koc 199 1; 6) 
These minorities were also dominant in the cultural and educational life of the city. It is 
possible to see the centrality of the minority groups in the administrative apparatus of 
the city. In the regional and local councils of the city the minorities held 
half of the 
council seats. For instance, three members of the local council out of six were non- 
Muslim in 1872 (Denel 1984; 133). Given the fact that economic power and property 
ownership were important in becoming a member of the council, this representation 
7Vehbi Koc is an important name as a native member of the city. 
Starting with small-scale trade he has 
became the biggest industrialist of Republican Turkey. As I will 
discuss later, the contracts he undertook 
during the construction of Ankara are an important source of 
his initial accumulation. 
C 
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structure also shows the dominance of the non-Muslim groups in the economic life of 
the city. 
The ethnic and economic structures of the city found their reflection in urban space. In 
the first place, the neighbourhoods were divided from each other on the basis of ethnic 
identity and named on this basis. Wealth also found its expression in the housing type 
and quality. The wealthy minorities lived in better houses and almost all of them had 
houses outside the city. There were more than 2000 summer houses outside the city 
which were used as second houses. The wealthy section of the Muslim population also 
had houses outside the city: 
'Coraklik was inhabited by Moslem families like our own, whereas Kecioren, a little further away, was 
inhabited by Catholics and Armenians. Their well-kept orchards and fine houses and gardens were much 
admired. The rich Christians spent the summer in Kecioren, Etlik, or Cankaya. Only the Jews did not 
move to surnmer houses' (ibid. p. 10) 
Yet during the war years this structure of the city underwent a radical change. While the Z-: ý 
long war led to a stagnant economic life in the city, the adverse conditions of the war 
years for the minorities, as in many other cities, resulted in the forced emigration of the 
minority population from the city. As I mentioned before, the minorities constituted 
more than a quarter of the city's population. In the first population census of the 
republican period, the minorities constituted three per cent of the city population. In this 
sense, the city lost the most wealthy section of its population. 
As in many other cities however, in Ankara too, the local Muslim 61ite started to take 
over the business as well as property left by the minorities. Thus, despite all the adverse 
188 
conditions of the war years, the Muslim merchant class in Ankara benefited from the 
War unlike other groups. 
Despite the fact that the local Muslim elite benefited from the departure of the 
minorities, the impact of the war years was very obvious on the economy and built 
environment of the city, when the headquarters of the Independence Movement started 
to arrive in the city. 
V. IV. Towards a Dual City: Independence War Years 
A new period started in the city's history with the move of the headquarters of the 
independence movement during the last days of 1919. The political and military 
leadership cadres of the movement started to settle in the city. The population influx 
was further boosted with the decision to gather the national assembly in the city in April 
1920. The provincial representatives from all over the country started to pour into the 
city. The social and demographic structures of the city underwent a dramatic change in a 
very short time. One of the striking features of the newly emerging social structure was 
a duality between the native population and the new-comers. 
Ankara at the beginning of the 1920s neither socially nor spatially was ready to 
accommodate the newly arriving population. The housing stock was very limited and a 
considerable part of it was destroyed by a big fire before the arrival of the independence 4: ) 
movement. Thus a housing crises was inevitable with the 
first arrivals. The housing, Z: ý
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problem was handled in two different ways. Some of the new groups started to settle in 
summer cottages outside the city. This group was the more higher circle of the 
movement and Kemal himself was among them. He chose his residence in the southern 
outskirts of the city. The majority, on the other hand, settled in the existing housing Z: ) 
stock by renting single rooms from the natives. In the face of the difficult living 
conditions in the city, most of the newcomers did not bring their families. 
The urban poor of the city was very cautious about the changes the city started to 
undergo with the move of the headquarters of the Independence Movement. As many of 
the leading names of the Kernalist fraction wrote later in their memoirs, from the very 
beginning the poor section of the local population was not happy with the settlement of 
the headquarters of the Independence Movement and with the subsequent settlement of 
the new regime in the City8. One of the leading members of the Kernalist fraction spelled 
out the dismay of the local population in his memoirs as follows: 
'The native population was not happy with the state's staying in the city. They thought that life was going LI Cý zn =1 
to be very expensive and they were going to be swallowed up among the population pouring, into the city' 
Way 1968; 352). 
8 The social relations between newcomers and the native population was more complicated. Before 
discussing this however, it is necessary to challenge the myth that the population of Ankara Z-1 
overwhelmingly supported the independence movement and welcomed the settlement of the headquarters L- 
of the independence movement in the city and its further staying. In the previous section, I have shown 
that the driving forces behind the independence movement was the alliance of Muslim merchant capital, a 
section of the Ottoman political and military 611te and the big landlords. It is not difficult to understand the 1-1 
support given by this group to the Ottoman political dlite given the fact that during the war years they 
appropriated considerable wealth by taking over the businesses and properties of the minority groups. 
In 
Ankara too, there was a similar situation and the local 611te rather than the whole city, as it was claimed, 
gave support to the independence war. Akyuz (1981) makes a bold statement that Ankara supported the 
independence movement and the war against the Western Allies. 
The evidence she provides however 
shows that the support came from the local 611te. There is no evidence. on the other 
hand that there was a 
similar feeling among the local population. Cý Cý 
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Furthermore, the move of the large section of the new-comers to the inner city 
intensified the cultural confrontation between two groups. The confrontation between 
them became a subject for the novels of this period. Karaosmanoglu, another leading 
member of the Kernalist intelligentsia, gave a vivid picture of this confrontation on a 
neighbourhood basis between a republican bureaucrat and his wife who came from 
Istanbul and the local population because of cultural differences9. 
Yet, the dismay and uneasiness was not one directional. From the very beginning it is 
possible to observe the exclusion of the native population by the republican 611te and 
vice versa: 
'The natives called us foreign and would not join us. I wanted to buy a piece of land from a local. He took 
me to his land around Cankaya. I did not understand anything about what he said about the border and 
trees in the land plot. Dialect and accent were so different between us' (Atay 1968; 352). 
The cultural values and life style of these two groups were so different that the sociable 
interaction between them was almost non-existent. Thus, as soon as the republican elite 
arrived at the city, it started to create its own space. There were particular coffee-houses, 
restaurants and other social facilities which were taken over by the new groups. The 
social gatherings of the republican 'lite were entirely among the members of this group Z: ý e ZD 
with few exceptions. The native population was to watch this new way of life as 
outsiders: 
'We weren't even saluting each Cý other since those who were in 
the street or who met in the municipal 
garden or in the restaurant were the same people. We were missing the days where we could socialise. 
9The wife of the idealist bureaucrat had found the living conditions and surrounding environment Cý 
unbearable and unhygienic while the locals were annoyed 
by their life style. As a result of this conflict the 
C, 
locals had wanted them to leave the neighbourhood. The novel reflects the 
feelings and observation of the I-- 
writer as one of the leading names of the 
Kemalist intelligence of the period. 
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There was no place apart from garden of the Assembly to spend the day, and we fancied of bein" invited to the residence of Mustafa Kemal. If we were not invited, we would meet in a corner of the restaurant where we could drink' (Atay 1968; 35-1). 
I will argue in this section that while at a national level the regime defined the role and 
future of the city on the basis of its contradiction with the old regime in Istanbul, at the 
city level the future of the city was, to a large extent, defined with reference to the 
conflict between the natives and new residents of the city. In other words, my point of 
departure in this section is the view that at the city level the "other" of the Kemalist 
project towards the city was its native residents. Thus, it is crucial to examine the 
relationship between them to understand the future development of the city. However, it 
is necessary to identify the internal structure of the two populations since neither was 
homogenous in terms of their economic, political, and cultural backgrounds. 
As far as the native population is concerned, as I have already discussed the majority of 
the urban population was constituted by Muslim-Turks, and the bulk of the this 
population was in the agricultural and craft and petty production sectors. After the 
induced departure of the minority groups, control of trade passed to the relatively rich 
Muslim. There were however still a tiny and relatively well-off minority group in the rý 
city. 
The new population. which started to pour into city after the head quarters of the 
Independence Movement moved to the city and culminated when the city became the 
capital of the new republic, was not a homogenous group. 
As we saw earlier, the main 1 4-71 t) 
force behind the Independence Movement was an alliance of Muslim merchant capital. 
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big landlords and a dissident section of the Ottoman political and military 611te under the 
leadership of the Kernalist fraction. In terms of political and cultural/ideological 
commitments, there were no big similarities among this group. Apart from the Kemalist 
fraction and a tiny section of the Ottoman political 61ite, there was no strong 
commitment to westernisation and modemisation associated with secular values. In 
contrast, most of the representatives who came from Anatolia were in the hope of the 
restoration of the old regime and strongly committed to Islam. The important point is 
however, that the Kernalist fraction eliminated these groups from the corridors of 
political power and dominated the state apparatus. As I will discuss despite the fact that 
the Kernalist fraction was a tiny minority, it was able to dominate the state apparatuses 
by largely using anti-democratic means. The commitment of this group to Western, 
modem, and secular values and life style was quite contradictory with those of the 
native population as well as remaining part of the political elite which came to the city 
after 1920 from different sections of Anatolia. 
In this cultural and political context, it is possible to identify four main groups in CD 
relation to the local politics: (i) the Kernalist/modemist section of the state elite; (ii) the 
traditional and conservative section of the state elite; (Ili) the land-owner local elite; (iv) 
the remaining part of the local population 
At the cultural level the conflict and contradiction was between the modernist section of 
the state elite and the other three groups. In 
fact this conflict was nothing other than a Cý 
localisation of the conflicts between the Kernalist regime, which was an avant-guard of k 
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the westemisation and secularisation project, and a large section of the Anatolian 
population which was non-secular and traditional. That is Kernalism was once again 
facing the same problem. That is, the social base in the city was not keen to be changed 
in the direction of westernisation and secularisation. The anti-religious attitudes of the 
VIC. 
xCernalist regime were the main sources of conflict. 
Yet the contradictions between the regime and local population was more dramatic than 
appeared at the national level. The contrast between the new elite of the city and native 
population in terms of life style was much more common place and concrete than any 
other place since the new elite and the local population were sharing the same city. 
V. V. Two Cities Project 
As we saw earlier, even for the majority of the Kernalists, Ankara was a temporary 
refuge to carry out the Independence War. When it ended, the dominant view was to 
return to Istanbul. These hopes were dashed with the insistence of the narrow circle of 
the Kernalist elite on Ankara as the new capital. With the proclamation of the city as the 
new capital, every section of the republican elite had to consider their situation within 
this new situation. 
This rethinking was very much dependent on rethinking the 
development perspective of 
C 
the city itself. First of all, the city had become the capital of the new republic and 
this 
function was going to place important loads on the city. 
Most of the public offices were 
Cý Cý 
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functioning in unsuitable places such as schools and houses. Given their permanence in 
the city now, they needed suitable places. Besides, as we discussed above, the city now 
was both a symbol of the new regime and a model of a socie ty- i n-the -making. The state 
of the city was far from reflecting these ideals. Furthermore, the state 611te including the 
Members of Parliament accepted these conditions with the thought of the temporality of 
the circumstances. Now permanently in the city, they wanted to settle in decent houses 
and brought their families. Further, with the determination of the city as the capital of 
the new republic boosted the migration into the city. The population of the city started to 
increase in an unprecedented scale (See Table V. I) 
Table V. L Population of Ankara between 1927-1950 
Years I Male Female Total 
1927 74553 
1935 74809 47911 122720 
1940 90953 66-189 157242 
1945 137058 89654 226712 
1950 174964 114 '1133 289 197 
Source: Development Committee Report, 1954, p. 51 
In this sense, the transformation of the city was inevitable. Yet, the direction of this 
transformation was not clear. There were two clear alternatives: the improvement of the 
existing town with the renewal and reconstruction of the areas destroyed by fire and the 
directing of further developments around the existing town, or leaving the old town and C" Z 
building a new one for the new regime and newcomers. The first option was to think of Z-- 
C) 
Ankara as a city by integrating the new developments with the old town. 
The second one zn 
was a two-cities project contemplating two different cities side 
by side. 
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The cultural collision between the traditional section of the native population and the 
modernist section of the new comers was an important input to this decision. The 
experience of the Independence War years had shown that the gap between these groups 
was quite big. The establishment of the new town for the republican elite was more 
tempting than staying in the existing town. But this choice was not without its own 4 
problems. In the first place, as we saw above, the Kemalist regime declared its disdain 
for its neglect of Anatolia, and the declaration of Ankara was shown as a sign of the 
defence of Anatolia. For this reason, leaving old Ankara to its own destiny was nothing 
other than repeating the same kind of attitude the Kernalist criticised. On the other hand, 
establishing a modem city standing for the image of the new regime was much easier. 
There was another input to the decision to be made between these two alternatives. The 
land prices had increased in the old town with the arrival of the Independence 
movement in Ankara and had shot up with the proclamation of the city as the new 
capital (See Table V. 11). Those who foresaw the future started to buy land. Given the 
high land prices in the old town, they were buying land in the area between the old town 
and Mustafa Kemal's residence in Cankaya. 
Table V II. Land Prices in Ankara 








Source; Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement, quoted in 
Marcussen (1982) 
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Thus, at the economic level, the main conflict was about the distribution of rent which 
derived from the unprecedented growth the city underwent. Naturally, when the new 
state elite moved into the city, the native population had a monopoly of ownership of 
urban land. Under these conditions, the question was who would appropriate the rent 
resulting from the development of the city. While ownership of the urban land by the 
native population was providing it with an advantage in the appropriation of the values 
in the city, the state elite had the advantage of being in control of the state apparatus 
which was able to direct the pattem of urban development. Thus, given these relative 
advantages of the two groups, the sources of the economic conflict between the state 
elite and landed section of the local population was the appropriation and distribution of 
the urban rents in a fast-growing city. 
In the end, these tensions and contradictions, which are rooted in the differentiation of 
cultural and ideological values and economic interests, resulted in the creation of a dual 
city. That is, as I will discuss below in detail, the Kernalist regime preferred to build a 
new city that was not very much related to the old one, and in the following periods, to a 
large extent, the development of the city was determined by the two-cities project of the 
Kemalist regime'O. Thus. The social duality between the traditional and modem sections 
during the Independence war years, started to find its expression in urban space after the 
101n the emergence of this dualism one of the first and most decisive moments was 
Mustafa Kemal's 
decision to live in a house outside the city. Following him, many of the leadership cadres were to 
find 
Cý 
their accommodation outside the city. Initially these decision might be seen as the result of the 
lack of 
accommodation available in the city. However, by staying permanently outside the city 
Kemal was to 
strengthen the dualism between the two (Yroups and latter 
developments were to show that Kemal's C 
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proclamation of the city as the new capital. In what follows in this chapter I will 
examine the development and fate of this two cities project. 
In sum, the society project of the Kernalist elite was very different from the existing 
social and spatial structure of the city. Ankara was a city with a Muslim population and 
a traditional way of life matching the Ottoman way of life rather than a western and c 
modem one as the Kernalist elite contemplated to create. Likewise the built environment 
in the old town part showed a village characteristic rather than a modem western city. 
Once again the Kernalist regime came to a point of denial of reality in favour of an 
imagined city. The denial had however another rationale. As we shall see later, in and 
through the imagined city the republican elite could take the lions share from the 
development rather than giving it to the local landowners. Thus, the two-nations project 4-n 
of the Kernalism at national level turned to be a two-cities project at the city level. 
In what follows in this section I will show the emergence and development of the two 
cities project in the city's space from a historical perspective by concentrating on state 
strategies - the forms of representation, intervention and 
internal organisation of the 
state apparatus with regard to the development of the city during this period. 
In the formation of this duality through the two-cities project, state strategies played a 
central role by allowing certain interests, represented in local politics, which intervened 
upon development through the planning and reorganising of the 
local govemment Z-- 
ive outside the existing city was not an accident but a conscious 
decision. The new 611 decision to 11 CII 
ite was 
aiming to create its own space outside the existing city. 
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structure. In line with these strategies, I will analyse the Kernalist project in its three 
different phases: a period of eclecticism and pragmatism: 1923-1928; planned 
development: 1928-38; the return of eclecticism and the collapse of the Kernalist 
project: 1938-50.1 will analyse the development of the city in the context of the 
Kernalist project by following these stages. 
V. V. 1. A Period of Eclecticism and Pragmatism: 1923-28 
It is a well-known fact that in the period of political and economic restructuring in most 
underdeveloped countries it is not uncommon for leaders to relocate the capital city as a 
sign of a break with the past. Capital cities like Brasilia, Chandigarh, and St Petersburg 
are the products of these kinds of developments. Despite its similarity to these cities on 
this point, the Ankara experience departs from the others in two respects. Firstly, it was 
not a clean slate in the sense that there was a pre-existing city to take into consideration. 
Secondly, when the city became the capital, there was no comprehensive plan to follow 
in the development of the city. Instead, the development of the city was dominated by an 
eclectic and pragmatic approach especially in the early years. C 
The pragmatism and eclecticism of the early years can be partly explained by the fact 
that in the wake of a long war, there was no sufficient financial and technical resources 
which could be devoted to the city for such a massive development. 
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There were, however, further and probably more important ideological and material 
reasons behind this pragmatism and eclecticism. In the first place, as discussed in the 
preceding section, the Kernalist regime was highly committed to liberalism, and an 1 11 1 
ideology which had no affinity with planning. Given this ideological outlook it would 
be unrealistic to expect the Kernalist regime to approach the city with a holistic 
perspective which put planning in front of the market. This does not mean. on the other 
hand, that there was non-involvement of the state in the development of the city. As one 
of the native residents of the city put it in 1923, 'Ankara was a city of non-availables 
There was no road, no telephone, no bricks, no builder. When the first car came to the 
city, everybody went to station to see it'(Koc 1980). For this reason, there was a need 
for active involvement of the state in the development of the city. The point is that, in 
the early years. this intervention was very ad hoc and lacked a long-term perspective 
In the first place, there was not a proper local government organisation to solve the 
problems of this underdeveloped city. There was a municipality. Yet it was not able to 
carry out the duties which are required of a capital city. The first important step in the 
development of the city was taken with the establishment of a new local government tý 
structure (Sehremaneti) in 1924. 
As a matter of fact, the model for the new local administration (Sehremaneti) was 
borrowed from Istanbul. During the Ottoman period Istanbul had a local government IC 
that was responsible for the provision of collective services and infrastructure. This had 
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a special status which did not exist in other cities' I- Although the Kemal ists' relentlessly 
criticised the Ottoman period with regard to the privileges given to Istanbul at the 
expense of rest of the country12, the new regime was to choose the same strategy by 
privileging Ankara with a special administration. 
In the establishment of the Ankara Sehremaneti, the republican regime followed a more 
centralising strategy than followed in Istanbul during the Ottoman period. In the case of 
the Istanbul Sehremaneti, there was a mayor appointed by the central government and a 
municipal council whose members were elected among the members of the local 
community who owned property and paid a certain amount of tax. In the case of Ankara, 
while the mayor was still appointed by the central government, the rules for council 
membership were changed. A property ownership criterion would have meant the 
exclusion of the republican elite from membership of the council since most of it did not 
yet own property in the city and would have led to the absolute dominance of the native 
property owners. Thus by not applying this rule the regime solved this problem and 
instead the centre appointed twenty-four members of the council. Thus, by eliminating 
the native property owners from the city administration, the republican 61ite was not 
I IThe local governments and councils outside Istanbul were mainly responsible for the collection of the 
taxes rather than the provision of urban services. The latter area was left largely to voluntar-, v organ'sations 
(vakif) and foundations. See Tekeli (1,981) and Ortayll (1978) on the local government structure of the 
Ottoman empire. 
12As a matter of fact, when the special bill was brought to the Assembly, there was another bill in the 
Assembly regarding the establishment of the local government In all towns and cities. The opposition 
challenged the special status given to Ankara and unsuccessfully attempted to legislate the establishment 
of the local government in Ankara toaether with the other cities. Eventually, this attempt failed and while 
the Ankara Sehremaneti was established in 1924, 'Me legislation of the other bill recgardin-g the 
establishment of the local government was postponed until 1930. C 
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only able to control the local government but also to take control of city's development 
pattem. 
The Sehremaneti was established immediately after the relevant law was passed, and 
after a few month the mayor of Istanbul was appointed to Ankara as the new mayor of 
the city. With the establishment of the municipal administration, the construction and 
infrastructure works gained pace in the city and the dominance of the republican 61ite 
became more apparent. 
The early attempts of the municipality in relation to construction of the city involved the 
establishment of plants for the production of building materials such as timber, bricks 
and cement as well as gas storage and bread production plants. There were, however, 
two-large scale problems awaiting immediate attention of the municipality. Firstly, there 
was an urgent need for public buildings to fulfil the functions of a capital city. Most of 
the ministries and public offices either did not have any buildings or were 
accommodated in temporary buildings which were not suitable for the purpose. 
Secondly, there was an acute housing problem for the republican politicians and 
bureaucrats. The agenda of the political regime was determined by these two issues in 
the city in the early years. 
The most important action of the municipality with regard to these two problems was C 
the compulsory purchases of 4 000 000 m2 urban land for the future development of the 
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CitY. I will analyse this purchase in detail since it is one of the most important decisions 
in the development of the city. 
As I pointed out earlier there was a sharp conflict between native property-owners and 
the republican elite regarding the development perspective of the city on the basis of the 
appropriation of the exchange values which would arise from it. Not surprisingly, local 
property-owners were in favour of a development within and around the existing city. 
The new 61ite, who came to the city after 1920, did not own property wlthin the city. 
They started, however, to buy land outside the city, especially in the southern outskirts 
of the city, after Mustafa Kemal choose this area for his residence, as did most of the 
republican 61ite. Hence, for this group, the development of the city outside the existing 
built area of the city was vital to appropriate the speculative values that would stem 
from the rapid development of the city. 
In 1924, the government introduced a bill to the Assembly to provide a legal base for 
this purchase. The debate that took place in the Assembly during the discussion of the 
bill is interesting in two regards. First, it shows the governments intention to set up a 
new town outside the old one. The govemment view on the establishment of a new 1. 
town was expressed in the following way: 
*The ministry of Interior had to make a choice between the improvement and development of old town 
and establishment of a new town and finds the second option more viable and rational in the face of 
difficulties in the implementation of the first option as well as the great expense of developing the old 
town. Currently, the state of the streets and their length were in such a unsuitable situation that their repair 
would cost much more than the cost of building a new town... The land prices shot up in such a rate that, 
in the centre of the old town a square meter of land was around 100 TL. Besides, it is impossible to renew 
the old town as it would lead to a massive housing crisis.. In civilised countries. the dominant strategy is 
always to develop a new town by using modern techniques around the old town and improve the old one 
in due course' (Assembly Minutes, Vol. 15, translated by Keles and Yavuz (1974)). 
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As it can be understood from the discussion. there was a strong opposition to the Z: ý
government view. They were against the establishment of a new town at the expense of 
the old town. Instead, they were proposing to develop the old town. One of the 'NIPs put 
the issue in the following way: 
'The most convenient policy for Ankara is to improve the old town, to make It more habitable. We cannot 
leave such a big town aside for the sake of couple of hundred houses. This does not fit our realities. We Zý I have a very tight budget and the municipality almost does not have a budget. We try to develop the city by 
lending money to the municipality. For this reason, I do not find it reasonable to give this money for a 
pr *ect proposing development outside the existing town' (ibid. p. 265). 01 Cý 
According to the bill, the Municipality was entitled to subject an area, which is between 
the old town and Mustafa Kemal's residence in Cankaya, to compulsory purchase by 
paying the owners fifteen-times more than the declared tax value of their land in 1915. 
The point was that the market value of this land was much higher than the amount 
proposed in the bill. This was defended by the government in the Assembly in the 
following way: 
'in none of the civilised societies are big increases in urban land values (due to social and natural reasons) L_ 
handed over to the owners. These values would belong to the locality or whole society. In such cases, 
most of the covernments either increase the existing taxes on land, either eight or ten-times, or subject the C, 11:  
land in question to compulsory purchase to sell it later on from higher prices or give it for Iona ter-m-lease* I 
r_1 
(ibid p. 260). 
The massive compulsory purchase of land made in 1924 by the municipality 
between 
the existing built area of the city and Kemal's residence was a tuming point 
in the Zý 
balance of between local property-owners and the Republican elite in terms of the 
development perspective of the city. The purchase favoured the latter group and showed 
that Ankara's future was lying outside the existent city at the expense of 
local land- 
C 
owners (See Figure V. 11 ). 
It 
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The compulsory purchase realised by the municipality had important features in terms of 
the appropriation of the exchange values created by rapid development. In the first 
place, the way in which the compulsory purchase took place was important. According 
to the Constitution of 1924, the payment for the land subject to compulsory purchase 
was to be made on the basis of its real value and payment should have been made 
immediately. In the compulsory purchase of 4 000 000 M2 of land there were important 
deviations from this regulation. In the first place, the municipality made the purchase on 
the basis of the tax value of the land rather than the real value. In this way, the cost of 
the land to the municipality was a fraction of its real value. However, the most 
controversial aspect of the purchase was that it was to be used to built houses for sale. 
According to municipal law, housing construction was not among the compulsory duties 
of the municipality (Tankut 1990: 34)13. 
Immediately after the compulsory purchase, the municipality initiated a planning 
activity and asked a foreign architect to prepare two plans, one for the old town and one 
for the new development area which was to be called later "New Town. " The plan 
prepared by Lorchler for the old town was rejected by the municipal council on the basis 
of 'its inapplicability', and the other one prepared for the new town, which was mainly 
13As a matter of fact, although there was an acute housing crisis for the new republican bureaucracy in the 
city. apart from this very limited experience, in line with the liberal ideology of the early years there was 
no housing project undertaken by the municipality for this group. While housing production was 
left to 
individual initiatives, for those section of the civil servants who were living in rented accommodation, the 
ing aIII regime preferred to pay hous' g llowance (Sen, yapili 1985; 
Tekel* 1979). 
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limited to a housing project, was put into effect immediatelyl4. The houses constructed 
within this project were for sale by the municipality to the mainly new population of the 
city. The remaining area of land acquired by the municipality was to be transferred to 
the new 61ite through auctions. It was quite often possible to see auction announcements 
in the newspapers (for and example see Hakimivet-i Milliye 27 May 1929)15. In the end 
the land which was taken from the local landowners at well below its market value on 
the basis of public interest was to be transferred to the new elite of the city. Atay 
surnmarises this process as follows: 
'A German came to set up the nuclei of the new town. Yet this district was an area where only rich could 
effort to buy a house. Until Saracoglu apartments were built low and middle income civil servants lived in 
poor houses. I knew a mathematics teacher who lived in one room with two children, wife and mother-in- 
law. On the other hand the new town had filled with apartments and villas in a short time' (Atay 
" 1) 1968; 42 
The main defence advanced to justify the development of the city outside the "old town" 
was the high level of land prices. Indeed, after the move of the republican elite in 
Ankara and especially with the realisation of the fact that the city was about to become 
the permanent capital of the new republic, land prices in the old town shot up rapidly 
(see Table V. 111)16. Thus it was claimed that shifting the development of the city from 
the old city to new area would curb land speculation, and lower land prices. The Lochler 
plan was prepared to provide cheap houses for the new-comers. Yet, with the plan, 
land 
14 It is quite likely that the planner asked to prepare a plan 
for the old one as well in order to avoid the 
charge of neglect of the old town. Then, on the basis of technical problems 
the plan was not applied to the 
old town. 
15 The municipality had continued to sell the land plots acquired through the compulsory purchase 
after 
1930 after this policy was reversed as I will discuss 
later. In the Hakimiyet-i Milliye ý IS March 1932), for 
instance, the municipality was organising an auction to sell eight 
land plots in the new city part. C, CI Zý 
16 Table VAIL provides the figure for the end of the period. 
It is worth nothing, that even after the shifting 
emphasis towards the new town, the 
land prices In the central areas of the old town cont inued to be very 
high. 
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speculation became worst than before. Atay points to this development in the following 
way; 
'We immediately indulged In land speculation. Everybody was so keen to buy a land plot to keep and then 
sell in the future. We were not in a state of mind to think that land speculation was the main enemy of the development of cities' (Atay 1968). 
While those pursued their own private interest in the city by conceiving it around 
exchange value, the local government also had become a tool of these interests. It was 
clear that there was no clear long-term policy to create a city which fit the image of the 
society the Kernalist regime declared to create. When these short-term interests were 
overcome in favour of a common good, in the lack of a long-term plan and perspective, 
these policies were ad hoc based on individual initiatives. For instance, In 1925, 
Mustafa Kemal, with his own money, bought 20 000 hectare of land in the West of the 
city to establish a farm to form a model of modem farming, as well as a leisure centre 
for the city. Yet, this initiative, like many others, was not a part of a holistic view on the 
development of the city. 
Meanwhile, in the lack of a comprehensive development plan for the city and a 
determinate authority, the development of the city was controlled by speculation- 
oriented initiatives. In all parts of the city, but especially 
in the new town part, there 
were uncontrolled developments. Likewise, the land prices were shooting up 
to such an 
extent that especially low-ranking civil servants were not able to afford 
buying a house. 
4. 
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Table V. Ill. Land Prices in Ankara (1953) 




On Anafartalar Street 1500-2500' Vicinity of Ataturk Boulv. 60 
Inner Sections 800-1300 Between Sarar Primary Sch. 40 
On Bankalar Street 1500-2000 Between Refik Saydam 40 
Inner Sections 800-1000 7. Bakanliklar 
On Cankiri Street 800-1000 Between Cankaya on the BIv. 200-500 
On Istasvon Street 500-1000 Vicinity of the New Nat. Assembly 50 
2. Cikrikcilar Yokusu Guvenevlefi Casino Section 40 
On the Road 60-80 8. Yenischir 
Inner Sections 30-40 Kizilay and Ataturk Boulevard 800-1000 
On the Hisar Road 60-100 On Ziya Gokalp Street 200 
Inner Sections 50-80 Mithatpasa Street 100 
On the Karaoglan Str. 1000-1500 Between Kizilay and Bakanfiklar 300-500 
Inner Sections 500-800 Inner Sections 40 
3. Samanpazari Section 9. Cankaya 
Central Section 500-800 On the Asphalt 60-100 
Behind Fortress 200-500 Inner Sections 30 
Between Adliye on the Str. 800-1000 Between 14 Mayis District 20 
Inner Sections 40-60 Between Kucukesat 15-20 
Vicinity of Fortress 30-50 Kavaklidere District 20 
Inner Fortress 10-15.20 Kavaklidere on the Boulevard 30 
4. Bentderesi Kavaklidere Inner Sections 15-20 
Vicinity of the Bridge 100-200 10. Baheelievler 
Between the Hisar Road 200-500 Central section 30 
Turgutreis District 30-50 Between Orman Ciftligi 20 
Inner Sections of Turgutreis 10-20 Between Balcrat 10 
5. Akkopru Balgat Village 10 
On the Street 50 Between Anit-Kabir 20 
Inner Sections 30 Between Maltepe 20 
Between The Istasvon Str. 150 Vicinity of Orman Ciftli-, -i 10 
Source: Development Committee Report, 1954, pp. 96-9 / 
Thus, at the end of the first five years of Ankara's development, there was a rapid 
but 
chaotic development in the city. Apart from a limited and piecemeal attempt at planning, 
C the city was developing through private initiatives. It would not 
be wrong to argue that 
the Kemalist leadership was not successful in leading the development of the city 
by 
going beyond economic corporate interests. Cý Z-5 
It was only towards the end of 1920s, that the regime started 
to realise that the 
prevention of this chaotic development was only possible 
if a holistic perspective and 
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idea of planned development had started to emerge in Kernalist circles. It should be 
noted that this realisation. was partly related to the changing accumulation strategies of 
the period towards state-led development, which is called Etat'sm after the failure of the 
liberal accumulation strategy of the early years. The Kernalist leadership began to 
concede that without a conscious leadership and an escaping econorrUC-Corporate 
position, the creation of a modem city which represents the values of the Kernalist 
project was impossible. 
V. V. 11. Planned Development: 1928-1938 
Thus, the chaotic physical development of the city and the manipulation of the 
development of the city by the landed interests became the major concern of the higher 
circles of the Kernalist elite. This in turn gave rise to pressure for obtaining a 
comprehensive plan to lead the development of the city and for establishing of a new 
organisational structure responsible for the development within this plan as the existing 
municipality became very receptive to speculative pressures. 
The disorganised development of Ankara in the early years was not only due to the lack 
of planning which paved the way for arbitrary development and land speculation. The 
fact is that this was possible only because the responsible institution, namely the 
municipality, was very weak and open to manipulation of the powerful 
landed interests. 
The new regime had eliminated the local landowners from local government 
by closing I 
representative channels to these groups. 
Yet, the new elite, which became dominant C 
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within the local government immediately started to use its position to replace the local 
land-owners in land speculation. When disastrous consequences of this abuse started to 
be obvious, there was a realisation at the highest circles of the regime that without 
restructuring the administrative structure of the city and excluding these new interest 
groups the destiny of planned development would not be different from the early years. 
Thus, the narrow circle around Mustafa Kemal became convinced that in order to 
overcome these speculation-oriented pressures it was necessary to get a comprehensive 
development plan for the city as well as a new administrative structure which could lead 
the planning and implementation processes. 
In 1927, it was decided to choose a development plan for the overall city through and 
international competition. Three foreign architects were invited to take part in the 
competition. These were, two German architects, H. Jansen, who was the winner of the 
competition for Berlin's plan, and M. Brix, and one French architect, L. Jusseley. 
While the architects prepared their plans, a new organisation, which was going to be I 
C) 
solely responsible from the planning activities of the city, was set up. The new planning 
organisation was independent from the municipality and the latter had no authority over 
the former. The Directorate of Development For Ankara (DDA) was established in 1928 
and it was responsible to the Ministry of the Interior. that 
is, to the central government. Cý 
In the discussions about the establishment of the DDA in the Assembly, the govemment 
pointed to the weakness of the municipality as the main reason 
behind the establishment 
12 
1 
of the DDA( The Assembly minutes: 26/5/1928). The technical and personnel problems 
of the municipality were very obvious. Yet rather than strengthening the municipality, 
the government preferred to set up a new organisation. This point was made by some of 
the opposition MPs during the Assembly discussions. They objected to the 
establishment of a new organisation at the expense of the municipality. Instead of 
establishing a new organisation, they were arguing, the municipality could be 
strengthened (Assembly Minutes; 26/5/1928). Yet, these criticisms were ignored and the 
law was passed in May 1928. After the enactment of the law establishing the DDA, the 
opposition continued to criticise the establishment of the DDA as well as its decision in 
the Assembly at every opportunity17. 
It is a fact that there was a constant opposition to the Kernalist regime in the Assembly. 
In that sense, the opposition to the DDA can be seen as a part of this overall attitude. 
However, there was a more concrete reason. As we saw in a quote from Atay earlier, a 
considerable part of the MPs had indulged in land speculation. It was quite likely that 
there was a concern for protecting the existing status quo underlying this opposition. 
The establishment of the DDA redressed the balance of power 
in local politics by 
redefining the internal organisation of the 
local government and channels of 
representation. The municipality and dominant 
interest groups were to a large extent 
excluded from the planning process with the take over of planning activities 
by the 
1tv, DDA. In other words, by further centralising the 
local govemment structure of the ci 
170ne of the criticisms was the employment of the 
foreign planners and the high wages paid to them. 
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in a way the higher circle of the Kernalist regime was trying to eliminate the lower 
circles of the republican elite and other organised interest groups who were mainly ZD 
responsible for speculation and chaotic developments. 
The jury constituted for the selection of Ankara's development plan reflected the 
changing balance of power very clearly. The jury for the selection of the project was 
chosen by the Directorate of Development for Ankara. A striking point in the 
composition of the jury was that almost all its members of were close to the Kernalist 
circle of the republican elite (Tekeli and Okyay 1981: 128). 
The first jury were constituted by twenty-six members. Later this number found to high 
and the number of the members of the final jury was reduced to six members18 . In this 
second jury too, there was an overall dominance of the Kernalist circle. The interesting 
feature of the second jury was that the mayor of the city, who was largely responsible for 
the pre- 1928 implementation in the city, was not among the jury members. 
The complete exclusion of the municipality from the planning process created 
considerable tension between the DDA and the municipality. Atay, who was a member 
of the DDA describes this conflict as follows: 
II 'A planning corrurussion was set up. I was the head of this commission. The late governor/mayor of the 
city was a member in the commission. He resented being a mayor who had nothing, but had to accept 
the decisions taken by a foreign expert from the first day. Since he could not oppose overtly, he took the Cý 
way of continuous obstruction' Way 1968: 4-14). 
18Although the competition was an international one, there was no foreign expert in either of the juries. 
Apart from two engineer members of the jury, there were four MPs and two of these MPs were also 
originally engineers (Hakimývet-i Milliye (Daily Newspaper) 16 May 1929 ) 
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There was however an overall dominance of the Kernalist group in the commission and 
the DDA, despite obstruction and opposition coming from different groups who took the 
responsibility of the planning activities. 
Three planners submitted their plans in 1928.1n the evaluation of the plans by the jury 
one of the basic criteria was the previously determined demands of the city 
administration from the planners. The planners were informed about these demands and 
asked to be taken into consideration in their plans. I think, among others, three of these 
expectations are worth mentioning: 
Firstly, the plan for the city should have been prepared for a population between 250 
000 - 300 000 and for a 50-year time period. There was no explanation on what basis 
these targets were chosen. 
Secondly, while the boulevard between the old city and the Kemal residence was given 
to the planners as the development direction of the city. the planners were asked to take 
the existing developments in the New Town as an input. As a matter of fact, the location 
of Kemal's residence and the big boulevard opened between the old town and this 
residence, as well as wide-spread developments that took place 
between them had 
already determined the development direction of the city. 
The third expectation of the city administration from the planners was to provide an 





fabric of the old town dramatically. This would require a substantial amount of 
investment, and the municipality was not keen to spend it in the old town. The 
preference was for the new town. However, as a result of the developments taking place Cý 
in the Yenisehir area in the late 1920s the duality between the old and new town was so 
clear that the expectation of the city administration from the planners was to bridge the ZD 
gap between the old and the new towns without big investments in the old town. This 
condition suggests that there was already a concern regarding the emerging dualism 1-n 
between old and new town. It is also interesting to learn from the newspapers of the 
time, though it was not mentioned anywhere, the planners were also asked to design a 
working-class neighbourhood ( Hakimiyet-i Milliye: 27 May 1929) 
The jury did not have any difficulty in its decision19. The Jansen plan was chosen in 
consultation with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and with his approval in 1929-0 (See Figure 
V. IN and IV). The Jansen plan was in line with the expectations of the regime. It had 
interpreted the terms of references of the competition well. As far as important plan 
decisions are concerned Jansen's plan fell in between the other two plans. Brix's plan 
was too simple and rough while Jusseley's plan was too monumental and expensive. 
19Tbere is no jury report available today despite the fact that In the newspapers of that day It Is mentioned 
that the jury had prepared a detailed report on the assessment of the three projects (Hakimiyet-i 
Millýye 16 
May 1929). However, the newspaper itself provided a detailed account of the jury decision and the factors 
effecting it. Since two members of the Jury. Rifki Atay and Celal Esat were writing 
for the same 
kely that this detailed information was provided by them. For this reason, I will rely newspaper it is quite li 
on the newspaper information on this Point. 
2OThe jury member and head of the planning commission, Atay notes that 
from the very beg-inning iI Cý 
Mustafa Kemal had been involved in the planning process directlY. He was often briefed by 
Jansen 
himself Way 1968). 
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Jansen's plan was not expensive but sufficiently detailed and sensitive to the expectation 
of the regime (Hakimiyet-i Milliye 27 May 1929). 
The most important success of the plan was that while it placed the emphasis upon the 
new town, it did this in a modest way such that the dualism was less clear than the other 
plans. On the other hand, the old town was preserved with certain small interventions 
such as new access roads and small scale renovations. Connection between the new 
town and old town was provided by a major boulevard. In this respect, Brix's plan had 
not suggested substantial change to the old town with a conservatist understanding, 
whereas Jausseley's plan proposed a wide-spread renewal in the old town. Jansen's plan 
followed a middle way strategy in relation to the old town by strengthening the link 
between the old and new town without too much changing of the fabric of the old town 
(Hakimiyet-i Milliye 27 May 1929) 
The main development area of the city in Jansen's plan was defined around the 
boulevard opened between the old town and The Kemals' residence. Thus the main 
housing development area was proposed in the south of the city. The plan was also 
proposing a large zone of public offices over this boulevard. In Jansen's plan it was 
almost only in this part that there was an emphasis on monumentality. One of the 
interesting features of the Jansen plan was that it was proposing, a housing development 4: ) Cý 
area for the workers in the west. Jusseley, on the other hand was proposing, to rebuilt the Cý 
city by extensive demolition in the old and new part of the city. 
This proposal was quite 
contradictory with the expectation of the city administration 
in that it was expensive as 
Fqgure V. 111. Competition Pr ject by Jansen Oj 
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well as too radical. In the third plan, the proposals were not detailed enough (Tankut 
1990: 53-4, Tekeli 1980). 
Yet, the plan prepared by Jansen was a competition project and not applicable (Figure 
V. IH). The preparation of the plan was going to take more than three years, and it was 
put into implementation in 1932 (Figure V. IV). However, the main decision of the plan 
had been taken as a guide to control the developments of the transition period in the 
rapidly growing city. 
Jansen's Plan was approved and officially put into implementation in July 1932. Yet, in 
the face of difficulties I will discuss shortly, it is difficult to argue that the plan could 
lead the development of the city and curb speculative developments. In effect, although 
the plan was prepared for the whole city, some of its proposals could not find a chance 
to be implemented. Before discussing its failures and reasons behind them, it is apt to 
look at the areas the plan that could have a chance to be implemented. 
The most successful element of Jansen's plan was the proposal to develop a zone of state 
offices and buildings. Despite certain changes, a zone of state buildings was constructed 
along the main boulevard. Given the urgent need for the public offices, it is easy 
to 
Cý 4- 
understand the quick implementation of this plan proposal. 
In a similar way, in the New City part, a housing estate, namely 
Saracoglu Mahallesi. 
I constructed for the bureaucrats, was proposed 
by the plan to solve the acute housing 
crisis the republican bureaucrats 
faced since the early 1920s. Sirn-Ilarly, Bahcelievler 
2 16 
Housing Estate which was thou ht to be a housing co-operative for the civil servants 9 Cý 
was successfully reallsed in the following years (See Figure V. V). 
As far as two main targets of the plan are concerned, - the integration of the old and new 
town parts, and the development of the new City within a plan - it is possible to say that 
the plan failed to fulfil them. I will discuss them respectively. 
The main strategy of the plan towards the old town was minimum intervention. While 
the houses within the castle were forbidden to be demolished or altered radically, in 
other areas redevelopment was left to the owners (Hakimiyet-i Milliye 4 March 1932 ). 
As a result of this policy, while there was a renewal along, the main roads and central 
areas by demolishing the old buildings and erecting apartment blocks. On the other 
hand, little change took place in the inner part of the old town, where usually urban poor 
were livinor. Thus, the plan stayed ineffective in bridging the ever-widening gap týi Z-: ) rm 
between the old and new city parts. While the new city part developed in an 
unprecedented manner, there was little improvement in the old town except the areas 
along the main roads which served as a commercial and government centre. 
As far as the new town section is concerned, where the main 
developments that had 
proposed in the plan were, the success of the Jansen's plan was 
limited. Successful 
implementations were, on the other hand, by and large, in those areas where the public 
sector was the developer. But even in these 
kinds of development proposals the plan's 
success was limited because of 
financial difficulties. As far as public sector 
Ftg, ure V. V. Bahcellevter Housing Cooperative 
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implementation is concemed, the main reason of failure of the Jansen's plan was 
financial. Given the fact that the Jansen's plan was prepared and put into implementation 
in early 1930s, the years the Turkish economy felt the impact of the World Depression 
of the 1929 most heavily, it is not difficult to contemplate the problem. In the lack of 
financial resources many of the compulsory purchases, which were necessary for the 
plan implementation, were either postponed or dropped completely2l. 
The main failure of the plan however was in the private part of the plan implementation, 
where the plan was supposed to regulate and control as well as guide private initiatives. 
As I discussed in the early years the main problem for the city was the chaotic 
development taking place as a result of speculation-oriented developments. Thus, one of 
the stated expectation of the Kernalist regime was for the plan to bring order to the cities 
development by preventing chaotic developments. As an experienced planner, Jansen 
was quite aware of the power of the landed interests. 
The failure of the plan in controlling the development of the city is very clear in the 
following figures (Tankut, 1990). The total number of the buildings constructed 
between 1926 and 1933 was 1709. On the other hand, the number of the buildings in 
the newly developing parts of the city was around 2493. Given the fact that some of the 
construction permissions were taken for the redevelopment in the old city area. it 
is not 
difficult to understand the extent of the developments that took place outside the plan 
21 The proposal of a construction of zone of public offices and pubhc 
housing for the republican 
bureaucrats was at the heart of Jansen's proposal. Even in the compulsory purchase of the 
land for these 
zones, Atay notes that the prime minister 
had refused to provide the necessary finance completely (Atay 
1969,420) 
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decisions. Furthermore, even in those developments where there is permission taken 
from either the municipality or from the DDA, there were deviations from the actual 
plan decision as a result of pressure exerted by politicians or bureaucratS22. Nonetheless 
the existence of the plan and the loyalty of the planners to the plan decisions placed 
some limits on speculation-oriented developments. Throughout the planned period, the 
planners and the DDA became a target of the groups who saw the plan as an obstacle to 
their intention to use the city as exchange space. 
It was not, however, only speculation-oriented action which was preventing the 
successful implementation of the plan decisions. The economic crisis as well as the 
priorities given to the other areas created a financial strain on the plan as I briefly 
discussed before. In turn, the plan failed to catch the rapid developments taking place in I 
the city. One of the important problems was to provide housing for the new migrants 
who arrive especially from rural areas. The new capital did look attractive for the rural 
poor who did not have a skill. There was a considerable migration of this group to the 4-: ) 
city starting from the early years. The housing crisis was apparent for this group as early 
as 1927. The working-class neighbourhood asked from the planner in the 1928 
competition was a result of the concern stemming from the lack of housing for this Cý 
group. In the Jansen plan, in the west of the city near the industrial district, there was a 
neighbourhood proposal for the working class (See Figure V. VI). Yet, it is not possible Z: ý
221t the political manipulations coming from is a fact that the establishment of the DDA did not fi iII C- 
different quarters. It is interesting to note that at least on one occasion there was a" request" 
from the 
planners to revise the plan decisions that were coming 
by Kemal himself. regarding one of his relatives' C, r-, 
building construction. The planner was said to complain about this intervention and said that 
his request 
was accepted just because it came 
from the president (see Atay 1968 for details). 
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to see any move towards the realisation of this proposal during the implementation 
period. 
In the lack of a policy towards these new urban poor, the first squatters started to emerge 
as early as the late 1920s and became a major issue in the early 1930s. The first 
squatters, more correctly shacks, emerged in those areas left outside the plan because of 
the unsuitable nature of the area due to the steepness of the slope, or being otherwise 
deficient. One of the main areas where squatters emerged was near the old centre, and 
the other was near the area designated in the Jansen plan as the working-class 
neig ourhood 
The initial reaction of the city administration to these developments was to demolish 
them. In the Hakimiyet-i Milliye demolition of 137 shacks were reported. However, the 
city administration as well as the govemment were quite aware of the lack of policy 
towards the newcomers housing needs and there was a recognition of this failure. For 
this reason, the determination to prevent squatting was not that strong. 
At the end of the 1930s, the authority of the DDA was weakened by, on the one hand, 
the developments taking place outside the plan decision, on the other by the continuous 
opposition it faced at national and local levels. Starting from the establishment years, 
there was a fierce opposition to the DDA and to the foreign planners under the banner of 
nationalism, while at the local level the municipality became the centre of a similar 
opposition to the DDA. 
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In the mid- 1930s the changing balance of power in favour of the municipality and the 
mayor became obvious with the departures of some members of the DDA who 
supported the Jansen plan and planned development. Atay, who was a fierce defendant 
of the Jansen plan, left the planning commission. Subsequently the DDA was taken 
away from being under the responsibility of Ministry of the Interior and given to the 
control of the municipality in 1937. This change was signalling the end of the "planned" 
period and the return of pragmatism and eclecticism in the development process of 
Ankara. 
V. V. 111. The Return of Pragmatism 
There was an opposition to the foreign planner, namely Jansen, from the very beginning 
as mentioned earlier. The pretext was that there was no need to bring a foreign planner ltý 
in by paying large amounts of money from the limited resources of the country. In 
reality, a considerable part of this opposition was against the planned development itself 
rather than planner because of the fact that in the absence of the plan it was easy to use 
the city as a source of speculative gains. Jansen was very aware of this fact and tried to 
resist the attempts to use the city's developments for this aim. His uncompromising 
attitude was creating important tensions between the DDA and these interest groups. In 
the mid- 1930s the argument of the opposition was that the plan had completed its 
function by giving a direction to the development of the city. Thus, there was no reason 




control of the municipality the opposition was in a much more stronger position than 
before. In 1938, Jansen's contract was finishing. It was an opportunity to get rid of him 
by not renewing his contract. Despite the fact that the plan was still in implementation, 
the group led by the Mayor of Ankara succeeded in terminating Jansen's contract and the 
last element of planned development also disappeared. 
The years following the termination of Jansen's contract was a period of financial 
austerity due to the beginning of World War H. Although Turkey did not enter the war, 
it applied a war economy. The impact of this policy on the city was the considerable 
reduction in the financial resources allocated to the city. Most of the major project was 
stopped due to lack of finance. Thus, the project of establishing a modem city after 
being undermined by the speculation-oriented activities of the various groups including 
the republican elite had a final stroke with the break of the World War H. 
Towards the end of the period, there were two radically different towns in Ankara. In 
terms of their physical and social structures they exhibited a duality. It is possible to 
follow the dramatic difference between the new and old town parts of the city in the 
following tables which provide a detailed account of the building conditions and 
standards in the new and old part of the city in the mid-1930s (see 
Tables V-IV and 
V. V). 
As far as housing conditions are concerned, the main 
housing stock of the city was still 4-: ý 
in the old town with 12 
558 housing units. The majority of these houses were 
1) 1) 1 
constructed before 1920 and in the lack of maintenance most of them were in very bad 
conditions. There were 182 apartments blocks, some of which were constructed after 
1920. There were also 822 shacks. In the newly developing part of the city (New town 
and Cebeci) there were 1781 detached and semi detached houses mainly made up of 
concrete and bricks. There were also 168 apartment blocks. There were only 40 shacks 
in this section of the city. In the periphery of the city, there were 2696 summer 
(vineyard) houses which were from the pre- 1923 period. 
Table V. IV. Building types andfunctions (1935) 
Building Type I Districts 






























11402 838 943 2696 15879 
182 156 12 1 351 
9 1 1 1 12 
40 1 - - 41 
31 - - 6 37 
72 11 7 25 115 
822 23 17 75 937 
12558 1030 980 2804 17372 
2447 116 57 74 2694 
9 9 
33 6 4 26 69 
8 8 
41 - 3 5 
49 
59 70 3 37 169 
338 2 27 319 686 
511 18 9 101 639 
38 2 - 10 50 
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the new town (See TableV. IV)23. As a matter of fact this duality was also obvious in the 
occupational structure of the city. While there was a considerable weight of those 
working in the state related jobs, number of those who works in unskilled works was 
quite high (See Table V. VI ). 
Table V. VI Distribution of Ankara's Population According to Professional Groups 
1927 1935 1940 1945 
Popul. % Popul. % Popul. % Popul. % 
Agriculture 10419 14.0 5588 - 4.6 5220 3.3 6217 2.7 
Industry and Small 
Crafts 6775 9.1 17911 14.7 16979 10.8 21 335 9.4 
Commerce 4 813 6.5 6775 5.5 7371 4.7 11913 5.2. 




Professional Services 18052 24.2 20414 16.6 30 129 19.2 49769 22.0 
Home Economics, 
Personal Services - - 2738 2.2 2709 1.7 2408 1.1 
Total of 
Professionals 40548 54.4 57762 47.1 65 863 41.9 98 898 43.6 
Without Profession 
or Profession 
Unknown 34005 45.6 64958 52.9 91 379 58.1 127 814 56.4 
Grand Total 74553 100 L 122720 100 157242 100 22671 100 
Source: Development Committee Report, 1954, p. -ýO 
That is, towards the end of period the duality was quite obvious in both social and 
spatial structure of the city. 
tude of the Kemalist regimes and the nati 23This was a reflection of the difference between the atti ID 
ive 
population towards the religion. 
Secularism was one of the consistently emphasised aspects of Kemalism 
on space. The regime discouraged the construction of mosques in 
the city throughout this period. For this 
reason, Ankara was often called as 
"the city without minarets" (Ahmad 1993). 
22 5 
V. Vt. Conclusion 
In this concluding section I would like to evaluate the overall period by concentrating on 
the Kernalist project with reference to its initial objectives and the outcomes at the end 
of period. As we saw earlier, the proclamation of Ankara as the capital in the wake of 
the Independence War was a conscious strategy of the Kernalist regime. The city was 
seen as the most important spatial dimension of the Kemalist nation-state formation 
project. It was not only a symbol but also a means through which the Kernalist regime 
wanted to advance its project. The city was conceived as a model of the society in the 
making. It is possible to argue that the Kernalist regime succeeded in achieving some of 
these objectives. As a matter of fact, comparing Istanbul and Ankara in terms of their 
scale, spatial structure and historical heritage, the denouncement of Istanbul in favour 
of Ankara was a success on its own right. Through moving the state capital inland and 
implementing similar spatial policies which we reviewed in chapter IV, the Kemalist 
regime challenged the primacy of Istanbul in favour of Anatolia and succeeded in this 
challenge. 
The success of the Kernalist regime at the local level is a question mark. I would like to 
evaluate the balance sheet of the Kernalist project towards the city with reference to 
different dimensions of its project. In the first place, the Kemalist project was about 
creating a capital city which represents the larger societal project that 
Kernalism stands 
for. That is to say, that besides its capital city functions, the city was an arena of 
identity 
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of the new regime. At this level, the Jocal point of the project was to create a city which 
represents the identity of the new regime 
Ironically, what was a strength for the Kernalist regime at the national level was a 
weakness at the local level. The denial of Ottoman heritage for a new Western-looking 
society created a major dilemma for the reason that Ankara was not a clean slate and in 
terms of its social and cultural structure the existing town was representing all those so- 
called Ottoman heritage traits. As we saw, the Kemalist project became a two-cities 
project by excluding a large section of the old town population. It took the new middle 
class of the city as its social base. 
On the other hand, Ankara was not only a capital city but also a capitalist city where the 
exchange value played a central role. In a city growing as fast as Ankara, land 
speculation was almost inevitable and the appropriation of speculative gaining was the 
other important factor playing a part in the transformation of Kernalist project into a 
two-cities project. By creating its own space the new middle class did not want to leave 
the emerging speculative gains to the traditional middle-class of old town. But, it should 
immediately be noted that this did not lead to the total exclusion of the traditional 
middle class from the two-cities project. Since the centre of the city was still in the old 
town, the traditional middle class, who formed a monopoly of the commercial activities 
in the city, benefited immensely from the changing fortune of the city. 
In this respect, Cý 
they were integrated into the project through these kinds of concesslons. 
On the other 
hand those who saw the city in terms of use values solely as a living place were 
227 
excluded from the project. This included a large section of the old town population 
(traditional urban poor), the new urban poor, who migrated to the city with the hope of 
finding a job, and even the lower ranks of the civil servants who could not afford to buy 
a house or land. Given this middle-class base that the Kernalist project relied on, it 
would not be wrong to argue the urbanisation of the state during this period was also the 
urbanisation of the middle classes. 
The rent-seeking activities of the middle class became a major factor in the 
detennination of the destiny of the Kernalist project towards Ankara. Especially in the 
early years, the dominance of a liberal ideology created a suitable environment for those 
(new and traditional middle-class populations) who sought to make money out of the Z_: ý 
city through land speculation. Thus, from the very beginning, there was a tension and 
contradiction between those who saw the city in terms of identity value and those who 
saw it in terms of exchange value. 
The success of the Kemalist project was very much dependent upon the solution of this 
problem. This required the transcendence of immediate economic interests (the 
economic-corporate phase) for broader political interests (the ethico-polit, cal phase); but 
the Kernalist leadership failed to persuade its own cadres let aside the broader social 
C base that the project relied on. Even if the Kemalist leadership made an attempt 
during 
the 1930s, the success was very limited. and in a short while those who were excluded 
due to their speculative concerns took the lead again. In this sense, neither the 
Kernalist 
leadership nor the project itself succeeded to establish 
hegemony. That is, while 
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excluding a large section of social base of the city (most of the native population as well 
as the new urban poor arriving from other parts of the country), the Kernalist leadership 
failed to persuade its own social base to go beyond narrow interests. That is, the strategy 
of placing the state as the main locus of urban consciousness did not succeed. Instead, 
individualism emerged as the dominant locus of urban consciousness. In turn, this 
undermined the success of the Kernalist project in creating a modem city which 
represents the success of the Kernalist project. 
At the end of the period, Ankara was a divided city. On the one hand, there was an old 
town of the native population. Except its central parts, which were also used by the new- 
middle class of the city, it benefited from the rising fortune of the city. Most of the 
native population living in this part were excluded from major services such as 
electricity and water. Likewise they were not a part of the newly emerging social and 
cultural life of the city. On the other hand, there was the new town of the new middle- 
class population of the city. They were the main beneficiaries of the transformation that 
the city underwent. While they were in control of the development direction of the city, 
to a large extent, they used this power to exploit the fortune of the city to their own 
benefit. They saw the city as a capitalist city rather than a capital city. It is this view that 
emerged as hegemonic at the end of the period and determined the 
development of the 
city in the following periods as well, as we will see in the next chapter. 
They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. 
Karl Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
[The modern state is] 'the creation of the middle class, first a 
means to break down feudalism, then a means to crush the 
emancipatory aspiration of the producers, the working class' 
Karl Marx, Writings on the Paris Commune 
CHAPTER VI: 
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CHAPTER VI: ANKARA 
LABOUR POWER 
1950-1980: URBANISATION OF 
V1. I. Introduction 
The late 1940s witnessed the beginning of a new period in the urban experience of 
Turkey. As we saw in chapter IV, large cities underwent a rapid urbanisation as a 
result of the massive influx of the rural population into the cities. I have argued that 
the experience of large cities during a 30-year period (1950-80) is characterised by 
the urbanisation of labour power. The chief objective of this chapter is to study the 
urbanisation of Ankara during this period in the context of the urbanisation of labour 
power. Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of this period, I would like to 
expose and elaborate the main arguments of the chapter. 
Large cities underwent a rapid urbanisation during this period, and Ankara was no 
exception to this trend. But what distinguished it was that the rapid urbanisation had 
started much earlier in Ankara than in other cities due to the rising attraction of the Z-ý 
city as the new capital of the country. In tum, this peculiar feature played a 
deterrnining role in Ankara's much faster growth in comparison to other large cities. 
Thus when the massive population influx started with the rural push, it did not create 
new problems for the city, but contributed to already burgeoning ones. I. C) 
This does not suggest however a simple continuity between these two periods in 
the 
C In 
case of Ankara. Although a degree of continuity can 
be identified in terms of the 
rapid rate of urbanisation and the problems 
it brought about, the qualitative changes Cý Cý 
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taking place in the social base and social forces in the city, owing to the massive 
rural-originated migration, progressively changed the balance of political forces in 
the political arena of the city, and in this respect, it justifies the claim that a new 
period had begun in the urban experience of Ankara'. 
In this context, the study of this period dwells upon two interrelated arguments: one 
regarding the break, and the other related to the continuity between these two 
consecutive periods. The first point refers to the break between these periods and 
asserts that, as I claimed above, the urbanisation of Ankara was characterised by the 
urbanisation of labour power, therefore, it should be examined primarily with 
reference to processes of working class formation. In other words, Ankara needs to 
be studied as the locald(s) of working-class fonnation. This refers to two interrelated 
processes: the spatiality of working-class fon-nation in the sense that the working- 
class came into being as a class in and through urban space; and the fact that the very 
same processes created a built environment which bore the mark of this class. Such 
an understanding allow us to see the formation of the working-class with reference C) 
not only to the working place but also to the living place and to consider the activity 
and inactivity of the working-class around different loci of consciousness 2. 
During the first period although there was a rural-originated in-migration to Ankara, the main bulk of CCC 
around during the second period (see the migration was intra-urban, whereas it was the other way 
Table 
I do not apply a structural definition of class. My approach is more akin to the one applied by 
Thompson in that it is indeed 'experience' and not simply an objective 'assemblage' that unites these 
heterogeneous groups into a class' (Melksins-Wood 1995,91). In a similar way, Draper argues that 
'the way in which a given society divides up into classes is specific to its own social relations ... There 
is no rule of thumb definition ... 
The point can be settled ... only 
by concrete examination of the overall 
social relations of the society' (Draper 1977; 507). 
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The shift from urbanisation of the (nation) state to the urbanisation of labour power 
brought important changes in the production and use of urban space. WhIlst the point 
of entry shifted from the state to labour power, by replacing the conflict between the 
identity value and use value, the conflict between use and exchange values became 
the prime urban conflict. In line with these changes, the abstract space of the forrner 
period was challenged by concrete spaces as the locales of the reproduction of labour 
power. In turn, community and class, as rivals to each other, became important as the 
locus of urban consciousness in the course of the second period. 
The second point refers to continuity and argues that the study of the second round of 
the urbanisation of Ankara needs to refer to the former round of urbanisation and the 
main forces of the former period, namely the state and the middle class. This is 
necessary not just because they provided a background for and contextual features of 
the latter period but also due to the fact that first layer of urbanisation and the 
dominant forces of this period did not die out with the emergence of a second layer 
but continued to shape the city in interaction with the social forces of the second 
period. For this reason, the second period can only be grasped and understood by 
reference to the dominant forces and the project of the former period since the latter 
constituted the main reference point for the emerging working class population of the 
city in the formation of strategies in work and living places. 
In the preceding chapter it was shown that the urbanisation of the state created a 
built 
environment not only for the state but also for 
its functionaries and their allies. ThIs 
could be read as the urbanisation of the middle classes. 
Thus the rise of the working 
class and its neighbourhoods in the city 
did not pose a challenge only to the state but 
In Z- 
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also to the middle-class and its norms which were dominant in the city till the end of 
World War 11.1 will show that the built environment of the middle class of the city 
constituted the other of the built environment of the working class and vice versa. In 
other words, starting from the early 1950s, these two groups started to define their 
environment with reference to each other. Nevertheless, this was symmetrical in the 
sense that while the middle-class population of the city, which became established 
during the first period, saw the newcomers as a threat to its life style and built 
environment, the latter group saw the former as a model despite the fact that they 
formed a distinctive urban presence. 
Finally the urbanisation of the working class needs to be understood with reference 
to the state. Here the point is to take the distinctiveness of Ankara as the state capital 
into account in the formation of the working class. The state played a more 
prominent role in Ankara than in other large cities in the urbanisation and spatial 
constitution of the working class. Given the fact that Ankara had not been an 
industrial centre but the state capital, the state rather than the capital constitutes the 
other of the working class in relation, not only to the place of work but also to the 
place of residence. Regarding the work place, the state became an important 
employer for the new working-class population of the city. In the context of 
residence, even if the state was not involved actively in providing accommodation 
and infrastructures for the new population, they still remained dependent on the state 
in those issues such as the legalisation of the squatter settlements and provision of 41- 
basic services and amenities. 
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In sum, in what follows in this chapter, I will analyse the production and use of urban 
space in Ankara during the second period in the context of a working-class formation 
which itself needs to be understood with reference to the state and the established 
population of the city. 
Section H discusses the changing social base and spatial structure resulting from the 
massive influx of rural people in the city. Section IR concentrates on the responses of 
the middle class and the state as the key elements of the dominant bloc in the city, to 
'the urbanisation of peasants'. While analysing the changing responses by this bloc, 
their project which was continuing from the first period, is also traced. Section IV 
explores the possibility of an alternative counter-project by the new migrant 
population of the city. After showing the problems of formation of such an 
alternative project, attention is then turned to the impediments concerning the 
transformation of the social base constituted by the squatters into a social force. 
Having shown that only towards the late 1960s and early 1970s did it become 
possible for the squatters, to a certain extent, to go beyond their 
immediate economic 
interest and gain a degree of long-term political perspective, 
Section V concentrates 
on these changing attitudes and their reflection on the 
local state. It discusses the 
C) 
mobilisation from above on behalf of the working class and urban 
poor at the local 
government level and gains around this project. 
It also points to the dilemmas and 
C> 
shortcomings of the radicalisation of city politics 
from above. The final section 
provides an overall evaluation of the period. 
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V1. I/. Changing Social Base and Spatial Structure 
In the preceding chapter, we saw that at the end of the first period, there were two 
cities: the first one was the old town with its native population, and the new town 
with its rruddle-class population. In this divided city the point of contact between 
these two sections was the city centre, and even within this centre there was a strict 
separation of the spaces used by these two groups. However, the population of the C 
city was not limited to these two groups for in the course of first period a group of r) 
urban poor coming mainly from rural areas had emerged. Yet, they were still 
marginal vis-a-vis the two groups and they settled either within or in the surrounding Cý 
areas of the old town. They partly articulated into the socio-spatial fabric of the old 
town. Nevertheless, they remained marginal in the social and political life of the city 
during the first period. When the city became a focus of rapid migration, it was this 
group whose weight dramatically increased and created a unprecedented change in 
the social base and spatial structure of the city. 
As mentioned earlier, in the wake of World War H, a new phase had begun 
for 
Ankara as the rural masses crowded into the city. While the population of the city 
was around 225000 in 1945, it almost tripled in 15 years to reach 
650 000 in 1960. 
The city continued to grow at a ra-pid rate during the 
1960s and by 1970 it reached 
&=> 'r 
to 1 209 000. As in the first period, Ankara was ranked as the 
fastest growing city 
(see Table VI. I). 
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Table VI. 1. Growth of Main Cities 1940-70 
Cities 
. ..... Index= 100(1940) Ankara (administrative centre) -1- 7- 69 --- Istanbul (industry, trade, port) 283 Izmir (trade and port) 283 Eskisehir (regional centre) 356 
KayseLL(resa 
__,,, 
ional centre) 319 
Source: Urban Development Strategy 
Needless to say, such unprecedented population growth within a short space of time 
brought dramatic changes to the city in terms of its social base and spatial structure. Lý 
The most c1ramatic effect of this rapid population influx was the massive sprawl of 
squatter settlements in and around the city. I will turn to this issue later, for now, I 
would like to concentrate on the different aspects of the new social base in the city. 
While the process of rapid urbanisation led to the emergence of new urban poor in 
the city, the most visible spatial consequence of this group was the booming of 
squatter areas around the city. As briefly mentioned earlier, the first squatters of the 
first period mushroomed in and around the old town. As one researcher put it, while 
the squatting became a widespread phenomenon during the second period, the 
process continued in a similar fashion so that the squatters first emerged in the old t; 
town section, spreading to other parts in due course. 
'While the city is divided into two central parts- a 'middle-class' area to the south and the old centre 
to the north- most migrants settle in the squatter housing estates, 
Gecekondu, which spring out from 
the old centre and which are starting to spread around the southern part of the city' 
(Levine 1973; 
358). 
Thus, after occupying the old town, squatters started to spread out to other parts of 
the city, including the outskirts of the middle-class neighbourhoods in 
the southern 
C Cý 
01 part of the city. The speed of this process was 
dramatic. Although there is no reliable 
information regarding the number of squatter houses 
for the eaxty years, it is 
C) C) 
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estimated that while this number was around 12.000 with over 60 000 people living 
in them in 1950, it reached 70 000 with 364 000 inhabitants in 1960 (see Table VI. 
U). The growth of squatter housing continued unabated in the following two decades 
and at the end of the period more than 70 per cent of the city population was living in 
squatter housing. 
TABLE VI. H. Squatter Housing In Ankara: 1950 - 1980 
Number of Squatter Number of People Percent of Urban 
Houses Living in Squatter Population Living in 
Housing Squatter Housing 
1950 12,000 62,400 21.8 
1960 70,000 364,000 56.0 
1970 144,000 748,000 60.6 
1980 275,000 1,450,000 72.4 
SOURCE: Keles and Danielson, 1985 
This dramatic change in the social and spatial base of the city could be expected to 
be reflected in the balance of power and state strategies of this period. Inevitably, the 
massive influx of the migrant population changed the socio-spatial structure of the C 
city on an unprecedented scale. But it is problematic to interpret this change as an 
outcome of a conscious strategy. Especially regarding the earlier years, if there was 
any strategy on the part of the migrant population it was a survival strategy rather 
than a strategy that was part of a political project towards the city. 
In other words, 
the motivation behind the act of squatting was in general economic, 
in the sense that 
it aimed at satisfying the immediate housing need of the squatter population, 
and no 
further political objective was defined especially 
in the early years of the period. 
Problems related to the transformation of this social 
base into a social force remained 
unexplored, and as stated earlier, one of the objectives 
of this chapter is to deal with 
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them. Perhaps, one of the best ways to do this is to begin with the strategies of the 
middle-class and the state during this period as they constituted the main reference 
point in the urbanisation of the working class. We can then turn to the working class 
itself later on. 
V1. Ill. Middle-Class Domination after Squatters! 
As we saw in the last chapter, although weakened towards the end of the first period 
there was still a middle-class domination in the city at the beginning of the second 
period. This domination was progressively undermined by the contradiction between 
the two interrelated objectives of the project. The formation of a modem city in line 
with the lifestyle of the middle-class was obstructed by the rent-seeking activities of 
the members of the same class. For the state the very same conflict emerged in the 
form of a contradiction between the formation of a national identity and the 
establishment of the conditions of private-property relations to which urban space 
was central. Thus, already troubled by these internal contradictions, middle-class 
hegemony in the city came under new attack from the massive influx of the rural 
masses into the city and the subsequent mushrooming of the squatter 
neighbourhoods. It is now necessary to look at the positions of the two important 
elements of the hegemonic block, the middle-class and the state, vis-a-vis the rapid 
population influx and expansion of squatter settlements 
in the city. 
In the wake of World War 11, the agenda of the middle-class as now 
the established 
population of the city was conditioned 
by a concern for protecting their modem city 
and identity against the invasion of outsiders. 
This concern was not different from 
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that in the former period in that while the native population during the first period 
was seen as the main threat, at the beginning, of the second period the migrant 
population started to be seen as the main threat, not only to the lifestyle of the 
middle-class, but also to the institution of private property due to their illegal 
occupation of either state or privately owned lands in the outskirts of the city. In this 
respect, at the beginning of the second period, middle-class hegemony continued to 
be based on a two-cities project and remained exclusionary as far as the immigrant 
population was concerned. 
It is extremely informative to look at the newspapers of this period in order to 
understand the perception and attitudes of both middle-class and the state 61ite 
towards the squatters since, as was also true in the first period, newspaper columnists 
and editors acted as the 'organic intellectuals' of the middle-class hegemonic projects 
towards the city. The following quotation from the editorial of a main daily 
newspaper reflects the typical reaction of the middle-class to the squatter settlements: 
'While we try to build cities like Ankara and think of abolishing the shanty houses, we cannot 
welcome the mushrooming of thousands of low-quality squatters in and around the city. One of the 
main problems squatters pose for the city is that they threaten public health as well as law and order in 
the city. Without water, electricity, a sewage system, they can be a source of contagious diseases 
which might infect the whole city. Due to the lack of police stations. these dark places can be a habitat 
for those criminals who would violate the security and safety of the city. For all these reasons, they 
should be prevented from spreading out all over the city' (Cumhuriyet, December 1949). Z: I 
While the above quotation placed the emphasis on the threat directed towards the 
life-style of the middle-class, the following points to the violation of private 
property by the squatters: 
'The prevallin, c, political regime in Turkey today rises upon the principal of respecting people's Cý 
property. If this is the principle, is it not a fact that to erect a squatter on someone else's property is 
attacking property rights and leading to another ideology? Are not those right when they say 
that on 
the roof of squatters red flags are flying rather than old shoes? 
' (Ulus. 22 August 1948). 
Cý -- 
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This kind of statement did not necessarily belong to the full-blown liberals. One of 
the well-known names of the statist wing during the first period, Falth Rifki Atay, 
put the matter in following way: 
'It justifiably became common among the squatting people to say that let's First occupy the land and erect a squatter, afterwards the state would somehow bring the necessary services such as electricity. water and Lyas. For this reason, the violation of property rights increased at a rate that had never happened before. 
.. Bolshevism should not be sought in the rags of students but in the violation of property rights' (Atay, 1949). 
Then, for the same circles the solution was that squatter settlements should not be 
allowed to mushroom in the city as they violate the basic premise of the system, that 
is, property rights. Even when the existence of the squatter development in the city 
was accepted as a permanent rather than a transitory phenomenon, the emphasis was 
placed upon the restoration of private property rights by the state by compensating 
those whose property was subjected to the invasion: 
'Migrating from one place to another is a right of every citizen. Yet, if there is no place in the Cý 
migrated place, then there is no right for him to settle in that place by force. As we came back from a L- hospital when there is no bed available, those who push the city gates should return or be sent back' 
(Cumhuriyet, 3 January 1959) 
'In the first place we need to prevent this disease from spreading out. Therefore, the further C, 
development of squatter housing would not be justifiable. The authorities should-in k-hat ever way 
they choose- explain this to the citizens who do not respect prevailing laws. Then, the existing squatter 
settlements should be brought into line with the regulations. The government should take the 
ownership of those invaded lands by paying the price of the land to the original o%vner. Then, it 
should sell to the squatter dwellers with long-term instalments and of a cheap price. If these lands were 
given to them for free and this became a common practice, then it would be impossible to prevent C 
others from asking the same favour. If you do not give then like the others, they would do the same, C- 
that is. they would invade the land. In this way, the squatter dwellers would be entitled to title deeds 
and then basic services such as roads, electricity, and a sewage svstem' (Cumhurlyet 3 November 
1949). 
The measures proposed were not limited to those mentioned above. As a matter of 
fact, at the end of the first period, as we have seen, there was a housing crisis in the 
city affecting the lower middle-class. The rapid urbanisation of the second period 
deepened this crisis bringging it to a point whereby nobody denied that the state 
should interfere in solving the crisis. 
For this reason, even for those who proposed Cý 
-)4() 
the above measures, the state had to take some positive steps to solve the crisis. In 
other words, we see an emphasis on the father state alongside an authoritative one. 
'It is a well-known fact that today there is a group of people in our cities and towns who 11 I-- ive on a day- to-day basis, going hunorry if a job is not found that day. They live under bridges, in old reser"o In II irs and in such accommodation which would be difficult even to call a shack in order to protect themselves from harsh weather. It is a well-known fact that the government is dealing with the building of cheap 
and hygienic houses. The Saracoglu housing estate was an outcome of the government's attempt to 
solve the housing problem of the civil servants who suffered and still suffer from the housing 
shortages. The housing question which I emphasise does not only regard the provision of houses of 
those who are over a certain level of welfare. Perhaps more importantly, the problem is of the very 
poor groups' (Ulus, 29 November 1946). 
Thus, at the end of the war the political agenda of the city was dominated by the 
housing crisis. The crisis which had affected the lower ranks of the state bureaucracy 
in the course of first period became a full-blown one in the wake of the World War H 
with the massive influx of rural poor into the city, and in the late 1940s, it reached a 
level that began to threaten middle-class hegemony in the city. At this point it is 
necessary to turn to the state strategies of the early years to see the position of the 
state in the face of a challenge coming from the migrant masses. 
As we saw, there were a suspicious attitude towards squatter housing in the early 4D 
years of the second period. It is not surprising to find this reflected in the state 
policies of the 1940s. The state remained sandwiched between two contradictory 
pressures. On the one hand, the squatter settlements were a challenge to the property 
rights of which the state was the guarantor, and as we saw above, they were seen as a 
threat to the socio-spatial environment of the middle-class. 
On the other hand, the 
legitimacy of the state vis-a-vis the squatter citizens was in 
jeopardy when the 
preventive measures such as demolition were applied, especially 
in view of the fact 
that the state did not offer any alternative solution. 
In the end, the dilen-una for the 
state was resolved in a way in which, while middle-class 
hegemony in the city 
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continued with the active intervention of the state in support of it, non-policy 
making was applied in the case of the squatter population, as if the they did not exist. 
Given that the main priority for the squatter population was to stay in the city by 
escaping demolition and similar policies, and that there was a lack of any radicalism 
among the squatters, the non-intervention policy of the state was preferred by the 
migrant population. 
As we saw earlier during the first period, the dominant policy towards squatter 
development was deterrence such as threats of demolition. In the wake of the War, 
the same policy remained intact. Yet, this time the scale of squatting was massive 
and demolition remained symbolic in the sense that while thousands were built, the 
number of demolished squatters did not exceed a couple of dozen. 
However the problem reached a level that could no longer be ignored by the state. 
Parallel to this deepening crisis, the government became vulnerable to the pressures 
from different quarters to respond to it one way or another. Ironically, the squatting 
groups were not limited only to the migrant population. There was also a kl-ý 
considerable number of low-rank civil servants who settled in squatter areas. 
Some 
studies shows that they consisted of around 10 per cent of the squatter 
dwellers in the 
early years(Yorukhan 1968). 
The first striking policy initiative by the government was the 
Gecekondu Amnesty 
Act of 1948. Although the act was not introduced as an amnesty 
law, it was in the 
first place, an amnesty act that legalised most of the squatters 
then existing in the 
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city. But more importantly, the act entitled the municipalities to provide urban land 
for needy individuals to build their own houses 3. 
Behind the discourse of solving the squatter housing problem, which was emphasised 
during the discussions in the Assembly, the law targeted the low-rank civil servants. 
According to law, only those who had been residents in the city for at least one year 
were eligible for this scheme. Besides, beneficiaries were required to have a 
permanent income. Under these conditions, a large part of the squatter dwellers, and 
newcomers who were likely to see squatting as a solution, were excluded since they 
could not meet the requirements defined by the law. In this sense, although the law 
was formally targeting all groups, in fact the beneficiaries of this scheme were 
mainly civil servants (Tokman 1985). 
On the basis of this law, the municipality made a compulsory purchase of 105 
hectares of land in the north-west of the city which was later to be called 
Yenimahalle. The area was divided into lots between 175 and 300 square mýetres and 
offered to those who were eligible on a 10-year payment basis at the true cost price. 
As mentioned above, the main beneficiaries of this scheme were civil servants, and 
with the collaboration of central and local governments a new (lower) middle-class Z: ) 
quarter emerged in the city with a population of 20 000 towards the 
beginning of the 
1950s. Thus, the implementation following law 5218 helped the civil servants solve 
their housing crisis, while the migrant population was excluded. For the 
latter group, 
3 According to Municipal Law 1580 of 1930, the municipalities were only entitled 
to develop urban 
land and build houses for renting. 
For this reason, the new law allowed the municipalities to 
develop 
urban land for private development. 
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the main benefit of the law was the legalisation of the squatter settlements 
established before the enactment of the law. 
This logic dominated state strategies during the 1950s, while the squatters continued 
to mushroom during this time. The main policy continued to ignore and not to 
acknowledge the problem. Except for a handful of demolitions, the state closed its 
eyes to the problem as if it did not exist. While non-policy making was the main ZD 
strategy towards the squatters, the attention paid by the state for the authorised 
section of the city was in line with expectations of the middle-class. 
At the beginning of the 1950s, the city had already reached a population which the 
Jansen Plan had projected for it in 1970. In other words, the developments taking 
place in the authorised part were going beyond the plan boundaries. In the early 
1950s, the main debate regarding the city was about the need for a new plan and this t, 
need started to be voiced frequently in the newspaper columns. For instance, one of 
the prominent members of the Kernalist intellectual circle, who was involved in the 
planning activities of the former period, was calling the authorities to act swiftly to 
get a new plan for the city (Atay, Ulus, 13 May 1948) 
In line with this expectation, a commission which was called 'the Development 
Committee' was established to determine the basic needs of the city. The members of 
the committee were the mayor and governor of the city along with the 
heads of Cý 
various departments of ministries such as public works and public 
health. There were 
also members in the committee from the universities and the 
Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry. In 1953, the committee prepared a report which 
laid out the 
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expectations and needs the new plan should take into account. The most striking 
feature of the report was that although there were considerable number of squatters in 
the city at the date of completion of the report, there was no reference to the squatters 
in the report. Instead, the Development Committee Report identified the lack of a 
cultural centre and facilities as the main problem and the provision of these as the 
main priority of the new plan: 
'One of the first needs of the city is a Cultural Centre suitable for a modern city like Ankara; 
established with due consideration to the relations and ties existing between the present educational 
and scientific establishments and the related societies and installations... it is necessary for the future 
of greater Turkey and for Ankara with a million population to have State Opera, State Theatre, and a 
large concert hall or house, State Conservatory, Academy of Fine Arts,... outdoor and indoor, cold 
and warm swimming pools.... only under these conditions Ankara may become a cultural centre and a 
modern State Capital' (Development Committee Report, 1954; 119). 
Ironically, the Cornnuttee Report, while the squatter settlements surrounded the 
whole city towards the mid-1950s, defined the lack of cultural facilities as the main 
problem. Yet, despite its emphasis on the cultural centre, the hidden agenda behind 
the report was the opening up of new development areas for authorised 
developments. As mentioned above, the development area defined by the Jansen 
Plan was full and there was an urgent need for new development areas. 
For this 
reason, after making the development of a cultural centre a priority, 
the report 
In designated the 4determination of city development boundaries' as the 
first urgent 
need of the city. Interestingly, the planners were asked to contain 
the plan boundaries 
within the municipal boundaries. In turn, that meant 
leaving not only a considerable 
part of the squatter developments outside the plan control 
but also making these 
areas vulnerable to further development. 
As we shall see later on, most of the 
squatter developments of the following years would 
take place outside the municipal 
and plan boundaries 
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As proposed by the report, an international Jury was formed including internationally 1 4-: 1 
established planners and architects such as Patrick Abercrombie and Luigi Piccinato. 
The jury chose a plan prepared by two Turkish architects, Rasit Uvbadin and Nihat 
Yucel, among a dozen plans. The second and third winners were German and Swiss 
architects respectively. 
The Uybadin-Yucel Plan took two inputs as given: the main decisions of the Jansen 
Plan, and more importantly, existing development trends in the city. In this sense, the 
plan extended the Jansen Plan in line with existing growth tendencies (See Figure VI. 
1). In other words, the new plan was not a radical plan which challenged market 
trends. Instead, it aimed at placing them within a framework. Like the Jansen Plan, it 
placed emphasis on the north-south axis as the development direction. It also 
continued to use the rectangular building islands which were proposed by the Jansen 
Plan as a part of the garden city idea. 
The plan and the priorities it set out once again showed that despite the massive 
influx of the rural population and concomitant mushrooming of squatter housing in 
the city, middle-class hegemony was intact in the 1950s. As one planner points out: 
'Although the plan negated the squatters they were there; encircling the regular housing zones, M- C ltý inhabiting areas reserved for green uses within an organic framework. The landless and obless 
peasants were overwhelmingly migrating and producing their own environment. 
It was a natural 
V r-, ý II
environment evolving with its own logic generating its own physical fabric' (Gunay 198837). 1-1 r_1 Zý Cý 
Meanwhile, explosive urban growth continued during the 1950s, and the population 
of the city grew to 650 000 in 1960. Towards the end of the 1950s, the number of 
squatters were and the squatter dwellers were comprising per cent of 
the city Cý 
population; and they were no longer contained 
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Rather, they were encircling the city. Thus, at the beginning of 1960s, the spatial 
structure of the city was different from the structure characterised by two cities, the 
old and new towns. Now there was a third city which had sprung out of the old town, 
but which encircled the whole cItY4. In a way, this situation reflected the relative 
position of the middle-class and the migrant population. While the former occupied 
the central part of the city, it was surrounded by the rural-originated masses. As 
argued above, the latter was not as antagonistic as the middle-class perceived it. 
Nevertheless, in the face of the irresistible influx of the rmgrant population, the 
middle classes narrowed their perspective to the authorised part of the city, and 
denied the existence of the migrant population. Yet, starting from the early 1960s, 
this position became untenable for both the middle-class and the state. 
In the first place, the scale of the problem reached a point where denial was no longer 
possible. The squatter districts were no longer restricted to certain parts of the city. 
They penetrated even into those parts which were known as middle-class 
neighbourhoods. Likewise, the city centres became a concentration point of the 
'informal' sector activities of the squatter population. In other words, the living and 
work places of the migrant population were so visible and pressing that in the early 
1960s it was impossible to deny the 'problem'. 
4 One of the leading left-wing Kernalist columnists describes the Ankara of this period in the 
following 
way: 'Forty-five per cent of Ankara's population lives in squatters. 
Ataturk's ideal was to set up a 
modern city in the place of destroyed section and old town which was on the skirts of 
the Altindag. 
We destroyed this ideal like the other ones. It is possible now to observe three Ankaras like three 
Turkeys; Ankara of Sultanate, Ankara of Ataturk ... Ankara of 
Democracy (Party Politics) 
(Cumhuriyet.. 13 January 1963, Ilhan Selcuk), It is worth nothing that the development of squatters as 
the third city is blamed on the transition to multi-party rule. 
The defeatist rhetoric is very evident in 
the tone of the article. 
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If the attitude to the squatters became more positive during this period, this cannot be 
explained solely by the massive scale of the problem. Perhaps by a continuity from 
the 1950s, the increasing strategic importance of squatters as a massive urban vote 
stock for the political parties also played a part in the tolerance they received from 
different governments with the restoration of multi-party rule after the 1960 
intervention. Ironically, the most intensive squatter development took place In the 
city during election periods as the parties in power closed their eyes to these 
developments due to their immediate political concerns. 
More importantly, however, there was a marked change in the political climate in the 
early 1960s. As discussed in Chapter 111, starting with the rnilitary intervention of 
1960, the balance of power shifted in a direction which favoured the state-led 
development strategies vis-a-vis the market one. However, the new project was 
different from the Kernalist project of the 1930s in that, while the latter was based 
on the idea of an organic society, the former started to recognise class divisions and 
aimed at finding a position in this class-divided society. As a result of this search, the 
Kernalist project became sensitive to the working class. 
The reflection of this shift in the urban domain was a more sympathetic attitude 
towards the squatters. One of the main changes was the recognition of the squatters 4- 
as a non-transitory phenomenon. While perception shifted 
from denial to acceptance, 
the need for reform became the main element of the stratecry. 
In other words. while 
the squatter was now seen as an undeniable element of the urban structure, 
they were 
perceived, by the state and middle-class, within a 
integrative discourse which still 
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saw the squatters as a category that needed to be integrated by improving their social 
and spatial conditions. This was consistent with the state-led developmental ism and 
planning ideology of the 1960s. 
By referring to the housing crisis in Ankara and other large cities, the prime minister 
of post-1960 period, Inonu, was declaring that, especially for the urban poor, housing 
provision was a duty of the state (Cumhuriyet 16 April 1962). Similarly, the Minister 
of Reconstruction and Settlements announced that the squatters were not going to be C) 
tom down without the provision of alternative cheap housing by the state. 
Likewise the conception of squatter housing underwent an important change in the 
early 1960s, with the increasing emphasis on the positive aspects of squatter housing; 
and there were other reasons than the immediate political concerns of political parties 
in power underlying, this changing attitude. After pointing to the failure of deterrence 4: ) 
policies against squatter housing and to the inevitability of the future spread of 
squatter housing, one of the emerging left-wing organic intellectuals of this period, 
Dogan Avcioglu, put the new position in following way: 
'In other words, while the population of cities was increasing, priority should be given to productive 
investments. This would prevent directing a large portion of existing resources to housing investment. z: 1 L_ C 
For this reason, there is no way other than accepting squatter housing as the cheapest way of solving C 
the housino, need. Whatever we do, the number of squatter dwellings would increase in the years to C C_ 
come ... Given the 
facts that it is impossible to prevent the further increase in the number of squatter 
housing and to allocate a very bia resource to the housing investments, it is the only sensible solution 
to rationalise squatter housing development and to provide necessary services to these areas. For this 
reason, by giving up squatter demolition, it is necessary to allocate large areas for squatters. The state 
should provide these areas with water, electricity, sewage system, schools and transportation, and 
provide technical help to the squatter-building people. In this way, the squatter dwellers who live an 
example of hard work and self sacrifice by meeting their own housing needs would avoid the threat of L, C7 
demolition and find some comfort. With increasing wealth, the primitive squatters would be upgraded 
to more solid and adequate accommodations. At later stages of economic development, the state 
would come forward with a policy that would target the eradication of squatters 
(Ulus, 8 July, 196 1). 
Z: ý
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It is worth noting that this new position represents a major shift in the policies 
towards the squatters from a negative attitude to a more positive approach. In this 
context, the new approach started to see the squatters as a solution rather than a 
problem. This is especially important in the context of the new developmentalism 
which points to the concentration of investments in the industrial sphere and the 
minimisation of so-called unproductive investments. 
The first five-year development plan approached the problem along these lines: A 
committee report prepared with the participation of the representatives of the 
universities, nunistries and municipalities as well as experts from the State Planning 
Organisation summarises the emerging approach the squatters in the following way: 
-It is impossible to get rid of all gecekondu neighbourhoods. For social, cultural, sanitary, urbanistic Z__ L_ 
reasons, these areas cannot be left to their destinies. The most reasonable way of handling the C, 
problem is to bring these squatter district to a situation in which their control could be possible. 
-To this end, only those squatter dwellings which cannot be improved should be torn town, in the other 
districts, where the squatters do not create problems, the main services and utilities should be provided 
immediately. 
-In order to prevent the development of new squatter districts, pre-designated or controlled squatter 
zones should be developed. 
-Rural-urban migration should be prevented and should by no means 
be encouraged. 
-Regarding the rehabilitation of the squatter zones, priority should 
be given to self-help schemes. Cý r_1 
-The help should be limited to those who own more than one squatter 
house. 
-The state owned lands in those squatter rehabilitation and prevention zones should not 
be transferred 
to the individuals; leasing on a 40-50 year basis should be applied. 
-The penetration of squatters into strategic areas of the city should 
be prevented (Ulus, 6 May 1964). 
The first comprehensive legal framework regarding squatter housing came with the 
Squatter Law of 1966 which bore the marks of the understanding sun-imarised above. 
By and large, while the central crovemment. namely the Ministry of 
Reconstruction 
4-: ) rý 
and Settlement, was responsible for the overall implementation of policy, 
the 
municipalities were given limited responsibilities such as granting 
land deeds for 
III Cý I 
those squatters built on public land. The law was proposinze,; various po icies 
regarding the legalisation, improvements, and prevention of squatter 
housing. As the 
r) 47- In 
250 
law was implementing the above mentioned policy proposals, I will evaluate the 
implementation of the law in Ankara without repeating the details of the law. 
As it had the largest percentage of squatter dwellings in Turkey, Ankara became the 
main focus of implementation. In terms of prevention, the main policy was the 
establishment of squatter prevention zones. To this end, between 1965 and 1976, 
3208.3 hectares of land were subjected to compulsory purchase for establishing 15 
prevention zones. Nevertheless, implementation remained limited to two zones, 
Aktepe and Sincan (Senyapili and Turel 1996; 10). The schemes failed to attract the 
squatters as the costs were high and controls were strict in comparison to erecting a 
squatter in an unauthorised area. In this sense, the success of the prevention policy 
was limited. Likewise, the increase in the number of squatters after the enforcement 
of law proved the failure of the prohibition policy as well. The implementation of the 
law was relatively successful with respect to improvement and legalisation. Yet, the 
provision of public utilities and title deeds was not a solution but only a commitment 
to squatter housing. In sum, the squatter law of 1966 proved to be a 
failure as far as 
the prevention of . squatter housing is concerned. Rather, it was a 
legal symbol of the 
shift of policy from a negative to a positive approach to squatter 
development. 
While the attitude towards the squatters changed in a more positive 
direction, there 
was no slow down in the rate of urbanisation 
during the 1960s and the population of Z-: ý 
the city reached 1.209.000 by 1970. The main source of this 
increase was still 
migration from rural areas (predominantly 
from Central and Eastern Anatolia). The 
annual inflow was 30.000 persons between 
1955-60,36.000 in 1960-65 and 45.000 
between 1965 and 1970. There were on the other 
hand. important differences 
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between the early years and the 1960s influx in terms of the employment and living 
place experience of the incoming population. Firstly, the late comers were arriving 
into the city through a network formed by the first arrivals. In the early 1960s, there 
were visible squatter neighbourhoods in the city formed on the basis of ethnicity and 
kin networks. (Senyapili 198 1; Ersoy 1985). Secondly, partly due to these networks 
and partly due to the expanding economy of the city, the newcomers were integrating 
into the economic structure of the city more quickly than its predecessors. Likewise, 
there also an improvement in the jobs taken by the incoming population. 
Despite the improvement in the conditions of living and workplace, the duality 
between the social, political, cultural and spatial structures of the middle-class and 
squatter population towards the end of 1960s remained intact. 
At this time, the squatters became the majority of the city population. There were 
important implications of this change for the social structure of the city. According to 
a survey conducted by the Ankara Metropolitan Area Master Plan Bureau, the 
population distribution of the city on the basis of income distribution was as follows: 
52 per cent low-income households (with net income of less than 1200 
TL per 
month), 39 rruddle-income households (1200-2750 TL per month), and 
9 per cent 
high-income (more than 2750 TL). The overwhelming majority of the low-income 
population was constituted by the squatter population. 
As is shown in the Table V. 
k at the end of the decade, more than half of the city population 
(5 1 %) was living in 
squatter settlements. It is interesting to note that the number of 
households was 
smaller than that of those living in the planned area, 
43 and 53 per cent respectively. 
25-1 
Table VI. 111. Planned and Unplanned Residential Areas, 1970 
Area Definition Households (%) Population (c7c) Gross Land Area 
Planned 53.0 43.0 31.0 
Unplanned 
Pre-plan area (old quarter) 4.0 4.8 3.0 
Illegal condominiums 1.0 1.2 
Squatters 42.0 51.0 66.0 
Total Unplanned 47.0 57.0 69.0 
Grand Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ankara Metropolitan Area Master Plan Bureau, Urban Development Strategy 
There was also a spatial duality in the city. The duality between the new and old 
towns of the first period was now replaced by the duality between the cities of the 
middle-class and of the squatters. In the course of development of the city, the old 
town lost its political importance and had become a part of the squatters domain by 
becoming their centre. Figure VI. 11 shows the duality and segregation between the 
middle-class and working class residential areas (squatter districts)in the city. In 
terms of income distribution a similar situation can be observed which matches the 
spatial segregation (Figure VI. 111). 
Although the attitude of both middle-class and the state changed in a more positive 
direction during the 1960s, this helped to consolidate the duality between the middle- Cý 
class neighbourhoods and the squatter ones. The so-called positive attitude never 
aimed at eradicating the socio-spatial inequalities between these two sections. 
While 
the above mentioned policy was applied to squatters, the middle-classes continued 
to 
advance their interest in the so-called authorised section of 
the city. As we discussed 
above, the Yucel-Uybadin plan re-tailored the 
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middle-class by providing a planning framework for the growth trends already Z--) 
created by the middle-class. As one of the planners put It, the plan was further 
manipulated by speculative concerns during the 1960s: 
'When the population pressures become more and more visible, II II the Urban Development Council did not make any effort to draw up a new plan, but simply started playing- with densities. The c. ity 
. 
was divided into zones and each was subject to a maximum building height limit. Furthermore, projections and depths of the buildings were considered to increase the densi ty. This system was well-suited to the small private developer, who purchased the urban parcel, constructed an apartment block in it and sold each dwelling unit to separate owners. The system also suited those who would readily buy and inhabit the dwelling unit. The consequent physical fabric is dull and monotonous with no regard for urban space or for replacing the older garden city environment of the city. Under these circumstances, the 
authors of the plan abandoned their position as controllers of the plan (Gunay 1985). 
Thus during the 1960s, along with growth taking place in the unplanned area, there 
was a rapid expansion of speculatively oriented development in the authorised part of 
the city. One of the interesting features of this development was that once again the 
exchange value was the driving force behind urban development in urban space of 
the middle-classes despite the continuing rhetorical emphasis on the identity value of 
urban space. 
Another feature of this trend was the consolidation of a formation of a new centre 
that was distinct from the old centre, and which served the middle-classes. As we 
saw in the preceding chapter, during the first period, despite the duality and 
segregation between old and new towns, both parts used the same centre, even if Z 
there was segregation within it. While there were developments pointing to the C) Zý 
formation of a centre for the middle-class, they were embryonic during this period. 
In 
the course of second period, a centre for the new town emerged progressively. 
By the 
kl-j 
end of 1960s, there were two visible centres which reflected the socio-spatial 
dualivy 
between the middle-class and working class. While the old centre 
became the centre 
of the squatter population, the middle-class progressively retreated 















old centre in favour of the new one. Thus, with the emergence of the new centre. the 
duality between two groups became more complete (See Figure VI. IV for old and 
new centres). 
In sum, Ankara was a divided city in the mid- 1960s. So far, I have evaluated this 
process with reference to the middle-class and the state. As far as the migrant Cý 
population is concerned, I have treated them as if they were passive agents of this 
process. A full understanding of this process requires that attention be paid to their 
strategies and projects towards the city. 
V1. Ill. The Squafters: From Social Base To Social Force 
Placing the emphasis on the project and strategies of the nugrant population is 
important in order to answer the question to what extent they were incorporated into 
middle-class hecremony and to what extent they mobilised to challenge rmddle-class 4ý 
hegemony and thus become a counter hegemonic force with its own project towards 10 
the city. Furthermore, as class formation takes place in and through concrete 
struggles, we can also understand the processes of class formation through the Cý 
analysis of these strategies and struggles. 
To begin with, it should be stated that these struggles and strategies of the migrant 
population underwent an important transformation 
in the course of this period. From 
the mid- 1940s to the late 1960s, there was a lack of political radicalism among 
the 
migrant population. Only in the early 1970s, 
did a certain degree of mobilisation 
towards a more radical agenda take place among squatter 
dwellers, and even during 
Figure VI. IV. Divided Centres 
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this period the emerging radicalism was very limited and fragile as I will show 
below. The immediate question we need to tackle is thus the reason for the lack of 
radicalism among the migrant population especially during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Even if it is true that the 1950s and 1960s were characterised by the lack of 
radicalism on the part of the squatter population, this should not be understood as 
complete inactivity of this group in the local political arena. On the contrary, from 
the very beginning the migrant population was very demanding and exerted 
considerable pressure on the state in order to get what they wanted. The lack of 
radicalism, on the other hand, should be sought in the very nature of these demands 
since these demands were defined primarily around economic material interest rather 
than political interest. In this respect, Cherki's evaluation of the French squatter 
movement is valid for the Turkish squatters of the 1950s and 1960s: 
'Demands ... and struggles are still economic in character, 
in the sense that squatting is seen as a means L- C 
of satisfying an immediate economic need (housing) ... The political consciousness of the protagonists CIII 
of the movement, the political aims of the movement, are not defined' (Cherki 1973, quoted in 
Pickvance 1977; 178). 
Initially their main demand was not to be denied the chance to become urbanites. 
This required in the first place, avoiding demolition. After securing the permanence 
of their dwellings, they turned to claim the main public utilities in the short term and 
title deeds for the medium term whereas the transformation of their neighbourhood 
into planned development areas was defined as a 
long-term objective. 
Yet, it is quite reasonable to argue that none of these claims posed a challenge 
to the 
middle-class hegemony in the city. This 
is true, although as we saw above, especially 
C Cý 
during the 1950s, there were intensive claims among, the middle-class 




squatting was no less than a violation of property rights. It is beyond any doubt that 
the massive influx of masses into the city and concomitant mushrooming of squatter 4-- 
4-: ) dwellings in the city did threaten the lifestyle and the urban space of the rruddle- 
class. But this was not a conscious strategy on the part of squatter population, which 
aimed at bringing middle-class hegemony to an end and surrendering its space. 
Rather, it was an unintended consequence of the migration process. In other respects, 
the migrant masses were far from being a counter hegemonic force and this situation 
did not change in the following period, even if they became more and more active in 
city politics. In other words, they met important difficulties in advancing their 
demands from immediate economic interests (economic -corporate phase) to long- 
term political interests (political phase). It is important to understand the factors 
playing a part in this failure. As we will see below, some of these factors stem from 
the internal characteristic of the migrant population, from which others emerged in 
the course of their urbanisation. 
Problems of class formation, in a Marxist or Weberian sense, among the squatters are 
an appropriate starting point for an understanding of their failure in becoming a 
counter-hegemonic force. 
In the first place, the occupational stratification of the squatter population posed an 
important difficulty in the formation of a unified class since their occupational 
composition was heterogeneous, ranging 
from productive to service workers, from ZI) 
civil servants to small entrepreneurs. 
In research conducted by the Ministry of 
Reconstruction and Resettlement in 1962, it was 
found out that petty producers and 
those who worked in artisanal. occupations made up 
the largest proportion with 28.9 
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per cent of the squatter work force whereas the workers constituted the second 
largest group with 25.8 per cent. The small entrepreneurs in the trade sector was 
made up of 11.5 per cent of the total active work force. Those working in the public 
sector amounted to 22.5 per cent, and 10.4 per cent civil servant and 12.1 per cent 
low-rank support staff such as janitors, watchman etc. The unemployed workforce 
was around 3.2 per cent and the remaining 8.2 per cent were working in various 
undefinedjobs 
5. 
Occupational differentiation was not the only impediment to collective action by the 
squatters. Further, there were divisions even within the same occupational categories. 
For instance, ethnicity played a divisive role in collective action by creating closed 
and intimate communities within the workforce. This kind of network has been 
especially evident in the informal sector (Ersoy 1985; 1992). The informal/formal 
distinction plays a central role in the internal division of the working class in that, as 
Roberts states for Latin America, 'both informal workers and informal employers 
have different sets of interests and levels of income than their formal counterparts' 
(Roberts 1995). Given these difficulties in forming a unified class and class 
consciousness, it is necessary to turn to the living place experience of the squatter 
population of Ankara. 
In their analysis of the imnugrant population in Sparkbrook, 
Rex and Moore identify 
a three stages process of 'integration, into the city. 
As Pickvance (1977) sums up, 
'In 
these stages are: 
5 Ankara-Gulveren District squatters research, Ministry of 
Reconstruction and Settlements, 1964. 
C- Cý Similar studies carried out by the same ministry give similar 
figures regarding the occupational 
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'a brief stage of anornie when ties to the host society are weakened and employment ,, the only tie to the host society; the formation of 'an intimate primary sub-community' with others of the same ethnic group providing help with personal problems, a meaningful social world and preventing social isolation-, and finally a stage in which the immigrant develops contacts outside this group, exercises his rights as a citizen and eventually leaves the 'colony' life of the immiarant area. ' 
A similar three stage process of 'integration' can be identified in the case of the 
migrant population of Ankara. For the first group of migrants in the post-war period, ZD 
there was again a short period of anomie when the ties with home still existed but 
settlement in the city was not complete in terms of the work and living environments. Z: ) 
The first migrants of the second period, who mainly settled in and around the old 
town, underwent an experience described above as anormc 6. After the first arrivals, 
the first stage got shorter as the followers did not arrive in cities where they were 
complete strangers. Rather they arrived into a network that was based on ethnicity 
and kinship relations. Findings from the studies on this area are consistent with this 
argument. In one of the most comprehensive follow-up research projects carried out 
in Ankara on the integration of migrant population from a small town close to 
Ankara, namely Iskilip, the author asserts that: 
'Out of 100 neighbourhoods in the city, only one third of them were selected as points of entry by the 
Iskilip migrants. All those particular neighbourhoods that were first settled had more than one L- 
Iskilipian family which had migrated to the city previously. Tentatively, we may argue that this is due 
to the existence of communication between those in the community of origin and those who 
had 
migrated to Ankara before. Hence, for more than half of the migrants the 
first housing in the city was 
found with the help of other Iskilipians who had already settled in the city' 
(Ersoy 1992; 139). 
While Iskilipians settled in those areas where there were clusters 
formed by 
previously arrived migrants from Iskilip, the 
kinship network played a prominent role 
distribution of the squatter workforce. 
6 For the migrant environment of the 1940s, 
Boran depicts a situation which resembles the ghettos of 
Chicago. Boran, who was a sociologist with a Ph. 
D. from the University of Chicago, reports that these 
quarters of Ankara where first migrants settled were 
known as Criminal Quarters. According to police 
records most of the criminals caught 
by police were from these neighbourhoods (Boran 1943 
Another study points out that, especially in the poor inner-city 
squatter neighbourhoods. the anomie 
was more common and persistent then in other 
neighbourhoods. His findings shows that in Topraklik, 
one of those squatter neighbourhoods around 
the old town as opposed to other areas. there was a lack 
C 
Z-1 
of solidaritv and trust among the residents 
(Yorukhan 1968; 36). In the light of these findings we can 
argue that the staue of anomie experienced 
among squatter d%kellers differed in 
different time and 
space contexts. 
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in the settlement of late comers. But in the course of time these ties weakened, even 
if they were not totally broken: 
'Of the married migrants, 35 per cent arrived alone in Ankara and for a few months stayed as guests in a relative's or friends house. It was only after renting or constructing a house that they brought their families there. The place where the migrants first lived has shown a drastic change in the last 50 years. For instance, while before 1950 , 40 percent of the migrants stayed as guests In a relative's house up to a year, this ratio dropped to 9.5 per cent for those who arrived between 1970 and 1980/ This is due to the weakening social links between migrants and their townsmen time' (Ersoy 1992; 138). 
These findings show that the first and immediate problem over facing the formation 
of a class consciousness was the existence of an altemative form of consciousness, 
that is, ethnic consciousness. Entering into an intimate ethnic community prevented 
the formation of a consciousness on the basis of class interests. The rise of 
community as the principal locus of urban consciousness prevented the development 
of a class-based consciousness among the squatter population. 
Ironically, while the squatter population formed intimate communities based on 
ethnic ties, their urban value system, 'which refers to at hierarchical ranking of ways 
of life in different districts of the city and different types of housing' (Pickvance 
1977; 180), was that of the middle-clasS7. I find two important areas through which 
the migrant population internalised the hegemonic value system via either the 
middle-class or the state. These are property ownership, and life style. 
7 Keyder seems to be claiming the opposite of the claim I put forward on this point. 
According to 
Keyder, 'Despite conflicts among immigrants to the city, shanty town dwellers shared a 
background 
which distinguished them from older urbanites: they saw their new standing as constitutino, 
territory 
gained from an exclusionary dlite, however, much as there was a culture 
that had perpetuated 
privileges associated with linguistic competence and the ability to emulate 
European lifestyles. Thus, 
shanty- towners reproduced in urban context the anti-elite resentment 
they had carried with them. The 
strength of this consciousness militated against the perception of class 
fon-nation as the new axis of the 
society and alienated the newly urbanised population 
from class-based politics. ' (Keyder 1987) As I 
will show below, the claim of anti-elitist resentment on the part of squatter 
dwellers carries some truth. 
Nevertheless this is misleading in that it underestimates the he(yemonv of the middle class over 
the 
squatters in terms of the urban value system. 
260 
In the first place, the squatter population became integrated into the socio-political 
structure through their internalisation of property relations. From the very beginnin, (),,, 
they started to see urban land as a means of accumulation. That is, even if its 
immediate consumption by the squatter dwellers was due to its use value, they took 
the middle-class disposition which conceived of urban land as private property and a 
means of exchance8. Even in its earlier stages, squatter housing emerged something 4-: ý Cý 
for the market. Despite the lack of title deeds, there was an informal squatter housing Z-- 
market where people could buy and sell squatter dwellings which were built on 
someone else's land. 
The very same relations paved the way for the squatters to be integrated into the 
political system through clientilistic relations with the state. Despite the existence of 
the informal market, being a part of the formal market which required title deeds was 
the ultimate aim of the squatter population, and since granting title deeds is in t) I 
monopoly of the state, it created a clientilistic relation in which consent is produced 
in return for title deeds. It was not surprising then that on the eve of the elections, the I 
political parties kept promising legalisation and granting title deeds. When the title 
deeds were secured, the clientilistic relations did not finish since the squatters 
advanced their demand of being entitled to the redevelopment of their land through 
development plans. In other words, a form of a clientilistic relation remained intact 




8 Perhaps, they did not find this so difficult as the property relations in rural Turkey, from which they 
just broke away, was based on small-scale property ownership. 
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In line with this internalisation process, the lifestyle of the middle-classes constituted 
a model for the squatter dwellers. The ladder model was at work in this area too in 
the sense that the squatters saw their situation in the city as temporary, whereas the 
final point to be reached was again a middle-class lifestyle including its built 
environment and consumption norms. 
We have shown above that the squatter dwellers contemplated a built environment 
transformed from squatters to authorised building blocks. In return, their land was 
seen as a speculative resource. But their desire for this transformation was not only 
rooted in speculative expectations but also in the lifestyle of the middle-class as a 
model for squatters. In research conducted in three different squatter districts, it was 
found that the majority of the squatters wanted to live in the middle-class 
neighbourhoods if they could afford it (See Table VI. IV). 
The same kind of imitation can be found in the consumption norms of the squatters. 
Especially in the 1960s, there was a dramatic increase in squatters spending on 
consumer durable. Senyapili points out that in most of the squatter dwellings it was 
possible to find the main consumer durable as such. 
9 
The occupational aspirations of the squatter population also show a certain 
degree of 
emulation of the middle-class by the squatters. Research carried out in squatter 
neighbourhoods point out that the squatter dwellers would 
have liked to see their 
9 Most of the studies, includina Senyapill's, explain the consumption pattern of 
the squatter population 
by the importance of the internal market for the dominant accumulation strategy of 
the period and 
assert that the squatters were encouraged to spend on 
these items to support the accumulation regime. 4-1 - 
I find that this explanation is functional and ex postfacto. The real mechanism of the orientation 
to 
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children dominantly in civil servant positions (Yorukhan 1968). In this sense, the 
squatter dwellers took the middle-class population as a model not only in relation to 
living space but also to workplace. 




Tuzlucayir Akdere Yildiz Total 
Etilk-Ayvali LM 7 3 6 2 2 1 15 2 
Kecioren LM - 16 6 9 4 25 4 Aktepe LM 2 1 - - 2 0 Haskoy L - 1 0 1 0 Siteler-Ulubey LM I I 1 0 1 0 3 0 
Aydinlikevler M - 1 0 2 1 3 0 
Akkopru-Varlik LM - - 1 0 1 0 
Yenimahalle M 12 6 17 7 8 3 37 5 
AOC-Gazi Mahallesi M - 2 1 - 2 0 
Altindau L I I - 1 0 2 0 
S. pazari-Eski Ankara L 3 2 - 1 0 4 1 
Cebeci M 13 6 20 8 - 33 5 
Kayas L I I - 1 0 
Incesu-S. Ba(ylari LM - 2 1 - 2 0 
K. Esat-K. Dere MH 13 6 7 3 7 3 27 4 
Y. Ayranci-A. Ayranci MH 4 2 1 0 4 2 9 1 
Cankaya-Yildizevler H 28 14 47 19 85 33 160 23 
Dikmen-Ovecler MH 3 2 7 3 6 2 16 2 
Bahcefi-Ernek MH 11 5 7 3 3 1 21 3 
Maltepe-Anittepe M 3 2 6 2 1 
Yenisehir MH 22 11 15 6 5 '? 42 6 
Ulus M 9 4 3 1 1 0 13 2 
Etimesgut L - 2 1 
Sincan (North) L 1 0 1 
Dikmen-OR-AN MH - 8 
The Same District L 31 15 71 28 95 37 197 28 
Unknown 36 18 22 9 11 4 69 10 
TOTAL 200 100 254 100 254 100 708 100 
SOURCE: Senyapili (1981) 
It is now time to turn to the state as it was more central to the urbanisation of the 
migrant population than the above remarks would imply. 
In the first place, the state 
Z71 
gradually became the single most important employer of the squatter workforce 
in 
4: ý I 
the city. Given the fact that Ankara as the capital was characterised 
by the dorriinance 
of the service sector, and most of these service sector 
jobs either in directly or 
this consumption pattern needs to be explained 
by reference to the hegemony of middle-class values 
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indirectly related to the state sector (See Table VIN), it is not surprising to find out 
that the state employed a considerable number of the squatter workforce. 
Table VI. V. Sectoral Distribution of the Economicallv Active Population in Major 
Cities, 1970 
Percentage Employed in 
Industry Services Other 
Istanbul 38.9 56.2 4.9 
Ankara 20.1 69.6 10.3 
Izmir 34.7 53.6 11.7 
Adana 31.7 45.9 22.4 
Bursa 40.4 41.1 18.5 
Gaziantep 29.3 48.3 20.4 
Eskisehir 30.9 53.3 15.6 
Source: Ankara Metropolitan Development Bureau Report 
According to another study, about 30 per cent of the workforce of the squatter areas 
were working directly for the state (See Table VI-VID. Roberts point to a similar 
situation in Latin American cities and asserts that this employment pattern has 
important repercussions on political organisation and activity: 
'In the 1960s and 1970s, we have seen how the state became a major employer In Latin America, 
particularly in the cities and particularly for non-manual workers. This state dependence 
did not 
prevent the formation of worker organisations but it is clear that it reduced their independence. 
Like 
the professional associations, they were being formed in the shadow of the state and, often, under its 
guidance' (Roberts 1995; 194) 
State control was not limited to public sector employees. It 
influenced the labour 
market and created some sort of dependence in the informal sector as well 
through a 
carrot and stick policy, as most of the activities taking place 
in the informal sector 
was not fitting into the legal frameworks, it required the 
implicit consent of the state. 
over the squatters. 
'164 
Table VI. VI. Sectoral Distribution 0 The Economically Active Population In 
Squatter District 
Number Of Household 17r, Skilled Labour 264 27.0 Unskilled Worker 114 11.5 Self Employed 169 17.0 
State Employee 146 14.5 
State Employee (Low Rank) 152 15.0 
Unemployed 35 3.5 
Agricultural 12 1.0 
Unknown 16 1.5 
Unanswered 92 9.0 
Total 1000 100 
Source: Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement 
In sum, in the living and workplace the squatter dwellers took their cue from the 
middle-class and the state and internalised their values. Yet, this inference should not 
lead to a conclusion that assumes a situation in which the squatter population was 
intentionally directed to a false consciousness and hence, middle-class hegemony 
continued without any serious challenge. I think both assumptions would be wrong in 0 
their basic premises. 
As far as the false-consciousness assumption is concerned, it can be challenged on Z: ) 
two grounds. Firstly, the perception of urban living and work environments by the In 
squatters as a ladder which was open to their access was not completely an illusion. 
The findings of different studies regarding the migrant population of the city point to 
the fact that the squatter dwellers improved their situation progressively in both work 11-1) 
and living place in timelo. Secondly, the squatter dwellers 
did not remain within the 
limits drawn by the state or middle-class in their expectations and demands. 
They 
progressively pressed the state to get further 
benefits and concessions which, in 
various occasions as will be shown below, created 
important tensions within and 
between the middle-class and the state. 
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The latter point brings us to the second argument which regards the middle-class 
hegemony in the city. It might be argued that as middle-class values became 
dominant among the squatter dwellers, the middle-class continued to be a hegemonic Z) 
force in the city. However, there axe good reasons to argue against this assumption. 
In the first place, if the two-city project of the middle-class during the first period 
became a one-city project progressively during the second period, this was forced by 
the squatters rather than giving voluntarily by the hegemonic bloc. As we saw above, 
in the 1940s, and 1950s, the two-city project was defended despite the massive 
population influx, only in the early 1960s, the inapplicability of a two-cities project 
was conceded and a progressive move started towards a one-city project which was 
characterised by a more inclusive strategy towards the squatters. 
Yet, this strategy was a conflict-ridden one in that it created important tensions 
between the dominant middle-classes and the squatters as well as within the 
hegemonic bloc itself and ended in a certain degree of radicalisation of the squatters 
and split in the hegemonic bloc towards the beginning of the 1970s. 
Vi. V. Towards a Radicai Agenda: the 1970s 
In Chapter IH we saw that there was a shift in the accumulation strategy towards Z") 
import-substitution industrialisation which was more inclusive than the accumulation 
strategy of the former period regarding the working classes. 
The introduction of the 
Inulti-party system also created the conditions of class-based politics. 
Although the 
I Cý 
10 See Senyapili (1981), Ersoy (1985). 
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RPP did not cut its ties with its initial premises, during the 1960s it started to shift 
towards the left progressively to find a social base for itself among the newly 
emerging working class. Again we saw in Chapter 111, this shift towards a class-based 
politics had broken the ties between the RPP and its traditional allies such the army 
by the early 1970s. In turn, especially starting from the late 1960s the alternative state 
and hegemonic projects created a more unstable political environment in the country 
due to the lack of single hegemonic project. 
Likewise, ensuring unity of the state became a major problem especially during the 
1970s. In the first place, the increasing importance of planning gave considerable 
autonomy to the technocrats and bureaucrats vis-a-vis the politicians, and created 
considerable tension between the legislative and executive bodies. Perhaps more 
importantly, the local governments, namely municipalities, became an important 
locus of power in their own right in the 1970s, and, in turn, the relationship between 
the central and local governments became tense and conflict-ridden. 
The local political scene of Ankara became one of the important arenas of these 
alternative projects and of the resulting instability. In the first place, the city 
continued to be a focal point of interest for the central government. 
Starting from the Z. ) 
rrud- 1960s, in line with the rising attractivity of planned 
development, the central 
government 
decided to form a Planning Bureau, which was later named the Ankara a 
Metropolitan Planning Bureau within the Ministry of Reconstruction and 
Resettlement. Its main objective was defined as the preparation of a comprehensiý,, e 
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plan for the city for the year 1990 (See Urban Development Strategy)". The Bureau 
was formally established in 1969 and through it, the central government aimed at 
controlling the development pattern of the city. 
While the political centre, which was controlled except for short intervals by the 
conservative right-wing coalitions from the mid-1960s until the end of this period, 
tried to remain in the driver's seat in the development of the city, as we saw in 
Chapter IV, there was a shift among the government of the large cities, including 
Ankara, towards a left-wing agenda. While the Marxist left was rising among the 
working class and especially among the youth, there was also a shift in the RPP 
towards the left and, as we saw in the preceding part of this chapter, this shift found 
its reflection in city politics in the form of a more positive attitude towards the 
squatters. In a gradual manner, as it can be seen in Table VI. VH, this shift was also 
reflected among the squatter dwellers and from the late 1960s the RPP started to gain 
support in squatter districts of the city, support which reached a peak in the local 
elections of 1973 and brought the RPP to the power at the municipal level. 
Under the motto of 'this order must change' the new city administration, under the 
charismatic mayorship of a well-known left-wing architect, Vedat Dalokay, reflected 
the main features of the neo-Kemalist project. While claiming the heritage of the 1--) 
Kernalist project of the first period, it was also recognising the inequalities and class 
11 The Bureau started to work on the preparation of a comprehensive development plan, before its 
formal establishment, in 1967. It developed alternative development plans 
for the city. In the proces, ';
the Bureau which became dominated by the left-wing technocrats, came into conflict with the central C 
government. The plan prepared by the Bureau could only 
be approved in 19821. A summary of these 
works can be found in * Urban Development Strategy, a Summary: 
Ankara 1970-1990'. 
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Table VI. VII. Party SUDDort by Type of Urban Community in Elections 
Percentage of Votes Cast 
Justice Party Republican People's Other Parties 
>art 
1965 1969 1973 1965 1969 1973 1965 1969 1973 
IINNLNNLNN1, 
isiant)ui 52.0 47.8 28.5 30.4 33.8 48.9 17 6 18 4 22 6 Gecekondus 62.4 53.8 26.7 19.1 21.8 47.5 . 18.5 . 24 4 . 25 8 Ankara 46.5 42.4 29.2 -30.2 36.0 44.8 23.3 . 11 0 
. 
26 0 Gecekondus 52.5 43.4 27.7 25.8 30.1 45.9 21.7 - . 26.5 . " 6.4 
Lower middle-class 48.7 47.1 32.4 31.8 32.5 41.9 19.5 20.4 25.7 
Middle-class 27.4 24.8 21.8 53.1 60.4 62.6 19.5 14.8 15.6 
Upper middle-class 26.8 25.8 24.9 54.1 60.1 57.2 19.1 14.1 17.9 
Izmir 62.1 53.2 40.9 29.8 35.1 44.6 8.0 11.7 14.5 Gecekondus 72.1 60.7 36.5 17.0 22.6 44.2 10.9 16.7 19.3 
Lower middle-class 73.4 61.3 41.9 17.4 25.7 44.1 9.2 13.0 14.0 
Middle-class 65.9 58.9 42.7 25.6 32.3 44.4 8.5 8.8 12.9 
Upper middle-class 54.1 46.8 37.8 36.5 43.9 50.4 9.4 9.3 11.8 
Source: Keles and Danielson 1985 
N: National Elections L: Local Elections 
divisions in the city. According to mayor Dalokay, the reason for the latter lay in the 
break with the Kernalist revolution: 
decision to make Ankara the capital of the country represents a revolution in its own right. The C, 
decision making centre of the country was taken away from an elite environment which was not 4-1 
capable of identifying and integrating itself with the rest of country and moved inland with concerns of 
integration and identification with the public. This move became a means and symbol of transition 
from a spatial organisation characterised by external dependence to a nation state which is internally 
integrated.... In today's Ankara, there is no sign of these successes. In a short period of time, 
speculation-oriented environments achieved prominence misdirecting this successful start' (Dalokay 
1973). 
While the blame was laid on the speculatively oriented groups and the social order 
supporting them, the local government level was defined as an alternative power Z-: ý 
centre which could stop this unfa-ir trend in favour of a more just city. But according I Zn 
to Mayor Dalokay, this change would require a new philosophy of local government C 
which would break away from the impartial mayor and apolitical municipality 
image: 
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'The municipalities are seen as the institutions responsible for the administrat, ion and planniniz of the lities are reduced to the collection of refuges and re city. 
Their responsibi II pairing the sewage svstern. They should not even be involved in the provision of electricity, school, health, transportation services 
in the city. They were seen as a technical institutions which serve the existing order and in this sense 
they are defined as the servant of the ruling classes. However, we would like to def-Ine the 
municipalities in a different light and want to add new missions to it. We would like to create a 
municipality which could be the voice of poor classes rather than the municipality of the ruling 
classes and like to give this city and services to them as a present... The previous municipality was 
provi i L, t-- 
service to the ruling classes, who run the dominant order, to strengthen them. The new 
municipality wants to contribute to the creation of a more just social order' (Dalokay 1977). 
In line with this understanding the municipality of Ankara started to implement new 
projects which aimed at creating a new understanding of municipal philosophy that 
challenged the dominant understanding of the 1960s. Under the leadership of the 
Ankara municipality a new understanding on local government became dominant 
and started to find reflection in other cities which were also controlled by the RPP: 
'An urban populism emerged that emphasised social justice, municipal autonomy and popular 
participation in local affairs. These ideas were the most fully developed in Ankara under Republican 
Mayor Vedat Dalokay who envisaged cities in which all strata participated in municipal governments 
dedicated to the equitable distribution of city services and were able to curb land speculation and 
claim the appreciation in land values for public purposes... Priority in the allocation of resources 
would be given squatter settlements and communal units would be oruanised to foster increased Cý Z-- 
popular participation in decision making' (Keles and Danielson 1985; 108). 
This new approach, which was going to be called later on as 'New Municipalism', Z. ) 
was not a part of a strategy Mayor Dalokay had before he took office. As one of the 
advisor to the municipality during this period put it, the municipality 
did not have a 
comprehensive strategy at the outset; the principals of this new approach emerged 
in 
the course of implementation (Tekeli 1992). 
If Ankara played a central role in the formation of a so-called 
'New 'i"viunicipalism 
Movement' it owed this partly to its newly emerging 
left-wing intellectuals who were 
employed by Mayor Dalokay In the newly established 
advisory board of the 
municipality. The advisory board worked closely with 
the mayor, and most of the 
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ideas, which guided the NMM in implementation originated from this advisory Cý 
12 board 
. 
In turn, towards the end of the first period in office, there was a municipal strategy 
that was shared by most of the other large city municipalities controlled by the RPP. 
These principles can be summed up in the following way: 
'New Municipalism' in general, favoured more direct and broader involvement of municipalities in the domain of production and management of collective means of consumption, more autonomy for local governments and their consolidation of especially financial aspect. These new considerations Cý 
were supported with social justice ideals' (Keskinok 1986; 140) 
The implementation of these principles was nothing less than a reversal of the state 
strategy in the urban field which had been dominant since the foundation of the 
republic. In terms of internal organisation, the new model was aiming at creating an 
administratively and financially autonomous local government in place of the 
existing understanding which saw local government as the local arm of the political 
centre. Likewise, in relation to forms of intervention, the new Municipalism was 
proposing massive involvement of the municipality in various areas of collective 
consumption by departing from the minimalist local-government model. Finally, 
regarding the forms of interest representation, the new understanding proposed a 
direct involvement of the urban poor and other working class groups in local politics. 
In line with this strategy, a concrete project began to emerge gradually. Among 0 
others, the most strategic one was the 'Akkondu Project' 
for the urban poor. This 
0 
was seen as an alternative to squatter housing. Briefly. according to the 
development 
12 When they were employed by Mayor Dalokay, most of the members of the advisory 
board had been 
victimised by the right-wing government of the period, either sacked 
or forced to resign from their 
CI ith radical 
jobs in public offices and universities. 
They were e ther affiliated with Marxism or w 
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plan proposed by the Planning Bureau formed within the Ministry of Reconstruction 
and Resettlement, the West corridor of the city was desianated as the development tý 
direction of the city. Following this lead, the municipality proposed to developing a Z 
new housing project in this area that would help to solve the housing problem of the 
urban poor by providing cheap housing. In line with the ideolocrical commitment of Z) 
the municipality to public ownership, most of the housing units were going to be in 
public ownership and would be rented to the urban poor by the municipality. 
According to the developers of this project: 
'the dependent nature of the capitalist development in Turkey on the world capitalist system, as in 
other less-developed countries, had led to the emergence of a dual social structure: one within this 
process and the other at the periphery of this process. The manifestation of this duality in the urban 
housing environment was in the forms of regular housing and squatter housing'. At the heart of this CP C1- 
problem lies the institution of private property rights. 'The proposed new built environment can only C 
go beyond previous experience by not allowing the private ownership of urban land. ' 13 
In this respect the main pillar of the Akkondu Project was the municipal ownership 
of the houses built by the municipality. 
Public transportation was also again a priority. In this case, the municipality placed 
an emphasis on the construction of an underground railroad as a mass transit system 
in the city. Like the Akkondu Project, priority was given to public as opposed to 
private forms of service provision. Besides, the idea of constructing certain parts of 
the underground system in Turkey was voiced against the complete construction 
duties and rewards being given to the foreign firms. gtý 
Kernalism. I think this point is important as this situation reflects the marriage of 
NlarxIsm and 
Kemalism during the 1970s in the local politics of Ankara. 
13 Study Report by Mayor's Advisory Committee, p. 143. 
2 7-2 
Another project was the establishment of control over the key everyday consumption 
items such as bread and dairy products which were vital for the urban poor. The 
municipality sought to gain control over the provision of these items, not only by 
regulating the market, but also by becoming direct producers. 
While the municipality initiated an intensive policy discussion regarding these areas, t) 
the controversial mayor, Dalokay, was also keen on smashing the dominant opinion 
of the impartial and apolitical municipality and mayor model. One of the radical 
actions taken by Mayor Dalokay was to cut off the water supply of the Spanish 
Embassy as a protest against the execution of five youths in Spain by the military 
dictatorship. In a short while, the city population got used to the radical actions of the 
Mayor such as sitting on hunger strike to protest against the financial strain imposed 
by the central government, or actions such as the confiscation of bread factories by 
the municipality after unwarranted price increases. 
Yet, the political centre controlled by the right-wing coalition during these years was 
not prepared to accept the newly emerging municipal strategy which challenged most 61n 
of the accepted principles of local government. Reactions were not limited to 
financial strain and obstruction and delay of the projects of the municipality which 
required the approval of the central government. More dramatically, the Ministry of 
the Interior removed Mayor Dalokay from office for being involved in political 
actions and ignoring his municipal responsibilities. Yet, this 
decision was nullified 
by the Council of the State and he returned to his office within a 
few days. 
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Ironically, what the conservative government failed to do was achieved by the 
political centre of the RPP. It would be a mistake to assume that the fact that the RPP 
became radical reflected the official line taken by the RPP's national leadership. 
Rather, the national leadership became increasingly disturbed by the radicalising 
agenda of its large-city mayors led by Mayor Dalokay. Their programmes were more 
of a socialist understanding rather than one of the left-of-centre RPP. In turn, most of 
the radical mayors were deselected with the active involvement of the national 
leadership. In the local elections of 1977, they were replaced by more moderate 
mayors who were close to the national leadership. The advisory board also resigned 
after the departure of Mayor Dalokay. 
Doubtlessly this intervention of the RPP headquarters was a blow to the emerging 
municipal radicalism, which was led by the Mayor of Ankara, Vedat Dalokay, but it 
did not bring the new Municipalism to an end completely in Ankara. Perhaps they 
were not as radical as the ones carried under the mayorship of Dalokay, but most of 
the policies continued to be applied by the new mayor of the city. 
The initiatives such as Akkondu and Underground projects were among those the 
new administration kept intact. 
The new mayor, Ali Dincer, took a more moderate stands vis-a-vis the central 
government. He tried not to antagonise the political centre which was controlled, 
except for a short interval, by the conservative coalition O'overnments 
for the sake of Cý 
securing that the central government co-operation 
for the realisation of the projects. 
4=1 4D 
During mayor Vedat Dalokay's administration, the approval of the projects was in 
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most cases delayed or refused by the central government. The Akkondu project was 
the main victim of the conflict between the central and local go-vernments as the 
central government did not co-operate in the compulsory purchase of the land 
necessary for the project. With a more moderate stand, new the mayor secured the 
help of the Ministry of Reconstruction for compulsory purchase. The project gained 
pace with the realisation of the compulsory purchase. 300 000 people were assumed 
to live at the area in the completion of the project (Batikent Policy Report 1979). The 
approval of the plan of the project, which is now called Bati Kent Project, was also 
secured without delay by the new mayor. Further, in order to avoid possible 
confrontation with the central government the municipality decided to stand down 
from being the leading force of the project. The responsibility of the project was 
transferred to a union of housing co-operatives constituted by trade unions, 
confederations and merchant associations, which was called as Kent-Koop. By doing 
this the mayor aimed to depoliticise the Bati- Kent project. The fast development 
and implementation proved the mayor's view. 
Yet, the Bati-Kent project turned to be radically different from the Ak-Kondu project 
of the previous mayor. it lost most of the initial objectives that challenged the 
dominant value system in the city. 
In Dalokay's initial scheme, most of the housing would be inexpensive rental units. But the blueprint 
developed by municipal and central officials shifted the emphasis to home ownership with only 
4500 
rental units out of the projected 60 000 dwellings ... 
However lofty Batikent objectives were with 92.5 
percent of the units for sale, most of the beneficiaries were bound to 
be middle-income families who 
could afford to purchase homes ... As in other 
housing programs. The rhetoric of providing alternatives 
for squatters faded before economic and political realities (Keles and 
Danielson 1985; 188). 
What the Bati-Kent experience showed in the first place was that there was a strong, Cý 
resistance to going outside the dominant understanding, which was exclusionary Cý' CI 
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towards the working class and urban poor. The Akkondu project, which was 
designed for these groups, did have a change to be realised only after it became a 
project for the middle class. The central government did not allow the municipality, 
along with the headquarters of the RPP, to develop projects which targeted the 
working class and urban poor. Even the new mayor who took a more moderate stand 
faced the obstruction of the central government whenever he intended to apply a 
policy which challenged existing values. For instance, when he wanted to develop 
the underground project popularised by the ex-mayor of the city, he met fierce 
opposition from the central government. 
The scheme proposed a rapid transit system with a 25-kilometer line. In order to 
reduce the cost, a negligible part of the line was underground and the cars were 
planned to be produced by the Turkish Railway Agency. The central government did 
not co-operate with the municipality. In return, the municipality began the 
construction of the metro by relying on its own resources. The central grovemment zn Zý 
responded by blocking the project. 
The initiatives of the municipality were not always a failure. It succeeded developing 
a public transportation system. By using the short interval in which the 
RPP was in 
power, the municipality purchased 200 buses for public transportation and persuaded 
the central govemment agencies to transfer their buses to the municipality to use in 
public transportation. Special bus lanes were also developed 
in the busy streets of 
Ankara. This scheme was a major challenge to the private or semi-private 
transportation system and it was successful at creating a public transportation system 
which was almost non-existent until then. 
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In sum, despite the fierce opposition of the central government, and some moderation 
in its policies, the new Municipalism. in Ankara made a mark in the local politics of 
Ankara. It challenged an understanding which saw the local government as the local 
an-n. of the political centre since the establishment of the Turkish republic. By 
departing from this local agency model, the RPP-led mayors and their teams, 
sometimes in conflict with their own party headquarters, aimed at becoming the 
voice of squatters and the urban poor. 
The new Municipalism movement was not an isolated case in terms of its radical 
stand. Rather, it was a part of rising radicalism in large cities starting from the late Cý 
1960s. There were radical mobilisations outside the RPP. Although their impact and 
support were still limited, Marxist parties were active among the working class. 
There were also revolutionary organisations finding support, especially from the 
second-generation squatter dwellers who were dissatisfied with the political system 
and the RPP 14 . They were 
different from the first-generation squatter dwellers in that 
they were looking for more radical transformations while their parents' radicalism 
did not go beyond the line represented by the RPP. These revolutionary organisations 
became increasingly active in many of the squatter neighbourhoods. 
They were 
organisino, land invasions, helping newcomers in erecting squatters and trying to rise n 
revolutionary consciousness among the squatter 
dwellers through seminars and 
educational programmes (Marcussen 1982,78). 
Towards the end of 1970s, many 
14 Unfortunately we do not have comprehensive case studies about this period covering these 
experiences. Marcussen provides two case studies 
but they are very brief and done just after the 
military intervention. The account provided 
here is based on mostly personal experience as I 11%, ed one 
of those neighbourhoods which was controlled 
by left wing groups. CC 
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neighbourhoods were declared 'liberated zones', that is, these areas were declared to 
be free from state intervention and in control of the revolutionarv organisation. wt 
This radical challenge was met with the reaction of radical and militant right wing 
groups supported by the right-wing crovernments of this period. The squatter areas 1ý 
become an intense and violent subject of confrontation between these groups ending C 4: ) 
on many occasions in blood shed 15 - Towards the end of 1970s, the city, like the other 
metropolitan cities, became an arena of political violence. Clashes between armed 
groups and killings were part of a daily life. 
The military intervened in the early hours of September 12 th , 1980 by justifying its 
act with the failure of the civil governments in preventing the terror in the country. 
Along with revolutionary parties and youth organisations, the RPP-led municipalities 
were held responsible for the anarchy and terror. Like many other mayors, the mayor 
of Ankara was sacked by the military govemment just after the coup. With the 
appointment of a retired colonel as the new mayor of the city, a period in the 
development of the city, which is marked by the urbanisation of labour power, came 
to an end. 
Ironically. almost no resistance came from the squatters to the military intervention 
which crushed most of the organisations active in squatter areas. Most of the squatter 
dwellers, like the other sections of the local population including the middle class, 
remained silent if they did not support the military intervention. 
This experience 
15 For instance, in one of the so-called liberated squatter districts, namely Pivangotepe, nine squatters 
dwellers were killed as a result of an armed attack by right wing-militants in a coffee house in 1978. 
178 
showed that the support for the left in the squatter areas was fragile and that, 
although the left dominated local politics in 1970s' Ankara, it did not become 
hegemonic. 
V1. V1. Conclusion 
We have seen that Ankara experienced a new round of urbanisation starting with the 
massive influx of rural -originated masses into the city. For this reason, I have argued 
that this period (1950-80) was characterised by the urbanisation of labour power, as 
the migrant population constituted the main bulk of the working-class population of 
the city. 
Their arrival led to a massive change in the social and spatial structure of the city. In 
a short space of time they outnumbered the existing population. While the social 
base in the city underwent such a dramatic change, the spatial dimension of this 
change was the mushrooming squatters at the outskirts of the city. Towards the end 
of the 1960s, more than half of the city population was living in squatters areas. 
Despite the dramatic change they caused in the social and spatial structures of the 
city, the migrant population was far away from becoming a major social 
force asking 
Z-: ý Cý 
for radical changes in the urban order in the early years of theIr arrival at the c1ty. 4 
They failed to go beyond immediate economic interests. C" 
They lacked a class unity-party because they were a very heterogeneous group as 
far 
Cý as the occupational structure was concerned. 
But, neither did they become housing 
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classes even if there was a material base for this kind of unity. One of the main 
reasons behind this failure was that for them the prime locus of urban consciousness 
was the (ethnic) community rather than the classes for some understandable reasons. 
In the lack of conscious leadership and organisational resources, they remained tied 
to ethnic relations for a long time as safety networks. 
The problems of the transformation of this social base into a (radical) social force 
can not be explained only with the internal characteristics of the migrant population. 
We saw that two major forces of local politics, namely the state and the middle 
class, had important roles in the relative passivity of the migrant population. 
The middle class constituted an important reference point for the squatter population 
especially regarding the living place. Despite the un-welcoming attitude of the 
middle classes in the early years of their a arrival, migrant groups took the middle- 
class lifestyle and consumption norms and its built environment as a model and ideal 
for themselves. The availability of social mobility kept this hope of the squatters as a 
realistic alternative for themselves and for their children. They also intemalised the 
way in which the middle class perceived the urban land, and it did not take them 
long 
to see the land they acquired in the city as a channel of accumulation. 
As a matter of 
fact, the small land ownership pattern of rural areas helped them immensely 
in this 
intemalisation process. 
It is in this context that the state gained prominence for the squatter 
dwellers. Even if 
4 
I the state did not welcome them into the city and did not provide 
them with housing 
C, 11ý and other services on their arrival, they 
felt still dependent on the state regarding 
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various issues, including the legalisation of their squatters through the provision of 
title deeds and basic services. In a short while a clientalistic relation was formed 
between the state and the squatter population. 
The relations of the squatter dwellers with the middle class and the state began to 
change starting from the early 1960s. In line with the changing political and 
economic climate, both the state and at least some sections of the middle class started 
to take a more positive attitude towards the squatters. The squatters, dwellers also 
shifted to the left wing parties in line with this large-scale change in the late 1960s. 
At the beginning of the 1970s, the new Municipalism movement emerged as a 
product of this changing political climate. Led by a group of MIddle-class 
intellectuals, they set their agenda at the local government level as being the 
representative of working people and the urban poor. They succeeded gaining the 
support of these groups and came to power in the early 1970s. The leadership cadres 
saw this mobilisation as an attempt at establishing a counter-hegemony in the local 
political life of the city. So did the conservative central government who was still 
controlled by right-wing parties and attempted to prevent the success of the so-called 
New Municipalism Movement. In turn, the state become an arena of alternative and 
conflicting projects. 
There was a similar mobilisation among the more radical groups in 
the city. While 
the RPP found support amono, the first generation of squatter 
dwellers, the 
L zD "n 
revolutionary groups found support among the squatter youth. 
Towards the end of 
n 
the 1970s, the squatters were the nest of revolutionary groups. 
In response to this 
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mobilisation and increasing unrest in the large cities, the army intervened in 
September 1980 and did not meet any resistance. The mayor of the city was sacked: 
the revolutionary movements which were active in squatter areas suddenly 
disappeared. Perhaps more importantly, the squatters themselves did not show any 
reaction at all to the military intervention which brought the projects of the left 
towards the city to an end. 
It is important to point to the fact that the mobilisation of the 1970s was not a 
bottom-up one. Rather, it was a left-wing, middle-class mobilisation as far as the 
leadership cadres were concerned. That is, it was a mobilisation from above aimed at 
representing (those who cannot represent themselves) the squatter dwellers. 
In a way, both the RPP-centred elite and other revolutionary groups saw themselves 
as some sort of organic intellectuals of the squatter dwellers. They wanted to inject 
consciousness into them from outside. Beyond any doubt the new Municipalism 
movement gained the support of the squatter dwellers in the local elections. In other 
words, the support that was given to the New Municipalism movement succeeded to 
get the electoral support of the squatter population. Yet, it hardly went beyond this 
point in the following years. The New Municipalism failed to become a movement Zý) 
which achieved an opening of channels of participation to its social base. Likewise, 
although the revolutionary movements were active in squatter areas, the 
first 
generation squatter dwellers took a cautious attitude towards them. 
The support 
C) 
given these groups remained limited to second generation squatter youth. 
Ironically, 
4n 
the RPP-led municipal movement and other revolutionary orcanisation that remained Cý 
failed to achieve the active participation of the urban poor. Furthermore, they 
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themselves were far away from providing unity within the left. While the RPP was 
troubled with its intemal problems, other radical organisations were highly divided 
and fragmented into different groups. 
It is too easy to put the blame on squatters in their failure to become a social force, 
and attribute the absence of radicalism among to them to false consciousness. It is 
also senseless to accuse the squatters for being too opportunistic. People develop 
their projects and strategies with reference to their experiences. As squatters arrived 
in the city, city politics was dominated by the middle class. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, the middle class itself was deeply indulged in speculative activities 
in the city by enjoying their access to the state. It was this value system the squatter 
dwellers borrowed from the middle class. In a similar way, the political parties 
approached them with favours in return for votes. Given these and the reality of r 
social mobility, it is too idealistic to expect a radicalisation of squatter dwellers. 
I do not certainly deny the role of intellectuals and organisations in the perception of 
these experiences and emphasised their role in this process throughout this thesis. 
Besides, the squatter people showed that they responded when they were offered 
acceptan'u-le choices. Their shift towards the left was the best evidence of this 
sensitivity in the early 1970s. Yet, the internal divisions and clashes within the 
left 
did prevent the development of an alternative hegemonic project which gained 
the 
active support of the working class and urban poor. 
Despite these divisions the left in general posed a treat to the urban order 
in the citN,. 
The military coup Of 1980 was partly a response to this. 
The coup did not only stop 
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the rise of the left but also opened a new period in the urban experience of Turkey. I 
called this new experience and round of urban'sation as the urban'satIon of capital. 
As I discussed in chapter 17V the cities became the arenas of capital accumulation. 
Ankara is one of these arena where five star hotels, huge shopping malls and 
skyscrapers started to invade the sky of the city. Some squatter areas became an 
arena of these processes through redevelopment plans. The apartment blocks 
replaced the squatters by providing the squatter owners with some gains. 
There is another face for this process. The city has become more and more polarised 
as a result of increasing income differences. Poverty has become more dramatic than 
before in the city. As the late 1960s and 1970 has shown, people learn from their 
interaction and experiences, and when the reality they confront changes, they change 
too, and act differently. The changing urban experience of the 1980s and especially 
1990s towards intensified exploitation and exclusion in general, and in urban space 
by capital, opened new possibilities for the working class and urban poor to develop 
a new form of radicalism, which might have led to the radical transformation of the 
urban space. 
Yet, this cannot be taken for granted. Without alternative projects and organisations 
which can articulate this progressively growing dismay and unrest among the 
working class and urban poor, it can lead into different directions. The support given 
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This thesis has had two interrelated objectives. The first was to apply the strategic 
relational approach which was developed in the field of state theory to overcome the 
long-discussed duality between agency and structure in urban studies. The second 
was to apply this approach to Ankara, the capital of Turkey. In what follows, I will 
evaluate the extent to which these objectives have been achieved. In doing so I will 
also show how our understanding of Ankara has changed as a result of this 
inter-vention, and will identify the implications of the thesis for theory in urban 
studies and point out areas for future research which this thesis has identified but not 
tackled. 
I have argued that in the field of state theory there is an unproductive duality between 
capital and class logic accounts and that we can get out of this impasse by applying a 
strategic relational approach originating in Gramsci's writings and later on fully 4: ) 
developed by Jessop. Since a similar impasse has existed in urban studies, I argued 
that the insights of the strategic relational approach can be applied in this field and 
provided a framework which conceptualises urban development and change in terms Cý 
of the strategies and projects of different actors without ignoring the contextual 
features of urban processes. Hence, I have treated urban space as an arena of 
conflicting pr jects and strategies with different time and space horizons. Some of C) 01 
them claim hegemony over the whole city and have a long-term perspective while 4- 
others fight for a limited hegemony or domination in a single part of the city. In the 4 
face of well-organised projects, some groups show very little resistance, but 4-D ltý 
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sometimes, wit limited resources, to fight against it to establish a counter 
hegemony. Without forgetting the structural context, which both limits and facilitates 
the success of different groups differentially, urban change is conceived as an 
outcome of the struggles for and against these projects and strategies. 
Such an approach is superior to the structuralist and/or capital loo-,, )ic approaches on 
the one hand, and to contingency and voluntaristic approaches on the other. It is 
superior to the structuralist approaches in that it does not reduce urban change to the 
effect of structural logic within which there is only one dominant logic, that of the 
dominant class. It is also superior to those contingency approaches which see urban 
space as an arena where anything is possible since there is no structural context at all. 
In this respect, the strategic relational approach shows a way out of the dualism 
between structuralism and voluntarism. 
hi the empirical part, I have applied this understanding, to the study of the Turkish b 
state and to the analysis of urban change in the case of Ankara. I have shown that the 
understanding of the Turkish state and society is trapped within similar unproductive 
dualism such as between the elite vs. masses or the state vs. civil society. In this 
respect, I argued for a strategic relational understanding of the 
Kemalist project 
which overcomes the duality between state and capital and conceives of political and 
economic levels as parts of an integral whole. In this sense, the 
Kemalist project is 
seen as a special entry into the project of capitalist modernity characterised 
by a 
degree of external imposition and selective import from above. 
In this sense the 
Kemalist project signified the nation state as the political forni, capitalist 
developmentalism as the economic form and Westernisation as the cultural 
form of 
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the same project of modemity. This approach then, overcomes the dualism created 
between the bureaucracy and the capitalist class. 
This approach has important implications for the analysis of the spatial form of this 
project, the main pillar of which is the formation of Ankara as the new state capital. 
Ankara did not simply become a symbol but also a vehicle throuorh which the 
Kemalist project established itself. Alongside its contribution to theory, I believe that 
the thesis has made important contributions to the study of urban processes in 
general and at a case-study level. 
In the first place, it has provided a theoretically informed account of urbanisation in 
Turkey. This is an important contribution in the sense that the field has long been 
characterised by an empiricism which led to a form of analysis that not only took one 
particular issue, such as squatters as isolated events and concentrated on their 
particular development without relating it to other events and processes. In the 
ausence of a theoretical framework, this easily led to a naive empiricism. As a step 
towards developing a viable theoretical framework, I developed a periodisation of 
the Turkish urban experience in Chapter IV. I showed that there were three 
distinctive periods in terms of this experience and that each was characterised by 
certain elements which gave a degree of unity. I also showed that each period Z: ) 
Zý represents a round of urbanisation which is followed by another one 
in the following 
period. Using the geological metaphor, I showed that there 
have been continuities 
and breaks between periods in terms of social and spatial structures. 
This is an 
important step forward to provide a macro-level 
framework for the study of urban 
processes in the city. 
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In line with this periodisation, Chapters V and VI focused upon two consecutive 
periods in the case study of Ankara-, which I characterised as the 'urban'sation of 
state' and 'urbanisation of labour power'. In these two chapters, the development of 
Ankara has been studied by taking the entire city as a unit of study. This is the first 
attempt in this field to focus on the socio-spatial development and change that 
Ankara underwent after becoming the capital of the Turkish republic. 
One of the main contributions of the thesis regarding the case of Ankara is to bring a 
new perspective by employing the strategic relational approach. The dominant 
literature has been characterised by the same empiricism mentioned above. Events 
such as the building process of Ankara, or squatter development have been taken as 
units of study in isolation with each other. By analysing the development of the city 
around a 'layer' model, this study has evaluated these developments within a 
relational framework. 
If there was a perspective in the mainstream literature to analyse these events in 
connection with each other it was a culturalist one in that the main conflict has been 
conceptualised as that between the modemising elite and the traditional native 
population for the first period. In the following periods this elite-mass confrontatIon 
has been seen as lying between the very same state elite and the squatter population 
which emerged as a result of the massive 
influx of population. As opposed to this 
culturalist framework, the point of 
departure of this thesis was to evaluate urban 
conflict by going beyond this simple 
dichotomy between 61ite and masses. By 
placing an emphasis on political economy categories 
such as use and exchange value. 
class and state formation, this study 
has demonstrated that cultural conflicts have 
288 
been only one dimension of the urban conflict and need to be articulated with other 
forms of conflicts. In this respect, the conception of urban change and conflict 
around alternative strategies and projects allows for an articulation of political, 
economic, cultural as well as spatial dimensions and this is another novel aspect of 
the thesis to the literature on urbanisation in Turkey. This became most obvious for 
instance in the study of dualism between the old and new towns of the first period. It 
has been shown that the conflict was not only based on cultural differences but also 
on economic interest, that is, the question of who would appropriate the rent in the 
rapidly growing city. 
Studying the city in terms of alternative projects and strategies aimed at establishing tn 
hegemony allowed us to see the points of interaction not only in terms of conflict and 
exclusion but also in terms of inclusion and integration. For instance, we have shown 
that the squatters' conception of urban conflict is not independent of rrUddle-class 
hegemony in the city and that it internalises many of the values of the latter. 
The theoretical approach of this study has also provided an opportunity to study 
urban actors and conflicts in terms, not only of what happened, 
but also of what 
possibilities were eliminated. It has been demonstrated that middle-class strategies, 
along with other reasons, created important impediments to the 
development of class 
consciousness among the working class population 
in squatter areas. This has been 
4: ý
an area ignored by the mainstream literature. 4-- 
In sum, the thesis has made a contribution in two areas. 
At the theoretical level it has 
developed a strategic relational perspective in urban studies and at 
the empirical level 
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it has applied this framework to the study of urbanisation in Turkey through a case 
study of Ankara. 
There are a number of issues identified in the thesis which are either partially tackled 
or not tackled at all. One of the issues which is important but which the thesis has 
partly elaborated is that of class formation and urban sPace. It has been shown that 
class formation and consciousness are not only subjects for historians or sociologists. Zý 
Class formation has considerable relevance to urban space. I evaluated this issue in 
relation to working class fonnation in the course of the second period but only 
considered it at a macro level. It became evident in the study that more micro-level 
research is required to reveal the intimate relationship between space and class 
formation. 
Another issue which requires further research is to apply this periodisation and 
theoretical framework to the study of other cities to test their validity. Equally further 
study is necessary to examine the last period, which is discussed in the periodisation 
but not tackled here since it exceeded the task set out for this thesis. The recent 
transformation of squatter areas into apartment blocks, mushrooming of skyscrapers, Z: ý
shopping malls, and five-star hotels, not only in Ankara but also 
in other large cities, 
the increasing individualisation of social life, and the poverty In the peripheral areas 
begs for further studies to reveal the logic of capital and its consequences 
for the 
cities. It is only by studying this logic, that it is possible to 
form an alternative project 
which can create an alternative logic to that of capital. 
The thesis provides a base for 
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